Anonymous v. Castagnola

• Citation: 210 A.D.3d 940,178 N.Y.S.3d 587
• Decision Date: 23 November 2022
• Docket Number: 2021–06810,Putnam County Index No. 501773/20
• Parties: ANONYMOUS, respondent, v. Joseph CASTAGNOLA, et al., appellants, et al., defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

210 A.D.3d 940

178 N.Y.S.3d 587

ANONYMOUS, respondent,

v.Joseph CASTAGNOLA, et al., appellants, et al., defendant.

2021–06810

Putnam County Index No. 501773/20

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—June 3, 2022

November 23, 2022

McGivney Kluger Clark & Intoccia, P.C., New York, NY (Gary J. Intoccia and Trish L. Wilson of counsel), for appellants.

Meagher & Meagher, P.C., White Plains, NY (Christina M. Killerlane and Christopher Meagher of counsel), for respondent.

VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the defendants Joseph Castagnola, Danielle Trippodo–Sullivan, Matthew Kraisky, Stephen Jambor, Valerie Henning–Piedmonte, Henrietta Lodge, Brewster Central School District, Brewster High School, and Brewster Central School District Board of Education appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Part CVA–R) (Steven M. Jaeger, J.), dated September 13, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of those defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first and third causes of action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In December 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Child Victims Act (hereinafter the CVA) (see CPLR 214–g ) against the defendants Joseph Castagnola, Danielle Trippodo–Sullivan, Matthew Kraisky, Stephen Jambor, Valerie Henning–Piedmonte, Henrietta Lodge, Brewster Central School District, Brewster High School, and Brewster Central School District Board of Education (hereinafter collectively the school defendants), and the defendant John Doe, asserting causes of action to recover damages resulting from alleged acts of sexual assault committed against the plaintiff beginning when she was 14 years old while attending Brewster High School. The acts of sexual assault were alleged to have been committed by Doe, a fellow student in the same grade as the plaintiff. The amended complaint alleged, in the first cause of action, negligence and gross negligence against the school defendants in failing to protect the plaintiff from the alleged acts of sexual assault, and, in the third cause of action, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against the school defendants. The school defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them, arguing, inter alia, that CPLR 214–g could not be used to revive the causes of action against them because Doe was an infant pursuant to Penal Law § 30.00 at the time the alleged acts of sexual abuse occurred and, therefore, could not have been held criminally liable for his conduct. In an order dated September 13, 2021, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied those branches of the school defendants' motion which were to dismiss the first and third causes of action. The school defendants appeal.

CPLR 214–g, enacted as part of the CVA, provides a revival window for civil claims or causes of action alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions that seek to recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article [130] of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, incest as defined in section 255.27, 255.26 or 255.25 of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, or the use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in section 263.05 of the penal law" ( CPLR 214–g ; see S.H. v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 A.D.3d 180, 184, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171 ). CPLR 214–g further provides that the affirmative defenses set forth in Penal Law §§ 130.30(1) and 130.45(1) based on the age of the defendant in relation to the victim shall apply in any such claim or action commenced pursuant to the statute, "in addition to any other defense and affirmative defense that may be available in accordance with law."

On this appeal, we are presented with an issue of first impression as to whether CPLR 214–g may be used to revive civil claims and causes of action asserted against a school district that are based on alleged acts of sexual assault committed by a minor who could not have been subjected to criminal liability at the time the alleged acts of sexual assault occurred. Resolution of this issue requires the Court to determine the meaning of the phrase "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in [Penal Law article 130]" as used in CPLR 214–g, and in particular, whether that phrase is limited to conduct that would subject the person who committed the acts of sexual assault to criminal liability. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that CPLR 214–g permits revival of the first and third causes of action against the school defendants.

The interpretation of the statutory language of CPLR 214–g presents a question of law for this Court to resolve de novo (see S.H. v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 A.D.3d at 185, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171 ). " ‘[S]pecial laws,’ such as CPLR 214–g, ‘that revive causes of action are extreme example[s] of legislative power and are narrowly construed’ " ( id. at 188, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171, quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 815 [E.D.N.Y.], affd 818 F.2d 145 [2d Cir.] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N.Y. 213, 135 N.E. 267 ). " ‘The primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ " ( People v. Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d 199, 203, 171 N.Y.S.3d 865, 191 N.E.3d 1136, quoting Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 ). "As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d at 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 ; see Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660, 827 N.Y.S.2d 88, 860 N.E.2d 705 ). "In construing statutes, it is a well-established rule that resort must be had to the natural signification of the words employed, and if they have a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add or take away from that meaning" ( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d at 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[C]ourts are not to legislate under the guise of interpretation" ( People v. Finnegan, 85 N.Y.2d 53, 58, 623 N.Y.S.2d 546, 647 N.E.2d 758 ). "If the wording of [a] statute has caused an unintended consequence, it is up to the legislature to correct it" ( People v. Golo, 26 N.Y.3d 358, 362, 23 N.Y.S.3d 110, 44 N.E.3d 185 ).

Here, we find that the plain meaning of the phrase "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in [Penal Law article 130]" as used in CPLR 214–g refers to the conduct described in the enumerated provisions of the Penal Law, and is not limited to those situations in which the conduct would subject the actor to criminal liability (see Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d at 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 ; Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208–209, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 359 N.E.2d 1338 ; S.H. v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 A.D.3d at 187, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171 ). To read the statute as limited to only that conduct for which the actor could be subject to criminal liability, we would have to interpret the language "constitute a sexual offense" to mean "establish a violation," which would require the Court to " ‘legislat[e] under the guise of interpretation’ " ( People v. Gross, 169 A.D.3d 159, 176, 93 N.Y.S.3d 50, quoting People v. Finnegan, 85 N.Y.2d at 58, 623 N.Y.S.2d 546, 647 N.E.2d 758 ).

The school defendants argue that the inclusion in CPLR 214–g of the affirmative defenses to criminal liability set forth in Penal Law §§ 130.30(1) and 130.45(1) based on the age of the defendant in relation to the victim demonstrates that the Legislature intended for the phrase "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense" to presuppose that criminal liability may be imposed for the conduct. This argument is unpersuasive. If the Legislature so intended, its inclusion of the affirmative defenses to criminal liability set forth Penal Law §§ 130.30(1) and 130.45(1) as a defense to this action would be superfluous (see Matter of Mestecky v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.3d 239, 243, 66 N.Y.S.3d 207, 88 N.E.3d 365 ).

Moreover, to the extent that the defense of infancy provided for by Penal Law § 30.00 may properly be used by Doe as a defense to this action pursuant to CPLR 214–g, this defense would be available for the benefit of Doe and not for the school defendants (see Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N.Y.201, 211 ; Robb v. Robb, 205 A.D.3d 493, 165 N.Y.S.3d 838 ). The causes of action the plaintiff seeks to revive against the school defendants are based upon...