United States v. John-Baptiste
Decision Date | 19 February 2014 |
Docket Number | 12–2875.,12–2675,Nos. 12–2301,12–2354,s. 12–2301 |
Citation | 60 V.I. 904,747 F.3d 186 |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee/Cross–Appellant v. Bill JOHN–BAPTISTE, Francis Brooks, & Enid Edwards, Appellants/Cross–Appellees. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Sonja Ralston, (argued), United States Department of Justice Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Cross–Appellant.
Donnie M. King, (argued), George H. Hodge, Jr., (argued), St. Thomas, USVI, Allison B. Duffie, (argued), Entin & Della Fera, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellants/Cross–Appellees.
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge and SCIRICA, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
In this consolidated appeal, Francis Brooks, Enid Edwards, and Bill John–Baptiste challenge their convictions following trial before the District Court. All convictions stemmed from the defendants' alleged extortion, kidnapping, bribes, and drug trafficking while each served as law enforcement officers. Brooks and Edwards were employed with the Virgin Islands Police Department (“VIPD”), and John–Baptiste was employed by the Virgin Islands Port Authority (“VIPA”). Defendants challenge their convictions on various constitutional and evidentiary grounds. In addition, the government cross-appeals the District Court's judgment of acquittal on certain counts. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the District Court's judgment of acquittal as to counts 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 46, and affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to all other counts.
This case presents a sordid picture of “law enforcement officers” who sought to enrich themselves rather than protect the public by engaging in a protracted pattern of criminality that included extortion, drug dealing and kidnapping, all at the expense of the residents of the United States Virgin Islands.
In September 2010, a federal grand jury issued a 53–count superseding indictment against the defendants, and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, the prosecution introduced the following evidence as to particular charges in the superseding indictment.
1. Brooks and Edwards Distribute Six Pounds of Marijuana for Resale. (Counts 2 to 4)
Kelvin Moses testified that in 2005, Brooks and Edwards approached him in their police cruiser and sold him six pounds of marijuana for him to resell. Joint App. 643–46. Moses also testified that prior to this exchange, from 2000 to 2003 and from 2005 to 2007, he routinely paid money to Brooks and Edwards for information regarding other people who were cooperating with them.
2. Brooks and Edwards Impound a Truck and Extort Payment From The Owner. (Counts 5 to 12)
Kenneth Love testified that in 2007, Brooks and Edwards illegally impounded his truck. Edwards told Love that he would have to pay $1,200 to get his truck back, and further informed him that she had been “taking money ... from people” for 19 years. Joint App. 572–73. Love also testified that Brooks and Edwards eventually arranged for him to pay approximately $825 in cash to release the truck. Joint App. 603–04.
3. Brooks, Edwards and John–Baptiste Arrest a Taxi Driver and Hold Her in Custody Until her Boyfriend Pays for her Release. (Counts 24 to 33)
In April 2008, John–Baptiste arrested taxi driver, Yvese Calixte, for a parking violation. John–Baptiste proceeded to forcibly detain Calixte until VIPD officers arrived, handcuffed her, and placed her in a police car. John–Baptiste followed behind as the officers drove Calixte to a VIPD facility, and placed her in a holding cell where she remained for four to five hours. Joint App. 737–39. Calixte was eventually transferred to a downtown jail, where she was processed for booking. Id. at 743. Thereafter, John–Baptiste handcuffed Calixte and drove her to a shipping station, where they were met by Brooks, Edwards, and Calixte's boyfriend, Jossenel Morino. Calixte was finally released, but only after Morino paid $1,000 to Brooks and Edwards in exchange for her freedom.
4. Brooks Extorts Payment from Felon in Possession of a Firearm in Exchange for Not Arresting Him; Edwards and Brooks then Coerce Him into Selling Cocaine for Them (Counts 34 to 38 & 39 to 46)
John Lindquist, a convicted felon, testified that in 2009, Brooks approached him while Lindquist had a gun in his possession. In exchange for not arresting him, Brooks asked Lindquist for $2,000, which Lindquist paid over the course of the next month. Months later, Lindquist encountered Brooks again while carrying another gun. Lindquist testified that Brooks and Edwards gave him 4.5 ounces of crack cocaine to sell for them in exchange for not being arrested. After Lindquist sold the drugs, he paid Brooks $3,500 over the course of the following months.1
At the close of trial, the jury convicted Brooks and Edwards of: conspiracy under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO); conspiracy and extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) & (2); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distribution of and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); conspiracy, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 551; extortion, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 701 & 11; solicitation and receipt of a bribe, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 403 & 11; and conflict of interest, in violation of 3 V.I.C. §§ 1102(3) & 1108 and 14 V.I.C. § 11. The jury convicted John–Baptiste of kidnapping and false imprisonment, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 1051 & 11.
Following their convictions, defendants moved for judgments of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29, and for new trials pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The District Court granted defendants' Rule 29 motions as to counts 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 35, and 46. Thereafter, the District Court sentenced both Brooks and Edwards to 151 months' imprisonment to be followed by 3 years' supervised release. John–Baptiste was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. These appeals followed.
We have jurisdiction to review a district court's final order and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3731 & 3742.
Prior to trial, Brooks moved to dismiss the indictment because the government failed to identify the victims of each crime by name. According to Brooks, the indictment was invalid because it failed to provide him with sufficient information to prepare a defense, and to plead double jeopardy in case of future prosecution. Brooks renews this claim before us. This presents a legal question over which we have plenary review. United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir.2007).
The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for measuring the sufficiency of an indictment. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763–64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). Under this test, an indictment is sufficient when it (1) “contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet,” id. at 763, 82 S.Ct. 1038, and (2) allows him to “plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). We have recognized that “[a]n indictment must allege more than just the essential elements of the offense.” United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir.2007). However, “ ‘[n]o greater specificity than the statutory language is required so long as there is sufficient factual orientation’ to permit a defendant to prepare his defense and invoke double jeopardy.” United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280).
Brooks's argument is wholly grounded upon the second of the above-cited factors. He claims that he cannot assert a double jeopardy claim in the future because the indictment omits the names of the alleged victims. He correctly notes that the indictment only references dates and the nature of the statutory offense charged in each count and does not include the name of any of the alleged victims. For example, Brooks highlights count 25, charging racketeering extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2. That portion of the indictment states:
On or about April 2, 2008, at St. Thomas in the District of the Virgin Islands, ENID EDWARDS, FRANCIS BROOKS and BILL JOHN–BAPTISTE, while acting under color of official right as law enforcement officers of the Virgin Islands, did knowingly and intentionally affect commerce by extortion, and attempted to do so, and aided and abetted the same; namely, by unlawfully requiring an individual to pay money in order for the individual to recover a vehicle that had been towed pursuant to police directive authority.
Brooks App. at 36 (emphasis added).
The specificity required for an indictment to have “ ‘sufficient factual orientation’ to permit a defendant to prepare his defense and invoke double jeopardy,” is not particularly onerous. Huet, 665 F.3d at 595 (quoting United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280). We have found that a defendant has sufficient notice to guard against a future prosecution in violation of the protection against double jeopardy if an indictment specifies the time frame for the criminal conduct. See United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d at 596 ( ).
Although this indictment could easily have identified the alleged victims, it adequately specified the period in which the alleged crimes occurred, and...
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