Antonsen v. Ward
| Decision Date | 21 August 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 1773,D,1773 |
| Citation | 943 F.2d 198 |
| Parties | 60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 235, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,062, 2 A.D. Cases 279, 2 NDLR P 62 Gregory ANTONSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin WARD, as Commissioner of the Police Department of the City of New York; New York City Police Department; Edward I. Koch, as Mayor of the City of New York, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 91-7215. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Thomas Martin Kennedy, New York City (Ira Cure, Lewis, Greenwald, Kennedy, Lewis, Clifton & Schwartz, P.C., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
William J. Thom, New York City (Victor A. Kovner, Stephen J. McGrath, and Frances Sands, Corp. Counsel, City of New York, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Before MESKILL, NEWMAN and PRATT, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Gregory Antonsen appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, John M. Cannella, Judge, that dismissed his complaint on res judicata grounds, and thus presents for us, once again, the problem of what claim-preclusive effect we should give a judgment rendered in an Article 78 proceeding by the New York State Supreme Court. It does so in the context of an employee discharge case where Antonsen seeks to recover in this federal action attorney's fees and compensatory damages after having obtained reinstatement and back pay in the state court proceeding.
Antonsen entered the New York City Police Academy in July of 1985, and was appointed as a probationary police officer for an initial term of 18 months. A month later, he suffered from abdominal pains and was diagnosed as having Crohn's disease, a condition causing inflammation of the gastrointestinal tract. Antonsen received medication and despite his condition, he completed the police academy's training program. In December of 1985, Antonsen served in a police officer orientation program, and in early July of 1986, he was assigned to regular patrol duties.
A short time later, Antonsen was hospitalized for his Crohn's disease and underwent intestinal surgery to remove the infected areas of his small intestine. The operation was successful, so he was soon placed on limited duty on September 17, and returned to active duty on October 1.
As part of routine procedure near the end of his probationary period, the department gave Antonsen a final physical examination to determine whether he was suitable for a permanent position as a New York City police officer. Upon discovering a significant history of Crohn's disease, the department extended Antonsen's probationary period and placed him on limited duty pending a determination by the Chief Police Surgeon. Finally, on May 8, 1987, after further medical review of Antonsen's condition, the department terminated Antonsen's employment based on its determination that Antonsen had failed to meet the medical standards required for permanent employment.
On September 4, 1987, Antonsen commenced a special proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, against the City of New York, the Police Department of the City of New York, Benjamin Ward as Commissioner of the Police Department of the City of New York, and On October 14, 1987, while the state proceeding was still pending, Antonsen commenced this action in the United States District Court against the same defendants and on the same grounds under the state Human Rights Law and the federal Rehabilitation Act. This action was eventually stayed by the district court on April 29, 1988, pending a decision in state court.
Edward Koch as Mayor of the City of New York (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the police department" or "the department"). Antonsen alleged that the police department's decision to terminate him was arbitrary and capricious and should be overturned. He also asserted that the decision to terminate him because of his history of Crohn's disease, violated New York's Human Rights Law, N.Y.Exec.Law § 290 et seq. (McKinney 1982 & Supp.1991), and the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Antonsen sought reinstatement with back pay and costs. Although the petition did not explicitly mention attorney's fees, one of the two notices of petition sent to the defendants, stated that Antonsen would be seeking reasonable attorney's fees incurred during the proceeding
Meanwhile, on January 22, 1988, the state supreme court rejected the police department's contention that Antonsen suffered an incapacitating disability; it held that the department had violated N.Y.Exec.Law § 296, which provides that an employee cannot be discharged due to a disability unless the disability prevents him from performing his job duties in a reasonable manner. See: N.Y.Exec.Law § 292(21) (McKinney 1982 & Supp.1991). The court found that the department's decision to terminate Antonsen improperly relied on statistical probabilities of the recurrence of Crohn's disease, rather than on an individualized assessment of Antonsen's medical condition. The court remanded the matter to the department for a de novo medical examination and for reconsideration of Antonsen's candidacy as a police officer. The opinion contained no reference to the Rehabilitation Act claim.
The department did not appeal. It reexamined Antonsen and reconsidered his candidacy, but eventually reaffirmed its earlier determination and refused to reinstate Antonsen because of his medical condition.
On January 6, 1989, Antonsen commenced a second Article 78 proceeding against the same defendants, again contending that the department was arbitrary and capricious. In his second petition, however, Antonsen asserted only a claim under New York law. Although the petition is similar to the first one in all other respects and asks for the same relief, it contains no mention of the Rehabilitation Act. Again the petition asked for costs, but did not specify attorney's fees, and the notice of the second petition mentioned only costs, not attorney's fees.
On June 16, 1989, the supreme court determined that no rational basis existed to support the department's decision to terminate Antonsen, since the department had again improperly relied on statistics in reaching its decision. The court also found that the decision to terminate Antonsen violated the N.Y.Exec.Law § 296(1)(a). Again, however, the opinion did not mention the federal Rehabilitation Act. It ordered that Antonsen be reinstated with back pay and any other employment benefits that had accrued during his termination period. The decision was affirmed on appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, 161 A.D.2d 378, 556 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dept.1990), and affirmed again on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, 77 N.Y.2d 506, 569 N.Y.S.2d 328, 571 N.E.2d 636 (1991).
Without awaiting the outcome of the appeals, Antonsen, on October 31, 1989, reactivated this case in federal court. He moved for partial summary judgment with regard to defendants' liability under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and sought to recover attorney's fees for services performed in both the state and federal actions, relying on section 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). Antonsen also moved for partial summary judgment with regard to the liability portion of his claim under New The district court denied Antonsen's motions, but granted defendants' cross-motion and dismissed Antonsen's complaint on res judicata grounds. The court concluded that Antonsen was barred from asserting claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and New York Executive Law. With respect to Antonsen's attorney's fee claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that "the state court was able to provide Antonsen with the full measure of remedies under federal law and the Article 78 judgment preclud[ed] Antonsen from re-litigating his claim under the Rehabilitation Act". Thus, the court found that since Antonsen could have obtained attorney's fees under the Rehabilitation Act in the Article 78 proceeding, he was barred from trying to assert that claim in the federal action. In addition, the court found that the New York Court of Appeals, after its decision in Gross v. Perales, 72 N.Y.2d 231, 532 N.Y.S.2d 68, 527 N.E.2d 1205 (1988), now would allow plaintiffs in Article 78 proceedings to recover compensatory damages, thus barring Antonsen's attempt to obtain compensatory damages under New York Executive Law in this action.
York Executive Law, and sought an award of compensatory damages. Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment to dismiss the entire action on the ground that Antonsen's claims were barred by res judicata
Under the full faith and credit clause of the constitution, a federal court is required to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as that state would give it in a subsequent proceeding. Migra v. Warren City School District, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738. New York law thus governs the question of whether Antonsen's claim is precluded. It is well established in New York that "once a claim [has been] brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (1981); see also Smith v. Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 192-93, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71, 429 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1981). Under this "transactional approach" to res judicata, claims arising out of the same "factual grouping" are deemed to be part of the same cause of action and any later claim will be barred. Smith, 54 N.Y.2d at 192-93, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 71...
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