Antonio ex rel. Mother v. Boston Public Schools

• Decision Date: 27 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.2002-12396-RBC<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>.,CIV.A.2002-12396-RBC<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>.
• Citation: 314 F.Supp.2d 95
• Parties: ANTONIO, by and through his MOTHER, Plaintiff, v. BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

314 F.Supp.2d 95

ANTONIO, by and through his MOTHER, Plaintiff, v. BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.

No. CIV.A.2002-12396-RBC¹.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

April 27, 2004.

Richard Ames, Rosenfeld & Rafik, P.C., Boston, MA, for Antonio, Plaintiff.

Peter M. Kelley, Office of Legal Advisor in Boston Public Schools, Boston, MA, for Boston Public Schools, Defendant.

Alissa Ocasio, City of Boston Law Department Boston Public Schools, Boston, MA, for Boston Public Schools, Defendant.

Mala M. Rafik, Rosenfeld & Rafik, PC, Boston, for Antonio, Plaintiff.

S. Stephen Rosenfeld, Rosenfeld & Rafik, P.C., Boston, MA, for Antonio, Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS A "PREVAILING PARTY" AND THEREBY ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES

COLLINGS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

In mid-December, 2002, minor-plaintiff Antonio² (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), by and through his mother (hereinafter "Parent"), filed the instant action against the Boston Public Schools (hereinafter "Defendant" or "BPS") under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Having succeeded in his appeal of his proposed Individual Education Plan ("IEP") to the Massachusetts Department of Education, Bureau of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA"), Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(3)(B)³. BPS denies that Plaintiff is entitled to such an award for a variety of reasons.

As a threshold matter, entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees hinges upon whether Plaintiff is considered to be a prevailing party within the meaning of the statute. In order to frame the issue for resolution, on July 10, 2003, Defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the contention that Plaintiff does not qualify as a prevailing party under the IDEA. BPS argues that because an administrative agency rather than a court granted the relief sought, Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiff has countered with his own memorandum of law in support of his contention that, indeed, consequent to his success before the BSEA, he enjoys prevailing party status. At this juncture, the prevailing party issue stands ready to be decided.

II. Facts

The background facts are not in dispute. BPS determined Plaintiff to be a student with disabilities. This finding entitled Plaintiff, now a ten-year old, to a free appropriate public education (hereinafter "FAPE") under both federal and state law. BPS developed an individual education plan (hereinafter "IEP") that provided for Plaintiff's placement at the McKinley Elementary School. In February or March of 2002, Parent, acting pro se on her child's behalf, filed an appeal to the BSEA asserting that BPS' proposed IEP would not meet her son's special educational needs. At that time, Parent sought a residential school placement for Plaintiff since he was then "an inpatient at the Walker Acute Residential Treatment facility, a program providing psychiatric and related treatment services to seriously disturbed children." (Complaint # 1 ¶ 7) Counsel filed an appearance on behalf of Plaintiff on April 22, 2002.⁴

Following a two-day hearing in late August, 2002, in an Order dated October 3, 2003, the BSEA hearing officer granted all the relief sought by Plaintiff. This Order was followed by a twenty-one page written decision of the hearing officer dated November 15, 2002. BPS complied with the Order and Decision and revised Plaintiff's IEP to conform with the administrative outcome. In a November 21, 2002 letter, Plaintiff's counsel wrote to Defendant and requested payment of attorneys' fees and costs since Plaintiff was the prevailing party. BPS responded by denying Plaintiff's request on the grounds that Defendant was "under no obligation" to pay fees and costs. Thereafter on December 13, 2002, the instant lawsuit was filed.

III. Discussion

Congress enacted the IDEA

to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living.

Title 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

Schools with children meeting the IDEA's criteria develop IEPs designed to address the student's individual needs and set forth goals for the child. See generally Title 20 U.S.C. § 1414.

If caretakers of a student are not satisfied with the IEP, they can undertake the process of appeal laid out by both the IDEA and state law. See Title 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); Mass. Gen. L. c. 71B § 3. Under the Massachusetts Special Education Law, caretakers must file a complaint with the BSEA detailing what they believe is wrong with the student's IEP. Mass. Gen. L. c. 71B § 3. If the parties do not reach a settlement, an impartial, due-process hearing for which counsel may be present occurs and the BSEA hearing officer renders a decision. Mass. Gen. L. c. 71(B) (citing to IDEA for guidance). Thereafter, in certain circumstances, if either party is yet aggrieved, they may seek further recourse in the state superior court. Mass. Gen. L. c. 71B § 3.

The issue to be decided in this case is whether Plaintiff's complete success at the administrative level and Defendant's acceptance and implementation the BSEA hearing officer's Order confers upon Plaintiff prevailing party status such that he is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

A panoply of federal statutes, including the IDEA, provide for attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party. In Buckhannon v. West Virginia Dep't of Health, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether the term "prevailing party"

includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct.

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835.

In Buckhannon, the petitioners challenged certain West Virginia state laws as violative of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (hereinafter "FHAA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (hereinafter "ADA"). Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600-01, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The case was dismissed as moot by the District Court following the enactment of certain West Virginia bills that "eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The petitioners then sought an award of attorneys' fees "under the `catalyst theory,' which posits that a plaintiff is a `prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Following Fourth Circuit precedent, the District Court denied the bid for fees, a ruling which was affirmed on appeal. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602, 121 S.Ct. 1835. In light of a split in the Circuits over the viability of the catalyst theory, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602, 121 S.Ct. 1835.

The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory, concluding "that enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the `material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties' necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (citations omitted). The Court explained that "[a] defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835.

The Buckhannon decision dealt specifically with the FHAA and the ADA. However, Circuit courts have viewed the Court's holding expansively. See, e.g., New England Regional Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 30 (1 Cir., 2002) (applying Buckhannon to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976); Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Department of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C.Cir., 2002) (applying Buckhannon to the Freedom of Information Act); Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 667 (7 Cir., 2001) (holding Buckhannon applicable to the Fair Credit Reporting Act). Moreover, three Circuit courts have specifically determined Buckhannon to be applicable to the IDEA. See T.D. v. LaGrange School District No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 478 (7 Cir., 2003) ("Today, we join the Second and Third Circuits in holding that Buckhannon is applicable to the IDEA"); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3 Cir., 2003); J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 125 (2 Cir., 2002). So, too, the District Court in Massachusetts has applied the Buckhannon reasoning in the IDEA context, and the First Circuit has affirmed that decision. Doe v. Boston Public Schools, 358 F.3d 20 (D.Mass., 2004). At the District Court level, Chief Judge Young held that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys' fees "because [she] achieved only a private settlement that was not entered as an order, [thus] she does not satisfy Buckhannon's definition of `prevailing party.'" Doe, 264 F.Supp.2d 65, 73 (D.Mass., 2003). On appeal, the First Circuit concurred:

Consistent with each of the circuit courts that have considered the application of Buckhannon to the IDEA, we hold that IDEA plaintiffs who achieve their desired result via private settlement may not, in the absence of judicial imprimatur, be considered "prevailing parties."

Doe, 358 F.3d at 29-30.

Defendant contends that, in light of the Doe decision, it is clear that the Buckhannon rationale is applicable in IDEA cases. Since the Buckhannon decision "establish[es] that enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the `material...