Antonelli v. Antonelli

• Decision Date: 10 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 334,334
• Citation: 408 A.2d 773,44 Md.App. 384
• Parties: Beverly P. ANTONELLI v. John O. ANTONELLI.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 384

44 Md.App. 384

408 A.2d 773

Beverly P. ANTONELLI v. John O. ANTONELLI.

No. 334.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 10, 1979.

John T. Bell, Rockville, and Robert W. Thompson, with whom were Bell, Cornelius & Shore, Rockville, on the brief, for appellant.

Herbert P. Suskind, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, COUCH and WEANT, JJ.

WEANT, Judge.

The basis for this argle-bargle was laid with the filing of a decree of divorce A vinculo matrimonii on July 26, 1977, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Equity No. 56325 (Antonelli v. Antonelli), which provided, among other things, "that the custody of the two minor children of the parties, Dominic Frank Antonelli, III, born September 26, 1964 and John Patrick Antonelli, born April 11, 1966, shall be awarded to the plaintiff (Beverly P. Antonelli) with reasonable rights of visitation reserved to the defendant (John O. Antonelli), pending further order of the Court." Thereafter, the defendant sought to have that decree modified through a change of custody of the two minor children; following this, he filed a petition for contempt on January 4, 1979, for the alleged failure of the plaintiff to grant him reasonable visitation with said children. This latter action resulted in the issuance on January 4, 1979, of a rule to show cause requiring the plaintiff to appear in court to show cause "(w)hy the Plaintiff (appellant herein) should not be found in contempt of the Order of Court dated July 25, 1977 for failing to allow reasonable rights of visitation to the Defendant (appellee herein)." A hearing was held and the plaintiff, by Order dated February 13, 1979, was "found to be in constructive civil contempt" of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County "for her willful failure to afford reasonable visitation to the Defendant, as required by the previous order of this Court;" it was further ordered

that the imposition of any sanction for this contempt is hereby suspended upon the condition that the Plaintiff afford reasonable rights of visitation to the Defendant at all times in the future, to specifically include the following rights of visitation until further order of this Court:

From 6:00 p. m. February 23, 1979 until 8:00 p. m. February 25, 1979, and

From 10:00 a. m. Saturday until 8:00 p. m. Sunday on the weekends beginning March 10, 1979 and March 31, 1979, and every second weekend thereafter . . . .

This same order provided that the Master should consider the question of definite specific rights of visitation in light of the difficulties which the parties had experienced in respect to visitation.

Beverly P. Antonelli appealed this finding to this Court, alleging that the Order of the Montgomery County Court of February 13, 1979, was improper in that it failed to contain a provision by which she could purge herself; she further presented the following questions:

1. Is the July 25, 1977 decree, requiring only "reasonable rights of visitation" too uncertain, unspecific or indefinite to provide a basis for holding the Appellant in contempt?

2. Has the Appellant denied visitation within the terms of the July 25, 1977 decree?

3. Should the Appellant be cited for contempt of the July 25, 1977 decree?

4. Has the Appellee met his burden of proof?

5. Did the hearing judge exceed his powers by conditioning the imposition of contempt sanctions on the Appellant's noncompliance with a new set of visitation requirements conceived in the Hearing to Show Cause?

Considering first the alleged failure of the trial court to provide a "purge" provision, we quote the pertinent part of the court's Order of February 13, 1979, which reads: "the imposition of any sanction for this contempt is hereby suspended upon the condition that the Plaintiff afford reasonable visitation rights to the Defendant . . . ." In a civil contempt such as this, the contemnor must be afforded a chance to purge herself of her guilt, this type of punishment being remedial and, abrogable by compliance. In the instant case the court provided for the suspension of the "sanction" but left standing the finding of "constructive civil contempt." In effect, this puts the plaintiff on probation without allowing for any means by which she can rid herself of the guilt. The contempt citation must therefore be reversed. State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 728, 298 A.2d 867, 876 (1973); Herd v. State, 37 Md.App. 362, 377 A.2d 574 (1977).

Since our conclusion above mandates reversal, it is not necessary for us to further consider the questions presented by Mrs. Antonelli. Nonetheless, we feel compelled to address her contention that the requirement of "reasonable rights of visitation" is too vague and uncertain to provide a basis for a contempt finding. We have been cited to no cases directly on point nor have we found any. Mrs. Antonelli argues that for a decree to be a basis for a contempt finding it must be "definite, certain and specific in its terms" and "sufficiently specific to give a defendant a fair guide as to what is expected of him." This argument certainly follows the dictates of our courts. Harford County Education Ass'n v. Board of Education, 281 Md. 574, 587, 380 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1977); Mattingly v. Houston, 252 Md. 590, 593, 250 A.2d 633, 635 (1969).

While the granting of visitation rights under a dictate that they be "reasonable" may not be as preferable as more specific directions as to date and time, we cannot hold that such a decree is so indefinite, uncertain, and unspecific as to be beyond the court's contempt proceedings. It is a term that is consistently used by the courts of this State and, in fact, is a term that was used in the separation agreement entered into between the parties to this case; said agreement was executed on May...