Antley v. Shepherd
| Decision Date | 22 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 3173.,3173. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Patricia T. ANTLEY, Appellant, v. William M. SHEPHERD, individually and Aiken County, Respondents. |
Herbert W. Louthian, Sr. and Deborah R.J. Shupe, both of Louthian & Louthian, of Columbia, for appellant.
William H. Davidson, II, James M. Davis, Jr., and Christine E.W. Edenfield, all of Davidson, Morrison & Lindemann, of Columbia, for respondents.
Patricia T. Antley filed this public policy tort and wrongful discharge action against William M. Shepherd and Aiken County. All parties moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted in favor of Shepherd and Aiken County. Antley appeals. We affirm.
In December 1993, Shepherd, the Aiken County Administrator, appointed Antley as Aiken County's tax assessor. As tax assessor, Antley had the sole responsibility of valuing property and had the authority to appeal disapprovals or modifications of any appraisals made by her. On September 13, 1996, in accordance with her statutory authority, Antley filed an appeal to the Administrative Law Judges Division (ALJD) from a decision of the Aiken County Board of Assessment Appeals (the board) regarding property owned by William and Eleanor Manfredi. The appeal involved what portion of the Manfredis' property should be considered residential property versus commercial property for taxation purposes. According to Antley, Mr. Manfredi had refused to provide documentation identifying what portion of the property was used for residential purposes.
On September 27, 1996, Shepherd issued a memorandum to Antley which stated, in part:
Prior to any result of the board hearing being appealed by the County to the State, such cases will be presented to me for review and discussion. Unless there is a cognizant reason to proceed to the State, we will accept the decision of our board.
In a memorandum dated October 4, 1996, Shepherd inquired about the Manfredi appeal and reiterated his position that the County would not pursue an appeal unless cognizant reasons existed. Additionally, he stated:
I do not intend that we will pursue any appeal just to argue for a valuation. I expect that the action of the Board will constitute a final judgment as far as the County is concerned.
In the same letter to Antley, Shepherd indicated that he told Mr. Manfredi that if an appeal had been initiated, the County would rescind it.
On October 10, 1996, Shepherd wrote Mr. Manfredi and assured him that the County would not appeal the board's decision in his case. He explained:
In consideration of the problems associated with the most recent reassessment and the vesting of the appel[l]ate authority in the Board of Adjustment Appeals, it is deemed to be in the best interests of Aiken County to accept the decisions of that Board.
Concerned about who had the authority to appeal the board's decisions, Antley sought advice from the County Attorney. On October 10, 1996, the County Attorney wrote Antley and informed her that as tax assessor, she was the only county official with authority to appeal the board's decisions. He cautioned Antley, however, that under the Aiken County Code, the assessor served at the administrator's pleasure and that Antley risked disciplinary action by refusing to follow Shepherd's policies.
On October 16, 1996, Antley informed the administrative law judge assigned to the Manfredi case that Shepherd had directed her to withdraw the Manfredi appeal and not to appeal future decisions of the board. She advised the judge that she did not wish to withdraw the case and instead sought a continuance to resolve the question of Shepherd's authority to direct her appeals.
On October 18, 1996, Antley wrote a memorandum to Shepherd concerning his newly-adopted policy on appeals. She explained to Shepherd that Mr. Manfredi's refusal to provide her with information about his property necessitated her appeal. Antley assured Shepherd she did not intend to file frivolous appeals and alerted him that "because of the confusion involved," she requested a continuance in the Manfredi case. Antley ended her memo with the following statement:
As a public servant for almost 18 years, I have always taken my legal duties and responsibilities very seriously. I have never relinquished them and I can do no less now.
In a letter dated October 21, 1996, Shepherd attempted to "clarify" his directive by advising Antley:
You are NOT to initiate any appeal of a decision of the Aiken County Board of Appeals.
Shepherd explained that after conferring with the County Council he decided the County would accept the board's decisions. He stated that both he and the Council trusted the board's wisdom and had "no desire or intention to question their decisions by continuing cases that might not have been adjudicated in the County's favor." On October 28, 1996, Shepherd asked Antley whether she had dismissed the Manfredi appeal. Antley answered that she had not and informed him of her belief that his directive violated state law by usurping her statutory authority. Shepherd disagreed and again directed her to dismiss the Manfredi appeal. Upon her refusal to do so, Shepherd advised Antley he deemed her refusal a serious act of insubordination and orally terminated her employment. Shepherd then wrote Antley a letter confirming his termination of her employment for insubordination. Shepherd based his decision on Antley's refusal to follow the directive in his October 21 letter.
Antley filed this suit against the County and Shepherd individually. In her second amended complaint, Antley asserted she was mandated by state law to file meritorious appeals from board decisions and thus Shepherd's directive that she not file any appeals from board decisions placed her "in a position of being required to disobey the law" as a condition of her employment. She asserted this requirement constituted a public policy tort and her termination for refusing to follow the directive was wrongful. The County and Shepherd answered, claiming Antley was an at-will employee fired for cause.
The parties stipulated to certain facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In a memorandum supporting her motion for summary judgment, Antley asserted new grounds for her causes of action. Specifically, she argued that the County attempted to usurp her statutory authority, that the County Council's policy was developed in violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and that the evidence created at least an inference that Shepherd acted outside the scope of his authority, with actual malice, or with the intent to harm her.
The circuit court granted Shepherd's and the County's motion for summary judgment finding that Antley was an insubordinate at-will employee and Shepherd was within his authority to terminate her. As to her public policy claim, the court reasoned that because state statute permitted, rather than required, her to file appeals, Shepherd's directive did not require Antley to violate the law. Regarding her FOIA argument, the court questioned whether she properly raised that issue. In any event, the court concluded there was no evidence of a FOIA violation.
Antley filed a motion to alter or amend the court's judgment, maintaining it misconstrued her public policy argument. She asserted that her public policy claim was that the County and Shepherd had usurped her statutory authority by requiring her to abdicate to Shepherd her authority to file appeals. Antley also reasserted her FOIA argument and noted the court failed to address the issue of Shepherd's individual liability. Finally, Antley argued even if the County and Shepherd did not violate state law by usurping her authority, the evidence demonstrated she refused to abdicate her authority because of her good faith belief she was being asked to violate the law, and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. The court denied Antley's motion, stating "[h]aving gone over this case numerous times, the court still finds that the defendants were permitted to take the actions taken and that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any issue that would allow the recovery [Antley] seeks."
Summary judgment is proper only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), SCRCP. In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the court must construe all ambiguities, inferences, and conclusions arising from the evidence against the moving party. Byers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 310 S.C. 5, 425 S.E.2d 23 (1992). When the evidentiary facts are not in dispute but there is a dispute about the inferences or conclusions to be drawn from those facts, summary judgment is not proper. Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318, 487 S.E.2d 187 (1997).
Antley first argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the County on her public policy tort claim. She maintains she was required to abdicate her statutory authority to appeal valuations in violation of public policy.
"Generally, an at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason, with or without cause." Stiles v. American Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 S.C. 222, 224, 516 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1999). Our supreme court, however, has recognized two important exceptions to that rule. First, an employee may have a cause of action where his or her at-will status has been altered by the promulgation of an employee handbook. Small v. Springs Industries, Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987). Second, an employee may have a cause of action where the termination of employment violates...
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