Antoine v. County of Sacramento

• Decision Date: 01 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. CIV. S-06-01349 WBS GGH.,CIV. S-06-01349 WBS GGH.
• Citation: 583 F.Supp.2d 1174
• Parties: Don ANTOINE, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Darin Griem, Chris Baker, Joseph Reeve, Grian Wade, and Christopher Britton, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

583 F.Supp.2d 1174

Don ANTOINE, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Darin Griem, Chris Baker, Joseph Reeve, Grian Wade, and Christopher Britton, Defendants.

No. CIV. S-06-01349 WBS GGH.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

October 1, 2008.

Amitai Schwartz, Law Offices of Amitai Schwartz, Emeryville, CA, Darren Jay Kessler, Law Offices of Darren J. Kessler, El Cerrito, CA, John Houston Scott, Lizabeth N. De Vries, The Scott Law Firm, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.

Robert L. Chalfant, Randolph, Cregger & Chalfant, LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

Defendants move for reconsideration of this court's Order of June 26, 2008, 566 F.Supp.2d 1045. In that Order, the court concluded that it had committed plain error in its instructions to the jury on the issue of damages, but rejected defendants' arguments that the court committed error in any of its evidentiary rulings or instructions to the jury on the issue of liability. Because the court also rejected defendants' arguments relating to alleged misconduct by plaintiff's attorneys and found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of liability, the court denied defendants' motion for a new trial on the issue of liability.

Based on those findings, the court in its Order of June 26, 2008, granted defendants' motion for a new trial on the issues of damages only and expressed the intention of instructing the new jury upon retrial that defendants have been determined to be liable and that their job is only to determine the amount of damages proximately resulting from the violations of plaintiffs Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In their motion for reconsideration, defendants argue that a new trial on the issue of damages only would violate their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, citing Gasoline Prods. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1931) (holding that it would be a denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial to order a partial new trial only on the issue of damages where the question of damages is not so distinct and separable from the question of liability that it could be submitted to the jury independently without creating confusion and uncertainty).

The Seventh Amendment does indeed guaranty defendants the right to a fair trial in a civil case. See Latiolais v. Whitley, 93 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 357 (7th Cir.1993) and Bailey v. Sys. Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir.1988) (holding that "fairness in a jury trial, whether criminal or civil in nature, is a vital constitutional right")). What must not be forgotten, however, is that plaintiff has the same constitutional right to a fair trial. Plaintiffs attorneys in this case, against what many observers would have agreed to be difficult odds, achieved a jury verdict in his favor—which this court has found to be untainted by any error on the issue of liability. That victory should not be taken away from plaintiff unless absolutely necessary to achieve justice.

The problem with attempting to separate the issue of damages from the issue of liability in any retrial of this case is that the case was presented to the first jury on several different theories of liability. For example, plaintiff alternatively contended that defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) striking him in the ribs, (2) applying unreasonable pressure to his throat, and (3) unreasonably chaining him to the grate in his cell rather than using an alternative means of restraint. The damages which would flow from each of those alleged actions would, of necessity, be different. Without knowing which conduct the first jury found to constitute the constitutional violation, the second jury would be unable to assess the damages proximately resulting from that conduct.

Punitive damages present the same problem. The amount of punitive damages to be awarded—or even if they should be awarded at all—can depend, at least in part, on the amount of compensatory damages found. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) (holding that under maritime law the maximum award of punitive damages allowed is an amount equal to the award of compensatory damages). More importantly, the amount necessary to punish a defendant or make an example of him would of necessity depend upon what conduct the jury intends to punish.

Plaintiff insists that the problem can be avoided by simply presenting the second jury with the same evidence as was presented in the first trial and instructing them that liability, i.e., excessive force and punitive restraint, was caused by "what occurred from when Mr. Antoine started knocking on the safety-cell door until he was released from being chained to the grate." Plaintiffs attorney then suggests that the jury be asked to "determine the extent of the force used" and compensate plaintiff for the "injury or suffering resulting from it."

The court wishes it were that simple. But many different things allegedly occurred during that time, and neither this court nor counsel know which of those things the first jury found did in fact occur or which of those things they found constituted the excessive force or punitive restraint. Without knowing that, and without being able to instruct the second jury on what the first jury found on those questions, the issues of liability and damages cannot be effectively separated.

When the issues of damages can be determined separately from the issues of liability, a new trial can be ordered only on the issues of damages, as this court originally intended.¹ Unlike the cases surveyed

1. For example, a new trial on damages alone has been ordered or upheld in the following cases:

Cases Within the Ninth Circuit

See Wharf v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 60 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no reason to reopen the issues of liability so long as no injustice would result from a retrial on damages only); Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th Cir.1984) (remanding for new trial on damages only); Nelson v. Equifax Info. Servs. L.L.C., 522 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1237 (C.D.Cal.2007) ("A partial new trial solely on damages may be ordered so long as it does not involve a tangled or complex fact situation that makes it unfair to determine damages apart from liability."); Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 434, 452 (N.D.Cal.1986) (denying defendant's motion for a new trial and for a partial new trial on the condition that plaintiff accept a remittitur; plaintiff's failure to accept would result in a new trial limited solely to the issue of damages); Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 2007 WL 2344962, at *2-5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62743, at *7-16 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2007) (finding a portion of the damage award to be disproportionate in light of the evidence and granting a new trial on the issue of damages alone unless plaintiff accepts a remittitur); Automotive Prods. plc v. Tilton Eng'g, 1993 WL 661138, at *1-3, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20814, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 18, 1993) (granting a new trial on the issue of damages alone and ordering new jury to be instructed that a previous jury had already found plaintiff/counterdefendant liable).

Cases From Other Circuits

See Banks v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 364 (2d Cir.1999) ("[T]he error infecting the damages award [was] entirely separable from the underlying finding of liability, and . . . retrial of damages alone [was] appropriate"); Boucher v. United States Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir.1996) ("[A] partial new trial limited to the issues of [damages] is just and appropriate because it clearly appears that those issues are sufficiently `distinct and separable' from the others that a trial of [those issues] alone may be had without injustice."); Atlas Food Sys. & Serv., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 599 (4th Cir.1996) (rejecting argument that new trial should encompass liability and compensatory damages and upholding new trial limited only to punitive damages); id. ("Considerations of economy, fairness, and repose may provide justification for preserving a jury's liability determination that has been fairly and fully made and ordering only a new trial on damages where there is no substantial indication that the liability and damage issues are inextricably interwoven, or that the first jury verdict was the result of a compromise of the liability and damage questions."); Brooks v. Brattleboro Mem'l Hosp., 958 F.2d 525, 530-31 (2d Cir.1992) ("It is well established that a partial new trial may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice." (quoting Bohack Corp. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 715 F.2d 703, 709 (2d Cir.1983))); Broan Mfg. Co. v. Associated Distribs., Inc., 923 F.2d 1232, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding damages issues were adequately distinct from the liability questions for a new trial on damages alone to be appropriate); Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., 861 F.2d 363, 375 (2d Cir.1988) (ordering any new trial, in the event plaintiff rejects remittitur, to be limited to the issue of damages alone because it was a distinct, separate issue); Stein v. Bd. of N.Y., Bureau of Pupil Transp., 792 F.2d 13, 19 (2d Cir.1986) (ordering new trial limited to damages issue); Sprague v. Boston & Maine Corp., 769 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.1985) ("The issue of damages [in this case] was so distinct and separable from the question of liability that allowing a second jury to determine only the amount of damages wrought no injustice on [Plaintiff]."); Walters v. Mintec[Int'l, 758 F.2d 73, 82 (3d Cir.1985) (finding that since the excessiveness of the jury verdict did not in...