Antonio Marcaccio, Inc. v. Santurri
| Decision Date | 23 June 1931 |
| Docket Number | No. 6922.,6922. |
| Citation | 155 A. 571 |
| Parties | ANTONIO MARCACCIO, Inc. v. SANTURRI. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Edward W. Blodgett, Presiding Justice.
Action by Antonio Marcaccio, Incorporated, against Luigia Santurri. Nonsuit was granted, and plaintiff brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled, and case remitted.
Thomas L. Marcaccio, of Providence, for plaintiff.
Benjamin Cianciarulo and Luigi Capasso, both of Providence, for defendant.
This case, brought for the recovery of a broker's commission and expenses according to an agreement hereinafter referred to, is before us on plaintiff's exception to the decision of a justice of the superior court sitting without the intervention of a jury in granting defendant's motion for a nonsuit.
On July 7, 1927, the defendant, a woman unable to speak English, desiring to raise money on her real estate, signed an agreement in writing, whereby she promised to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $193 if it would raise a second mortgage of $1,500 on property which she owned in Cranston. The agreement is as follows:
After the execution of the agreement, plaintiff (upon receipt of a satisfactory certificate of title) was ready to advance the $1,500 as a second mortgage and claimed the $193 commission referred to in the contract.
The agreement was signed in plaintiff's office, and, as appears from an examination of same, it does not give the exact number of the lots owned by defendant or state which lot or lots are covered by the existing first and second mortgages. The evidence of the attorney who examined the title is to the effect that the defendant owned but twenty-four lots, all subject to the Old Colony first mortgage and the Cipolla second mortgage.
The agreement was drawn by Mr. Marcaccio, president and treasurer of the plaintiff corporation, and by its terms the second mortgage to plaintiff was to be subject to two mortgages which were then in existence rendering the agreement impossible of performance. If deceit was practiced in persuading the plaintiff to raise the money, the action for damages would be in a different form. So far as appears, Cipolla was not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Psaty & Fuhrman Inc. v. Hous. Auth. Of City Of Providence. Hous. Auth. Of City Of Providence
...promisee. The following cases, among others, upon which the contractor relies plainly and properly support such view: Marcaccio, Inc. v. Santurri, 51 R.I. 440, 155 A. 571; Danforth & Armstrong v. Tennessee & Coosa R. Co., 93 Ala. 614, 11 So. 60; People ex rel. v. Craig, 232 N.Y. 125, 133 N.......
-
Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley
...of a more general and broadly inclusive provision. 3 Corbin, Contracts § 547, at 173 (1960); accord, Antonio Marcaccio, Inc. v. Santurri, 51 R.I. 440, 442, 155 A. 571, 572 (1931). The underlying rationale for this standard is '(a)ttention and understanding are likely to be in better focus w......
-
Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Wilmington Housing Auth.
...promisee. The following cases, among others, upon which the contractor relies plainly and properly support such view: Marcaccio, Inc., v. Santurri, 51 R.I. 440, 155 A. 571; Danforth & Armstrong v. Tennessee & Coosa R. Co., 93 Ala. 614, 11 So. 60; People ex rel. Wells & Newton Co. v. Craig, ......
-
School Committee v. Crouch
...of the CBA that did not explicitly subject for-cause terminations to the arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Antonio Marcaccio, Inc. v. Santurri, 51 R.I. 440, 442, 155 A. 571, 572 (1931) (applying the rule that specific terms in a contract limit the general terms); accord Williston, § 32:15 at ......