Antonov v. Gen. Motors

• Docket Number: 8:23-cv-01593-FWS-MJR
• Decision Date: 19 January 2024
• Parties: Roumen B. Antonov v. General Motors LLC et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

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Roumen B. Antonov
v.
General Motors LLC et al.

No. 8:23-cv-01593-FWS-MJR

United States District Court, C.D. California

January 19, 2024

Present: HONORABLE FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [10] AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [12]

Before the court are two matters: (1) Defendant General Motors LLC's (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Case, (Dkt. 10 (“Motion to Dismiss” or “MTD”); and (2) Plaintiff Roumen B. Antonov's Motion to Remand Case to Orange Superior Court, (Dkt. 12 (“Motion to Remand” or “MTR”)). Both the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Remand are fully briefed. (Dkts. 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.) The court found this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”); L.R. 7-15 (authorizing courts to “dispense with oral argument on any motion except where an oral hearing is required by statute”). Based on the record, as applied to the applicable law, the Motion to Remand is DENIED and the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff initiated this suit in Orange County Superior Court on July 21, 2023, alleging three violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, California Civil Code §§ 1790 et. seq., as well as a fraud claim and violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (Dkt. 1-1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 35-120.) Plaintiff served Defendant on July 26, 2023.

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(Dkt. 1 ¶ 3.) On August 24, 2023, Defendant removed to federal court. (Dkt. 1.) On September 8, 2023, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 10.) On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Remand. (Dkt. 12.)

B. Summary of the Complaint's Allegations^[1]

On December 26, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a 2020 Chevrolet Bolt (“Vehicle”) for personal, family, and/or household purposes from an authorized dealer in California. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle subject to several express warranties, which stated that the Vehicle would be free from defects in materials, nonconformities, or workmanship during the applicable warranty period and that Defendant would repair any existing defects. (Id. ¶ 11.) The Complaint asserts Defendant impliedly warranted that the Vehicle would be of the same quality as similar vehicles sold in the industry and fit for the ordinary purposes for which similar vehicles are used. (Id. ¶ 12.)

When the Vehicle exhibited “defects, non-conformities, misadjustments, or malfunctions,” Plaintiff notified Defendant through one of its authorized service and repair facilities within a reasonable time of discovering the defect and invoked the applicable warranties to demand that the facilities repair the nonconformities. (Id. ¶ 13.) On each occasion, Defendant and its facilities represented that they would make the Vehicle conform to the applicable warranty and/or that they had successfully repaired the vehicle; however, Defendants failed to make the Vehicle conform to the applicable warranties in a reasonable number of attempts. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Per the Complaint, Defendant represented that the Vehicle was safe and functional for normal use, but the Vehicle is not safe for normal use because its batteries may ignite if the battery is fully charged or if the battery mileage falls below seventy miles and the Vehicle may not be parked inside. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) As a result of the battery defect, Defendant issued a recall notice for the Vehicle in 2021 that warned customers that the Vehicle's charge should not

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exceed 90%, the battery mileage should not fall below seventy miles remaining, and the Vehicle should not be parked indoors overnight. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the Vehicle has been severely limited by this defect, and Plaintiff would not have bought the Vehicle if he had known it was not safe and did not function as advertised. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 34.)

II. Legal Standard

A. Motion to Remand

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction over only those suits authorized by the Constitution or Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a suit originates in state court, a defendant may remove to federal court only when the suit could have been filed in federal court originally. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “In civil cases, subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred upon federal district courts either through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Peralta v. Hisp. Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005). Diversity jurisdiction requires both complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy greater than $75,000. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.”).

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988)), and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance,” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). “A defendant seeking removal has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A defendant's notice of removal must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for

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removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Because “§ 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirement stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” the defendant's “statement ‘short and plain' need not contain evidentiary submissions.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84, 87 (2014).

A plaintiff's motion to remand may raise either a facial attack or a factual attack on the defendant's jurisdictional allegations. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). A facial attack challenges “the form, not the substance” of the defendant's removal allegations by asserting the facts are “insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, the defendant need not respond to a facial attack with “competent proof” under a summary judgment-type standard. Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 2020). By contrast, a factual attack “contests the truth of the [defendant's] factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings.” Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020). If the plaintiff mounts a factual attack, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the basis for removal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Harris, 980 F.3d at 699. The plaintiff may rely solely on “a reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which [defendant's numbers] are based are not supported by evidence.” Id. at 700.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). To withstand a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” such that the factual allegations “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (reiterating that “recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal ‘can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'” Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

“Establishing the plausibility of a complaint's allegations is a two-step process that is ‘context-specific' and ‘requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint . . . must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Id. at 996 (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). “Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest...