Aponte Diaz v. Navieras Puerto Rico, Inc., No. CIV. 98-1917(HL).

Decision Date23 January 2001
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 98-1917(HL).
Citation130 F.Supp.2d 246
PartiesAlfredo APONTE DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NAVIERAS PUERTO RICO, INC.; Holt Hauling & Warehousing Systems, Inc.; NPR Holding Corporation. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Dennis A. Simonpietri-Monefeld, Guaynabo, PR, for plaintiffs.

Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Beatriz M. Rodriguez-Burgos, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants Navieras Puerto Rico ("NPR"), Holt Hauling & Warehousing Systems and NPR Holding Corp.'s motion for summary judgment.1 Plaintiffs are Alfredo Aponte Diaz ("Aponte"), his wife Emma Diaz Molina, the conjugal partnership composed by them, and their daughter Frances Aponte Diaz. Aponte held the position of Buyer at NPR. Plaintiffs claim that Navieras terminated Aponte in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")2 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")3, Title VII and the Constitutions of the United States and Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs also bring state law claims.

The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. See LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993). During his 27 year tenure at NPR and its corporate predecessors4 Aponte labored in different departments, including Operations, Accounting, Pricing & Tariffs, Administration and Purchasing.5 Aponte was commended for his work on various occasions and was never disciplined throughout his career.6 In May of 1990, Aponte requested a transfer due to a hearing impairment.7 Aponte was transferred to the position of Supervisor Retail Audit in the Pricing and Tarriffs Department, where he earned a higher salary and benefits.8 The position of Supervisor Retail Audit was eliminated in 1991.9 After the elimination of his position, Aponte was offered a position in Tampa, Florida, which he declined.10 Rather, Aponte requested the position of Buyer in the Purchasing Department in San Juan.11 Although the salary of Buyer was lower than that of Supervisor Retail Audit, Aponte's request was granted and his salary remained unchanged.12 Aponte's responsibilities as Buyer were, in essence, to purchase materials for all the departments in Navieras, approve and negotiate prices, manage inventory, maintain cost statistics and supervise an assistant Buyer and secretary.13 On March 4, 1996, NPR notified Aponte in writing that pursuant to a restructuring plan the position of Buyer would be eliminated and that he would be laid off effective March 15, 1996.14 At the time of his termination Aponte was fifty-six (56) years old.15 After his termination, Aponte received a pension from NPR based on the term of years he served.16

In its motion for summary judgment, NPR argues that Aponte's discharge was nondiscriminatory because it was the result of a major restructuring undertaken by NPR pursuant to a new business philosophy.17 NPR claims that when it acquired the assets of Navieras, there was a downturn in the market and the company decided to maximize its resources.18 Pursuant to a strategic plan, NPR implemented a company wide reduction in work force.19 NPR laid off employees throughout all its locations, including Puerto Rico where over fifty (50) employees were terminated.20

Plaintiffs have opposed the motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants NPR's motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party has the burden of presenting any facts that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841. The nonmovant must do more than show "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). An issue is genuine when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

ADEA Claim

Aponte claims that NPR dismissed him in violation of the ADEA. This statute makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of his age. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1). In a claim for wrongful discharge, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that he would not have been terminated but for his age. Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 478 (1st Cir.1993). The analytical framework for ADEA discrimination cases is interchangeable with the framework for Title VII cases. Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 n. 9 (1st Cir.1996). Under this analysis, when there is no direct evidence of age discrimination, the court must apply the burden shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1996); Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir.1996). Under the McDonnell Douglas standard, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by establishing that (1) he was within a protected class — in this case, that he was over 40; (2) his work performance met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone with similar skills and qualifications. Mulero-Rodriguez, 98 F.3d at 673; Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d 533, 536 (1st Cir.1996); Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 719 (1st Cir.1994). The burden to make out a prima facie case is not a particularly onerous one. Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir. 1995); Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 719; Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1995).

Once a plaintiff has successfully made out a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is created. Ayala-Gerena, 95 F.3d at 95; Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1091. A burden of production then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination. Ayala-Gerena, 95 F.3d at 95; Vega, 3 F.3d at 479. To satisfy its burden, the employer need only adduce admissible evidence that would allow a fact finder to rationally conclude that the adverse employment decision was not motivated by a discriminatory animus. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 845; Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (1st Cir.1988). If the employer successfully meets this burden of production, the inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's prima facie case drops out of the case. Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1091; Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 720. In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must then adduce evidence to show that (1) his employer's articulated reason for discharging the plaintiff was a mere pretext and (2) his employer intentionally discriminated against him. Mulero-Rodriguez, 98 F.3d at 674; Ayala-Gerena, 95 F.3d at 95. Because a prima facie case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation may permit a finding of liability in employment discrimination case, the plaintiff need not always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2109, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Id.

In the case before the Court, Aponte has shown that he was over forty at the time of his termination;21 that his work performance met NPR's legitimate expectations;22 and that NPR nevertheless terminated him.23 Plaintiff has established the first three elements of a prima facie case. To meet the fourth element of the prima facie case a plaintiff must show that his employer either replaced him with, or sought as a replacement, a person who had roughly equivalent job skills. Mulero-Rodriguez, 98 F.3d at 673; Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 719. An employer replaces an employee by hiring or reassigning someone "to perform the plaintiff's duties." Le Blanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 846 (1st Cir.1993)(quoting Barnes v. GenCorp. Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878, 111 S.Ct. 211, 112 L.Ed.2d 171(1990)). Thus, the inquiry focuses on who performs the plaintiff's duties once he is terminated. See Flebotte v. Dow Jones, 51 F.Supp.2d 36, 40 (D.Mass.1999); Shenker v. Lockheed Sanders Inc., 919 F.Supp. 55, 60 (D.Mass.1996). An employee holding a different title or position may be considered a replacement by being reassigned to perform most of plaintiff's duties.24 In addition to showing that he was replaced, Aponte must show that the person performing his duties has job skills roughly equivalent to his. Mulero-Rodriguez, 98 F.3d at 673; Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 719.

The only evidence in the record regarding this fourth element is a sworn statement by Aponte declaring:

Approximately 85% of the duties of Buyer that I...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 30 Septiembre 2003
    ...disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled. Aponte Diaz v. Navieras Puerto Rico, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 246, 254 (D.Puerto Rico 2001); see also, Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir.1995). ADA does not require an employer to ......
  • Otero v. Penney
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 22 Enero 2015
    ...may be considered a replacement by being reassigned to perform most of Plaintiff's duties," Aponte Diaz v. Navieras Puerto Rico, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 246 (D.P.R. 2001), the Plaintiff still bears the burden of showing that her alleged replacement has "job skills roughly equivalent to [her own......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT