The People v. Page

• Decision Date: 01 January 1868
• Citation: 1 Idaho 189
• Parties: The People, Respondents, v. John C. Page, Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

1 Idaho 189

The People, Respondents, v. John C. Page, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 1, 1868

EVIDENCE-REBUTTING EVIDENCE.-Rebutting evidence is that which is given to explain, repel, counteract or disprove testimony or facts given in evidence by the adverse party. It is a general rule that anything may be given as rebutting evidence, which is a direct reply to that introduced by the other side.

COUNTERFEIT GOLDDUST-UTTERING OR ATTEMPTING TO UTTER.-The crime of uttering or attempting to utter counterfeit golddust consists in the possession of a counterfeit or spurious article knowing it to be such, and passing it, or attempting to pass it, with intent to defraud.

INSTRUCTIONS-INTENT TO DEFRAUD.-It was correct to instruct the jury that if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had and passed, or attempted to pass, a debased or counterfeit article of golddust, knowing its spurious character, the conclusion necessarily followed that he intended to defraud.

DEBASING GOLDDUST.-No definite amount or proportion or relative difference in the actual value of genuine golddust and that which is counterfeit is required. It is sufficient that it be debased, and that the party uttering it is cognizant of the fact, and passes it for a genuine article.

PRESUMPTION-CRIMINAL LAW.-The general rule in criminal cases is that every person is supposed to contemplate the result, and know the nature of his acts, so that when the acts which constitute the crime are established, the guilt is presumed. Guilty purpose is presumed from the commission of an unlawful or forbidden act.

APPEAL from the Second Judicial District, Boise County.

The following are the instructions given to the jury by the court below:

"In this case, the prosecution must prove, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the defendant had in his possession an article of counterfeit or spurious golddust; that he had it with intent to pass the same for a genuine article; that, if he tried to pass it on one Stewart, he was aware of its true character; that the attempt or act of passing it, if committed, was made or done in this county and territory. The law presumes, where the facts of the spurious character are established, and the passing or attempt to pass is made out conclusively, that the defendant knew its spurious character and the passing or attempting to pass is conclusive evidence of the intent to defraud.

"Other evidence of the guilty knowledge and the intent to defraud may also be introduced by the prosecution, by showing that the defendant passed the same quality or any other quality of adulterated or spurious golddust upon other parties or at other times. Such proof strengthens the conclusion of guilty knowledge in the particular instance when the indictment alleges the offense was committed. It is not neces-

sary the prosecution should prove in addition to the facts that the defendant had the spurious or counterfeit dust in his possession, and the passing of it, that he knew its real character, by affirmative testimony. It is sufficient proof of his knowledge that it is shown to be a nongenuine article, and that being such he attempted to pass it.

"If the jury believe that he had such an article in his possession and passed it on the prosecuting witness, or attempted to pass it, that it was done in this county and territory, then the case of the prosecution is made out, and on all of these points the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt which may arise in the minds of the jury as to his guilt. And if the jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these facts are true, then the doctrine of reasonable doubt does not apply to any other part of the case. The law then presumes his guilt, unless the defendant establishes his innocence by a preponderance of testimony in his favor. Such is the rule in offenses of this character.

"A man who is a worker in these metals may show that he had the article in question, not to use or pass off as currency, but for some other or innocent purpose. A jeweler may use it in his trade; a chemist may experiment in his profession, and an innocent person may show his innocence of guilt by any proof that shows the jury that his possession of the spurious article and his use of it were for legitimate purposes. But unless he shall show such to be the fact by a preponderance of the testimony he is not entitled to an acquittal, if the facts I have laid down are first established.

"As to the character of the golddust in question, the jury must be satisfied that it is not genuine golddust; that it is not the article which it purports to be. I do not mean by this that it shall be pure gold, but it shall be as pure of other metals as golddust of like appearance. It should not carry a false face. And false appearance or false representation of its value, if the said fact is known to the possessor, is evidence of his guilty purpose in passing it, if passed as genuine.

"Representations by the defendant of its being good golddust need not be in words. It is a false representation of its

character if he permits the man to whom he passes it to take it at a fictitious value, knowing that it is calculated to deceive him. And in this case if the jury believe that the dust in question was offered to the prosecuting witness, Stewart, to pay debt payable in golddust, and it was not equal to what it imported to be, in value, then the defendant must show that he was ignorant of its debased character. And it does not matter that it was debased in value by being mixed with silver unless the defendant show that he was ignorant of its being so mixed.

"This ignorance would be shown if the defendant could establish that the dust in question was in its natural condition; that it was taken from the ground in that condition. This would form a strong presumption of the defendant's want of knowledge of its base character. Yet if a party should undertake to pass for good golddust an article debased by silver, by artificial means, knowing it to be below the usual standard value of gold of like appearance and with intent to take advantage of the fact, to defraud the person to whom he passes it, he would be guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. If, therefore, the dust passed in this case is shown to have been mixed or adulterated with silver by artificial means, it is a fact which the defendant should explain to the satisfaction of the jury, showing his innocence, and the absence of such explanation would leave the guilt of the transaction proven. The attempt was made to show that the defendant had the tools and means in his possession to manufacture counterfeit dust. Possession of such means is a circumstance to be considered with his explanation of the use for which he had them. If the jury believe that an assay office on a quartz ledge is not unusual, or that if it was, that it was there used for honest and legitimate purposes, then that fact is sufficiently explained. Of this you may judge.

"The defendant has, by the statute of this territory, a right to testify in his own behalf, and his explanation of the transactions referred to in the testimony are to be considered by the jury, and such credit given to them as they deem them worthy of. The interest which a party accused of crime has

in the event is a strong temptation to him to state such facts only as will exculpate him. But the credibility of the witness is a question wholly with the jury. They may believe or reject it as in their opinion the truth requires."

The jury returned a verdict of guilty, whereupon the defendant was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment at hard labor in the territorial prison. The other facts material to the case appear in the opinion of the court.

Samuel A. Merritt, for the Appellant, assigned as error the charge of the court to the jury and cited, Statutes of 1864, sec. 89, crimes and punishment act; 3 Greenl. Ev., sec. 111, 111a; 2 Archb. Crim. Pr. and Pl. 917; 1 Greenl., sec. 14, latter part. Permitting the prosecution to call Koenisberger after the defendant had rested: 2 Bouv. Dict., title Rebutting. J. J. May, District Attorney for Second District, for the People.

CUMMINS, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court,

McBRIDE C. J., and KELLY, J., concurring.

The defendant was indicted under the eighty-ninth section of the act concerning crimes and punishments, for having in his possession counterfeit golddust with intent to pass the same for the purpose of defrauding one Sam Stewart, knowing such dust to be counterfeit. A trial and conviction was had, whereupon the defendant moved in arrest of judgment certain objections to the grand jury who found and presented the indictment, which motion being denied, a motion for a new trial was then made, which being also denied, an appeal is brought to this court.

The errors assigned, in the order I will proceed to discuss them, were: 1. In permitting the prosecution to call one Koenisberger as a witness after the defendant had rested his case; and, 2. The instructions of the court to the jury at the trial.

From the bill of exceptions it appears that under the direction of the court, one Cavalli, an assayer, made assays of three distinct parcels of what purported to be golddust. coming from the hands of the prisoner, one lot passed by him on

the prosecuting witness, Sam Stewart, another on one John Clarrisy, and the third found on his person at the time of his arrest, which assays Cavalli reported to the court. A few questions only were asked Cavalli while on the stand, by both the prosecution and the defendant, concerning the assay made of the dust alleged to have been passed by the prisoner on the prosecuting witness, and he was then...