Anthony v. Anthony

• Decision Date: 10 January 1898
• Citation: 29 S.E. 923,103 Ga. 250
• Parties: ANTHONY v. ANTHONY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

29 S.E. 923

103 Ga. 250

ANTHONY v. ANTHONY.

Supreme Court of Georgia

January 10, 1898

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a woman brought against her husband a libel for divorce on the ground of cruel treatment, and he filed against her a cross libel on the ground of adultery, and upon the trial the jury returned two verdicts, one finding in the libelant's favor a partial divorce, and the other finding in the respondent's favor a total divorce, held, that if two such verdicts could, under any circumstances, stand together, they ought to be set aside, and a new trial had when it affirmatively appears that under the evidence submitted pro and con these verdicts were absolutely inconsistent with each other, and manifestly based on diametrically conflicting opinions as to the credibility of the same witnesses.

Error from superior court, Fulton county; J. H. Lumpkin, Judge.

Libel by Mary L. Anthony against Joseph L. Anthony for divorce, and cross libel by Joseph L. Anthony against Mary L. Anthony. From a judgment on a verdict in favor of Joseph L. Anthony on the cross libel, Mary L. Anthony brings error. Judgment reversed.

Anderson Felder & Davis, for plaintiff in error.

Goodwin & Westmoreland, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN P.J.

Mrs Mary L. Anthony brought against her husband, Joseph L Anthony, a libel for divorce on two grounds. One of them was a cruel treatment. The other, in view of the record, requires no notice at our hands. The alleged cruelty consisted in the respondent's accusing the libelant of having communicated to him a venereal disease, and in threatening to sue her for a divorce upon that ground. Anthony filed a cross libel, in which he prayed for a divorce on the ground of adultery. The case coming on for a trial, the jury returned two separate and distinct verdicts, which were as follows: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and against the defendant a partial divorce; that is to say, a divorce a mensa et thoro." "We, the jury, find for the defendant a total divorce, and against the plaintiff. We find that sufficient proofs have been submitted to our consideration to authorize a total divorce,--that is to say, a divorce a vinculo matrimonii,--upon legal principles, between the parties in this case." We are not now called upon to decide whether two such verdicts could, under any circumstances, stand together; for, upon a careful examination of all the evidence submitted pro and con...