Antz v. Coppolo

Decision Date03 July 1950
Citation137 Conn. 69,75 A.2d 36
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesANTZ v. COPPOLO. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

William T. Holleran and Arthur B. O'Keefe, Jr., New Haven, Arthur B. O'Keefe, Sr., New Haven, for appellant.

Francis J. Moran, New Haven, John E. McNerney and John J. Kinney, Jr., New Haven, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

BALDWIN, Judge.

This is a negligence action in which the defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict and from the judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in the charge to the jury. He also assigns error as to the finding.

The finding, including the minor corrections to which the plaintiff is entitled, discloses the conflicting claims of the parties. These were the plaintiff's claims of proof: On March 17, 1947, in midafternoon, she parked her automobile, headed north against the easterly curb of Front Street opposite Talmadge Street in New Haven. Front Street runs in a general northerly and southerly direction and is twenty-five feet wide and paved with concrete. Talmadge Street extends westerly from Front Street but does not cross it. About twenty-five feet south of Talmadge Street, Exchange Street intersects Front Street from the west. At the Exchange Street intersection there is a bend in Front Street of approximately six degrees so that north of that point it bears to the east. Otherwise it is straight for several hundred feet both to the north and to the south. There is a sidewalk on its westerly side but none on its easterly side. The plaintiff, a visiting nurse, after she had called at a house on the west side of Front Street, walked southerly to the northwest corner of Talmadge and Front Streets, intending to cross to her car. Upon reaching the corner, she looked to the south and saw the defendant's truck traveling north along the middle of Front Street at a point south of Exchange Street. She looked to the north and saw nothing coming. She took one step into the street and stood with her heels against the curbing waiting for the truck to pass. The defendant was operating his truck at a speed of thirty miles per hour. At this time Arnold Amore, a thirteen-year-old boy, was riding a bicycle south on Front Street about three feet westerly of the center line. When the defendant's truck reached the intersection of Exchange Street, the Amore boy, then about twenty to twenty-five feet north of the plaintiff, turned to his right to within four feet of the west curb of Front Street to let the truck pass. The defendant, in order to pass the plaintiff's parked car, swerved to his left of the center line of Front Street to a point within three feet of where the plaintiff was standing. The boy when about three feet from the plaintiff had to turn sharply farther to his right and apply his brakes to avoid being hit by the truck. As the front of the truck passed the plaintiff she was struck by the bicycle, thrown to the pavement and seriously injured. There was not room for the bicycle to go between the plaintiff and the truck. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's negligence was the cause of her injuries.

The claims of proof of the defendant were: After making a delivery, he drove his truck out of a driveway on the east side of Front Street about sixty-five feet south of Talmadge Street and turned to proceed north on Front Street. He was operating his truck in second gear at a speed of ten to fifteen miles per hour. As he drove northerly on the easterly side of Front Street he turned to the left side of the street to go around the plaintiff's parked car, the left side of his truck coming within about four feet of the westerly curb. After passing the parked car, he turned back to his right and continued north. His truck met the plaintiff about twenty feet north of Talmadge Street. At this time she was on the west sidewalk walking south. He met the Amore boy riding his bicycle about forty to one hundred feet north of Talmadge Street. His truck was about one hundred feet north of Talmadge Street when the plaintiff was struck by the bicycle. Fifty feet farther on he heard a woman calling to him. He stopped, went back and found the plaintiff lying in the street at the northwest corner of Front and Talmadge Streets. The plaintiff was struck by the Amore boy's bicycle just as she stepped from the sidewalk into the street. The boy could not stop because his bicycle had no brakes. The plaintiff did not see the bicycle at any time before she was struck. The defendant's truck did not strike the plaintiff or the bicycle. The plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to see the bicycle approaching her.

At the conclusion of the charge, counsel for the defendant stated an objection. What he then said, interpreted in the light of the language of his assignment of errors, was apparently directed at the claimed failure of the court to charge the jury on the question of supervening negligence. To comply with the rule, a written request should have been filed. Practice Book, § 156. In Syms v. Harmon, 134 Conn. 653, 656, 60 A.2d 166, 167, we recently said: 'The purpose...

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10 cases
  • Moriarty v. Lippe
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1972
    ...McAvoy, 105 Conn. 528, 136 A. 76. The charge was correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient to guide the jury. Antz v. Coppolo, 137 Conn. 69, 72, 75 A.2d 36; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § There is error, the judgment against The Hour is set aside and the case is remanded with directio......
  • Johnson v. Teamsters Local 559
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • June 5, 1996
    ...that causation exists when the defendant's action was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's damages); Antz v. Coppolo, 137 Conn. 69, 75 A.2d 36, 39 (1950) (same); Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 405, 71 A.2d 593, 594-95 (1950) B. The Union's Liability 1. Standard of Proof The U......
  • State v. Anthony
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • December 28, 1976
  • Kelleher v. Smith
    • United States
    • Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
    • April 4, 1969
    ...is reasonable and this portion is mandatory.' In the present case the defendant's request to charge was oral. See also Antz v. Coppolo, 137 Conn. 69, 72, 75 A.2d 36. The case of Lowell v. Daly, 148 Conn. 266, 169 A.2d 888 elaborates further on the specificity of written requests to charge. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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