Ansell v. Green Acres Contr. Co.,

Decision Date28 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-3251.,02-3251.
Citation347 F.3d 515
PartiesHarry B. ANSELL, Appellant v. GREEN ACRES CONTRACTING CO., INC.; Paul Humberston; Thomas Pisula; Douglas Schiff.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Gregory T. Kunkel [Argued], Kunkel & Fink, LLP, Pittsburgh, for Appellant.

Charles R. Volk, Jane Lewis Volk [Argued], The Volk Law Firm, Sewickley, for Appellees.

Before: RENDELL, SMITH and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

This employment discrimination case, arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., presents a question of admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of a subsequent good act offered by an employer to demonstrate non-discriminatory intent-namely, the employer's favorable treatment of another older worker. Plaintiff Harry Ansell, who was 45 years old, was terminated by his supervisor, Douglas Schiff, at Green Acres Contracting Company, Inc. ("Green Acres"). Several seasons later, Schiff hired an employee who was the same age as Ansell. Ansell argues that the evidence of this subsequent hiring is irrelevant to his employer's intent as a matter of law. He also argues that evidence of the subsequent act was admitted for an improper purpose and that its unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. Because we conclude that the evidence was relevant and admitted for a proper purpose, and because its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

Green Acres performs highway maintenance work on a seasonal basis. Harry Ansell worked as a laborer and truck driver for Green Acres during each season from 1993 until 1997. At the beginning of the 1997 season, Ansell was assigned to a five person crew led by a new foreman, Douglas Schiff. Ansell was permanently laid off in December of 1997.

Ansell filed suit in April of 1999 against Green Acres, Schiff, Green Acres' Vice President Paul Humberston, and Green Acres' President Thomas Pisula (collectively "defendants"), seeking damages for discharge in violation of the ADEA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq.1 According to Ansell's theory of the case, Schiff sought to increase his crew's productivity by replacing the older members of his crew with younger workers. At trial, Ansell introduced testimony establishing that Schiff permanently laid off two truck driver/laborers on his crew. In July of 1997 Schiff replaced Roger Myers, age 47, with Scott Miller, age 26, and in December of 1997, Schiff replaced Ansell with Harry Fabian, Jr., age 28. Schiff also hired an additional worker in his twenties, Keith Summers, in July 1997 around the same time he hired Scott Miller.

Defendants responded that Schiff had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Ansell and offered evidence of four incidents of insubordination involving Ansell. First, in late July of 1997, Ansell insisted that he should be assigned to drive the crew truck based on his seniority, and swore at Schiff when Schiff disagreed. Then in December, Ansell argued with a state inspector about a stop and go paddle used for traffic control, refused to attend a safety meeting, and took time off from work, without permission, to go hunting.

Defendants also presented evidence regarding Schiff's treatment of employees over the age of forty. Specifically, defendants presented the testimony of Anthony Beddingfield, who, at age 45, was hired by Green Acres in August of 1999 for a temporary laborer position and assigned to Schiff's crew. Beddingfield testified that he was asked by Schiff to stay on the crew permanently, and that he was still working for Schiff at the time of trial in 2002.

Ansell filed a motion in limine objecting to any testimony by Beddingfield concerning his hiring and treatment by Schiff.2 Ansell argued that this testimony was inadmissible "other acts" evidence, offered to show propensity under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Ansell further argued that Beddingfield's testimony was not relevant and was unfairly prejudicial. Defendants proffered that Beddingfield's testimony was admissible to show that Schiff lacked an intent to discriminate against older workers. The District Court denied Ansell's motion, declaring that Beddingfield's employment was probative of Schiff's intent and that it was admissible under Rule 404(b). The District Court noted that Ansell had introduced evidence of numerous people under age 40 hired by Green Acres after Ansell was fired, and stated that "if that's 404(b) evidence [of intent], so is this other witness."

The ADEA and PHRA claims were tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on July 18, 2002.3 Ansell appealed, challenging only the District Court's decision to admit the Beddingfield testimony under Rule 404(b). We have jurisdiction over Ansell's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4 We exercise plenary review over the District Court's interpretation of the rules of evidence; however, assuming that the evidence could be admissible in some circumstances, we review the District Court's decision to admit that evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir.2003). Admission of evidence is an abuse of discretion if "the district court's action was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.... We will not disturb a trial court's exercise of discretion unless no reasonable person would adopt the district court's view." Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted).

II.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states, in pertinent part:

Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident...

Rule 404(b) thus prohibits the admission of other acts evidence for the purpose of showing that an individual has a propensity or disposition to act in a particular manner. Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir.1992). Such evidence may, however, be admitted if offered for a proper purpose apart from showing that the individual is a person of a certain character. Id.

The typical Rule 404(b) case presents a prosecutor in a criminal case seeking to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of a defendant. If the purpose of the evidence is to show that the conduct charged was not performed inadvertently, accidentally, or without guilty knowledge and intent (that is, for one of the specific permissible uses outlined in Rule 404(b)), it is admissible. See, e.g., Givan, 320 F.3d at 460-62 (discussing admissibility of prior conviction for drug distribution to show knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake with respect to nature of drugs); United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 261-62 (3d Cir.2002) (discussing admissibility of prior bad acts to show knowledge with respect to drug conspiracy). If the evidence is presented for the improper purpose of showing a propensity to act in a certain way, it is inadmissible. The evidence admitted in this case differs from garden variety Rule 404(b) matter because it is evidence, not of a prior bad act in a criminal case, but of a subsequent good act in a civil case. Nonetheless, this evidence is encompassed by the plain text of Rule 404(b) which addresses "other ... acts," not just prior bad acts. See United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 645 (3d Cir.1988) ("[T]here may be cases in which evidence of subsequent... acts may properly be admitted under Rule 404(b) [to show knowledge or intent.]"); see also United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir.1998) ("The fact that the evidence involved a subsequent rather than prior act is of no moment."). Likewise, Rule 404(b) applies equally to civil, as well as criminal, cases. Fed.R.Evid. 404 advisory committee's note.

For other acts evidence to be admissible under the exceptions listed in Rule 404(b), (1) the evidence must have a proper purpose; (2) it must be relevant under Rule 401 and 402; (3) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) the court must charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). Ansell argues that the Beddingfield testimony fails the first three elements of this test, i.e., that the evidence was admitted for an improper purpose, that it is irrelevant, and that any probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice. We address each of these arguments in turn.

A.

To be admissible under Rule 404(b), other acts evidence must be offered for a proper purpose, i.e., a purpose other than showing that an individual has a propensity or disposition for certain activity. Pinney, 967 F.2d at 914. We have held that "a court must be able to articulate a way in which the tendered evidence logically tends to establish or refute a material fact in issue, and that chain of logic must include no link involving an inference that a bad person is disposed to do bad acts." Id. at 915; accord Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 191 (3d Cir.2000).

The District Court ruled that Beddingfield's testimony was offered to establish that Schiff did not have a discriminatory intent when he discharged Ansell, intent being an enumerated proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Ansell contends that Beddingfield's testimony was not evidence of intent, but rather was evidence of Schiff's good character or...

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