Anthony A. v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20499
• Citation: 260 A.3d 1199,339 Conn. 290
• Parties: ANTHONY A. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

339 Conn. 290

260 A.3d 1199

ANTHONY A.

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION^*

SC 20499

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 10, 2020

Officially released June 17, 2021^**

Vishal K. Garg, West Hartford, for the appellant (petitioner).

Zenobia G. Graham-Days, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (respondent).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

KELLER, J.

In Anthony A. v. Commissioner of Correction , 326 Conn. 668, 166 A.3d 614 (2017) ( Anthony A. II ), this court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, which concluded that the petitioner, Anthony A., had a protected liberty interest in not being incorrectly classified by the Department of Correction (department) as a sex offender for purposes of determining the petitioner's housing, security and treatment needs within the department.¹ Id., at 674, 166 A.3d 614. Because the due process clause prohibits the government from depriving a person of any such interest except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures, the case was remanded to the habeas court for a determination of whether the department had afforded the petitioner the process he was due prior to assigning him the challenged classification. Id., at 686, 166 A.3d 614. Presently before us is the petitioner's appeal² from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the habeas court incorrectly determined that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, did not violate his right to procedural due process in classifying him as a sex offender.³ The petitioner also claims that the habeas court incorrectly determined that the challenged classification did not violate his right to substantive due process or his right not to be "punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law," under article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution. We conclude that the petitioner was not afforded the procedural protections he was due prior to being classified as a sex offender and, therefore, that his classification violated his right to procedural due process under both the federal constitution and article first, § 9, of our state constitution.⁴ We reject the petitioner's substantive due process claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The petitioner was arrested and charged with several offenses, including sexual assault in a spousal relationship pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a-70b, in connection with an incident that occurred on the evening of July 18 and the early morning hours of July 19, 2011, at the home of the petitioner's former wife, M. According to a police report, M informed the police that, on the night in question, she and the petitioner had been drinking and "smoking ‘crack’ " cocaine, which caused the petitioner to become paranoid and to act in a delusional manner. Believing that another person was in the house, the petitioner began searching for that person under the bed, in closets, and in the hallway outside the bedroom.

After repeatedly accusing M of having an affair, the petitioner "made her take off her clothing and [lie] on her back," whereupon he digitally penetrated her vagina and anus looking for " ‘used condoms.’ " Later, the petitioner became suspicious that another man had been using his video game system "and stuck [his] fingers inside [M's] vagina and anus again." When the petitioner continued to accuse her of having an affair, M, out of annoyance, lied to the petitioner that, in fact, she was having an affair with one of his friends, which caused the petitioner to become violent and to pour soda on M.

M informed the police that, following the soda incident, she went downstairs to shower and to get away from the petitioner. While she was showering, the petitioner entered the bathroom and threw cat litter, milk, flour and paint on her. He also slammed the shower door repeatedly in an apparent effort to "smash it." The petitioner then forced M back into the bedroom and onto the bed. When M attempted to get out of the bed, the petitioner restrained her and punched her in the face. M was able to summon the police when the petitioner left to use the bathroom. According to the responding officers, the house was in "shambles" when they arrived on the scene, with damage, "including but not limited to ... broken doors, smashed glass windows, and red liquid splattered on [the] floor later identified as paint." The officers also observed bruising on M's arms and above her right eye. While being transported to a hospital, M informed the paramedics that the petitioner had sexually assaulted her, a claim she repeated to police officers when they interviewed her a short time later.

In the petitioner's statement to the police, he admitted to " ‘getting high’ " on cocaine and to questioning M about whether she was having an affair. The petitioner also stated that, throughout the night, as he lay in bed next to M, he touched the inside and outside of her vagina despite her saying " ‘no’ " and that she was not in the mood, pushing his fingers away, and clenching her legs. The petitioner stated that, when M said "no," he would stop for a while before trying again, which happened "several times" throughout the night, and that, at one point, M "got [so] tired of him putting his fingers in her vagina [that] she ... threw her phone at him." The petitioner stated that "he then took [the] phone and snapped it in half."

M subsequently recanted her statement to the police. In a notarized letter dated August 17, 2011, she stated that she "[did] not wish to pursue any ... charges against [the petitioner]," that "the police report [concerning the night in question was] inaccurate" and that the petitioner "never sexually assaulted [her]." M explained that she and the petitioner "are very sexually active and [that] any marks [on her body that evening] came from [their] sexual activity ...." M further stated that her "face was injured when [she] came out of the shower and slipped on the wet floor," and that the petitioner "was not present" when she fell and "at no time tried to harm [her]." She concluded by asserting that "from the day [she] met [the petitioner] he [has] NEVER EVER [been] violent" and "has never laid a hand on [her] in any way." (Emphasis in original.)

On February 21, 2012, the prosecutor informed the trial court that she had met with M, who informed her that "she was abusing substances" on the night in question, that she no longer recalled her conversation with the police, and that she "now believes that something different happened [from the sexual assault that] was alleged to have happened ...." The prosecutor informed the court that M also stated that, "when she sobered up, she saw [that] what really happened ... was not [that the petitioner had] sexually assault[ed] her," that, "when she ... slipped and hit her head [in the bathroom] ... she had a seizure and sometimes ... seizures make her believe things that are not actually true," and that she "has no memory of whatever she told the police, but [now] believes it to be ... incorrect." Accordingly, the state entered a nolle prosequi on the charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship. Anthony A. v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 326 Conn. at 671, 166 A.3d 614. The petitioner thereafter pleaded guilty to unlawful restraint in the first degree, failure to appear, and violation of probation, for which he was sentenced to an effective term of three years and six months of incarceration. Anthony A. v. Commissioner of Correction , 159 Conn. App. 226, 229, 122 A.3d 730 (2015) ( Anthony A. I ), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 668, 166 A.3d 614 (2017).

Upon his incarceration, the petitioner was classified pursuant to the department's administrative directive 9.2, which requires that "[e]ach inmate under the custody of the [respondent] ... be classified to the most appropriate assignment for security and treatment needs to promote effective population management and preparation for release from confinement and supervision." Conn. Dept. of Correction, Administrative Directive 9.2 (1) (effective July 1, 2006) (Administrative Directive 9.2). An inmate's classification is based on the individual risk and needs of the inmate, which are determined by an assessment of seven risk factors and seven needs factors. Administrative Directive 9.2 (8) (A) and (B). For each factor, an inmate is assigned a score of 1 to 5, with 1 representing the lowest score and 5 representing the highest score. Administrative Directive 9.2 (6). Among the seven needs factors, inmates are assessed for their sex treatment need (STN). Administrative Directive 9.2 (8) (B) (6). An inmate's risk and needs level is used to determine "appropriate confinement location, treatment, programs, and employment assignment whether in a facility or the community." Administrative Directive 9.2 (3) (A). Inmates are further provided an "overall classification assessment score" of 1 to 5 that corresponds to the highest rating assigned to any of the seven risk factors. Administrative Directive 9.2 (6) and (8) (C). "No inmate with [an STN] score of 2 or greater [may] be assigned an overall score below level 3 without authorization from the [respondent] or designee." Administrative Directive 9.2 (8) (C).

The department's Objective Classification Manual (manual) details the process for assigning an STN score. The manual provides that an inmate's STN score indicates whether they have "a record or known history of problem sexual behavior." Conn. Dept. of Correction, Objective Classification Manual § III (D) (6), p. 35 (2012) (Classification Manual). The manual further provides that, in assigning an STN score, the department may rely on "information acquired through [c]o...