Anthony v. State
| Decision Date | 03 January 1899 |
| Citation | 55 P. 884,6 Idaho 383 |
| Parties | STATE v. ANTHONY |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
RAPE-INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-Where improper and prejudicial evidence is introduced by the state, a judgment against the defendant must be set aside, and the cause remanded.
SAME-SUBSTANTIAL CONFLICT IN EVIDENCE.-Where there is a substantial conflict in the material evidence, and there has been improper and prejudicial evidence introduced by the state, this court will not undertake to determine whether the conflicting evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT.-Under the provisions of section 6082 of the Revised Statutes, after the examination of a witness has been concluded, on both sides, the witness may be recalled by leave of court, for further examination.
IMPEACHMENT.-Under the facts of this case, it was error to compel the defendant to answer questions concerning an alleged attempt to debauch a child, which matter was not connected in the remotest degree with the crime for which the defendant was being tried.
SAME.-The credibility of a witness may be impeached by proof that he has made statements relevant to the issues out of court contrary to what he has testified to on the trial.
SAME.-Under the provisions of section 6082 of the Revised Statutes, a witness may be impeached: 1. By contradictory evidence; 2. By evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad; but cannot be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment that the witness has been convicted of a felony.
INSTRUCTIONS-REASONABLE DOUBT.-It was not error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury, that however slight the "reasonable doubt" might be if fairly based on the evidence, the defendant must be acquitted.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from District Court, Cassia County.
Reversed and remanded.
Hawley & Puckett, for Appellant.
It is the universal rule that where the defendant denies the act the alleged injured party must be corroborated. (Matthews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 27 N.W. 234; Gazley v. State, 17 Tex. App. 267; People v. Tierney, 67 Cal. 54, 7 P. 37; State v. Cook, 65 Iowa 560, 22 N.W. 675; Carney v. State, 118 Ind. 525, 21 N.E. 48.) Rebutting evidence has been defined by the supreme court of Idaho as that "which is given to explain, repel, counteract or disprove testimony or facts given in evidence by the adverse party. (People v. Page, 1 Idaho 189.) The rule is well settled that in rebuttal in criminal cases the prosecution is restricted to evidence controverting the facts proven by the defendant. (3 Rice on Evidence, 326 et seq., and authorities cited; Ford v. Niles, 1 Hill, 301.) Evidence of other crimes will not be admitted upon the trial of a defendant upon a criminal charge. (3 Rice on Evidence, 207, 208; State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 24 Am. Rep. 69, and authorities cited; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54; Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. St. 60, 13 Am. Rep. 649; People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 1 Am. St. Rep. 858, 14 N.E. 319; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 1 Allen, 541; People v. Fultz, 109 Cal. 258, 41 P. 1040.) When several felonies are connected together, so as to form one entire transaction, the one is evidence to show the character of the other. (Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, 86; 3 Rice on Evidence, 208, and authorities cited; People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, 34 P. 856.) But it is never competent in a criminal trial to show that defendant was guilty of an independent crime not connected with or leading up to the crime for which he is on trial, except for the purpose of showing motive, interest or guilty knowledge. (3 Rice on Evidence, 209; People v. Greenwall, 108 N.Y. 301, 2 Am. St. Rep. 415, 15 N.E. 404; People v. Walters, 98 Cal. 138, 32 P. 864.) And wherever there is doubt as to the admissibility of the evidence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant, as such evidence, from its very nature, is prejudicial in its character. (3 Rice on Evidence, 209; Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. St. 60, 13 Am. Rep. 649.) But the prosecution cannot show in evidence the commission of other offenses for the purpose of increasing the likelihood of his having committed the particular crime charged. (People v. Jones, 31 Cal. 565; People v. Hartman, 62 Cal. 562; People v. McNutt, 54 Cal. 116; People v. Scott, 74 Cal. 94, 15 P. 384; People v. Jones, 32 Cal. 80; People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 P. 45; Roper v. Territory, 7 N. Mex. 255, 33 P. 1014; State v. Bonsor, 49 Kan. 758, 31 P. 736; Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. St. 60, 13 Am. Rep. 649; Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 129, 16 Am. St. Rep. 283, 21 N.E. 821; State v. Sterrett, 71 Iowa 386, 32 N.W. 387.) Guilt cannot be shown nor can the weight of evidence be increased by showing that defendant has committed other offenses. (People v. Tucker, 104 Cal. 440, 38 P. 195; People v. Smith, 106 Cal. 73, 39 P. 40.)
R. E. McFarland, Attorney General, and E. J. Dockery, for the State.
For the purposes of this case, it may be admitted that corroborating evidence is necessary to convict, for we have here very complete and the strongest kind of corroborating evidence of guilt, and the cases cited by appellant in support of that rule need not be here examined or questioned, although authorities are numerous where convictions have been sustained which were founded on the uncorroborated evidence of a girl below ten years. (Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, 968, subd. 2; State v. Lattin, 29 Conn. 389; Anonymous, 1 Russell on Crimes, 3d Eng. ed., 696, and note.) The extent to which cross-examination may be carried is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court. (Jones on Evidence, 837, 842, and cases cited in note 18; Lewis v. Steiger, 68 Cal. 200, 8 P. 884; Davis v. Roby, 64 Me. 427; State v. Roberts, 81 N.C. 65; Ballard v. Lambert, 40 Ala. 204; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 462; 2 Taylor on Evidence, sec. 1451.) If charge is adultery, the accused may be asked if he has not committed the offense with the person named in the indictment at other times. (Jones on Evidence, sec. 845; Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 346.) Where the action was for indecent assault counsel were allowed to ask the defendant whether he had before been arrested for a similar offense and whether he had paid money in settlement of such former charge. (Jones on Evidence, sec. 842; Leland v. Kauth, 47 Mich. 508, 11 N.W. 292; State v. Martin, 124 Mo. 514, 28 S.W. 12.) In various later decisions the wholesome rule has been adopted that a witness may be questioned specially on any vicious or criminal act of his life, and compelled to answer unless he claims his privilege. (People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 34 N.E. 730; State v. Hack, 118 Mo. 92, 23 S.W. 1089; State v. Pratt, 121 Mo. 566, 26 S.W. 556; Carrol v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 431, 40 Am. St. Rep. 786, 24 S.W. 100; People v. Harrison, 93 Mich. 594, 53 N.W. 725; Roberts v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 499, 22 S.W. 845.) It is a general rule that when a party becomes a witness the same rules of cross-examination apply to him as to other witness. (Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal. 89; Howland v. Jenks, 7 Wis. 57; State v. Merriman, 34 S.C. 16, 12 S.E. 619.) And even greater liberty in such cases may be allowed in cross-examination on matters not mentioned in direct examination. (Knapp v. Schuerder, 24 Wis. 70; Morris v. Cargill, 57 Wis. 251, 15 N. W., 148; State v. Bulla, 89 Mo. 595, 1 S.W. 764; Este v. Wilshire, 44 Ohio St. 636, 10 N.E. 677; Commonwealth v. Price, 10 Gray, 472, 71 Am. Dec. 668, and note; Sharp v. Hoffman, 79 Cal. 404, 21 P. 846; State v. Ober, 52 N.H. 459, 13 Am. Rep. 88; Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 346; Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 40 N.E. 189; Raines v. State, 88 Ala. 91, 7 So. 315; Peck v. State, 86 Tenn. 259, 6 S.W. 389; Connors v. People, 50 N.Y. 240.) A prior purpose to ravish the same woman, or perhaps any other, as indicated by threats or other evidence, may be shown. (Wood v. State, 28 Tex. App. 61, 12 S.W. 405; Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204, 16 Am. St. Rep. 48, 7 So. 38; Massey v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 371, 20 S.W. 758; Sharp v. State, 15 Tex. App. 171.)
The defendant was convicted of the crime of rape, alleged to have been committed upon a girl ten years of age, and sentenced to a term of twenty-five years' imprisonment. This appeal is from the judgment and the order overruling a motion for a new trial. The errors assigned go to the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, and in compelling the defendant to testify in regard to an alleged criminal assault on a young girl by name of Marshall, alleged to have occurred in 1895, and in allowing witness Alfred Marshall to testify in regard to said alleged criminal assault.
As to the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict: We have made a careful examination of the evidence, and no good can result from an analysis of it here. Had the jury found the defendant guilty upon the legal evidence found in the transcript, this court would not be inclined to disturb the verdict; but as improper evidence was introduced, over the objection of the defendant, we are unable to determine what the verdict of the jury would have been if the improper evidence had not been introduced. Whether the legal evidence introduced on the trial was sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt is a question, in the first instance at least, for the jury, as there is a material conflict therein.
At the conclusion of the evidence for the defense, and...
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