Antonov v. Walters

• Decision Date: 30 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2-04-255-CV.,2-04-255-CV.
• Citation: 168 S.W.3d 901
• Parties: Anton ANTONOV and Tanev & Son Trucking, Appellants, v. Sonja WALTERS and Shawn Brown, in his Capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Delbert and Sonja Walters, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

168 S.W.3d 901

Anton ANTONOV and Tanev & Son Trucking, Appellants, v. Sonja WALTERS and Shawn Brown, in his Capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Delbert and Sonja Walters, Appellees.

No. 2-04-255-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

June 30, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Downs & Stanford, P.C., M. Gaddy Wells, Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

Wells, Purcell, Kraatz & Brookman, Davis Purcell, Fort Worth, TX, for Appellee.

PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; HOLMAN, J.; and SAM J. DAY, J. (Retired, Sitting by Assignment).

OPINION

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.

Anton Antonov and Tanev & Son Trucking appeal from an adverse judgment for Sonja Walters and Shawn Brown in his capacity as chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Delbert and Sonja Walters. In three issues, appellants complain that the trial court's judgment is void because Sonja's lack of standing to sue deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction; the trial court erred by denying appellants' motion to strike Brown's intervention in the lawsuit; and the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's damages award for future medical expenses. We will affirm.

On January 31, 2001, Antonov and Sonja were involved in a motor vehicle accident during which Sonja was injured. On September 27, 2001, Sonja and her husband Delbert filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Brown was appointed chapter 7 trustee for the Walterses' bankruptcy estate. The Walterses listed on their personal property schedule Sonja's personal injury claims against appellants. On October 25, 2001, the Walterses claimed as exempt from the bankruptcy estate the following claims resulting from the accident: a personal injury claim valued at $17,425 and a "los[t] wages claim" of unlimited value. No objections were made to these exemptions.¹

Thereafter, on August 15, 2002, Sonja sued appellants for damages she allegedly sustained in the January 2001 accident. Brown was not a party to the lawsuit when it was filed, nor did he participate in the subsequent trial.

On April 21, 2004, a jury found that Antonov's negligence had caused the accident and Sonja's injuries and awarded her $745,790 in past and future damages. Six days later, Brown petitioned for the first time to intervene in the lawsuit on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. Over appellants' objection, the trial court rendered judgment that appellants were jointly and severally liable to both Sonja and Brown for the full amount of the jury's verdict plus interest and court costs. The trial court overruled appellants' postjudgment motions, including a plea to the jurisdiction based on Sonja's alleged lack of standing and a motion to strike Brown's intervention, and this appeal followed.

In their first issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in overruling their plea to the jurisdiction and in refusing to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. Appellants assert that Sonja's lack of standing deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and rendered its judgment void.

A plaintiff must have standing to bring a lawsuit.² The issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit to have a justiciable interest in its outcome.³ A plaintiff has standing when she is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether she is acting with legal authority.⁴ Thus, in Texas, the test for standing requires that there be (1) a real controversy between the parties (2) that will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.⁵ Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time.⁶ We apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court's determination regarding standing.⁷

When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, all of her property—including any legal claims that belonged to the debtor before the petition was filed — becomes property of a bankruptcy estate.⁸ Once a claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy trustee, as the estate representative, has exclusive standing to assert the claim.⁹

Nonetheless, a debtor may file a list of property that the debtor claims is exempt from the bankruptcy estate.¹⁰ Unless a party in interest objects, "the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt."¹¹ Thereafter, the debtor's entitlement to the exemption is invulnerable to attack, regardless of whether the debtor had a colorable statutory basis for claiming the exemption.¹² Further, "[i]t is well-settled law that the effect of this self-executing exemption is to remove property from the [bankruptcy] estate and to vest it in the debtor."¹³ These principles apply to both pending and potential causes of action claimed as exempt.¹⁴

Applying these principles to this case, we hold that Sonja had standing to sue appellants. Sonja was personally aggrieved by the accident and, in October 2001, she listed as exempt her personal injury and "los[t] wages" claims resulting from the accident. No one ever objected to those exemptions. Therefore, those claims became exempt,¹⁵ were removed from the bankruptcy estate, and were revested in Sonja.¹⁶ Once the claims were no longer part of the bankruptcy estate, Sonja had a real, justiciable interest in the outcome of the controversy between her and appellants, which could be actually determined by the judicial declaration she sought when she filed suit in August 2002.¹⁷

Appellants contend that Sonja "did not claim any part of the personal injury cause of action in her exemptions," but only her right to receive payment on her claims. To support this contention, appellants point out that Sonja listed bankruptcy code section 522(d)(11)(D)-(E) as statutory authority for exempting her claims. These subsections provide that a debtor may exempt from the bankruptcy estate the right to receive payment on account of personal bodily injury and in compensation for loss of future earnings.¹⁸

Appellants assert that these subsections do not authorize the exemption of a cause of action from the bankruptcy estate, but only authorize the exemption of part of the proceeds from a claim or cause of action after the proceeds have been collected. They contend that, "[w]ith the statutory references to modify the descriptions of her exemptions, no reasonable person would conclude that [Sonja] was claiming the personal injury cause of action itself" as exempt. They also contend that Sonja could not exempt her cause of action from the bankruptcy estate because neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Texas Property Code allows a debtor to exempt a cause of action.¹⁹ We disagree.

Sonja described the property she was claiming as exempt as "PI claim for Debtor Spouse resulting from auto accident; no lawsuit pending at this time. Loss [sic] wages claim resulting from auto accident; no lawsuit pending at this time." [Emphasis supplied.] "Cause of action" is included within the definition of "claim."²⁰ Further, because no lawsuit was pending at the time Sonja claimed the exemptions, we construe her property descriptions as claiming at least part of her cause of action itself as exempt, not merely the right to receive proceeds in the event the trustee chose to sue. Moreover, regardless of whether Sonja had a statutory basis for claiming all or part of her cause of action as exempt, she is entitled to the exemption because no one objected when she claimed it.²¹

For all of these reasons, we hold that Sonja had standing to sue appellants. Therefore, the trial court did not err by overruling appellants' plea to the jurisdiction challenging Sonja's standing to sue, and the trial court's judgment is not void for want of jurisdiction. We overrule appellants' first issue.

In their second issue, appellants complain that the trial court erred by denying their motion to strike Brown's post-verdict intervention on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. Appellants assert that the intervention was improper because the statute of limitations had run, Sonja's suit had not tolled the limitations period as to Brown, and Brown therefore no longer had an enforceable interest to protect.

Any party may intervene by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken by the trial court for sufficient cause.²² The party opposed to the intervention has the burden to challenge it via a motion to strike.²³ We review a trial court's ruling on a petition in intervention under an abuse of discretion standard.²⁴

Here, regardless of whether limitations had run, Brown had an enforceable interest to protect. When two persons claim an interest in a single cause of action, and one of those persons timely files suit, the remaining party's intervention in the suit outside the limitations period to protect his interest relates back to the timely-filed suit and is not barred by limitations.²⁵

In this case, there was only one cause of action—Sonja's personal injury claim against appellants—in which both she and Brown, as bankruptcy trustee, claimed an interest. The purpose of Brown's intervention was to protect the bankruptcy estate's interest in Sonja's recovery on her claim against appellants, not to assert an independent cause of action against them. It is undisputed that Sonja's suit, filed less than two years after the accident, was timely.²⁶ Therefore, Brown's intervention related back to Sonja's timely filing of the suit and is not barred by limitations.²⁷ Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellants' motion to strike Brown's petition in intervention.²⁸ We overrule appellants' second issue.

In their third issue, appellants challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's award of $100,000 for Sonja's future medical expenses.

In determining a "no evidence" issue, we are to consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding of the disputed fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.²⁹ That is, we must "credit[]...