Appeal of Forsyth County
Decision Date | 13 March 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 13,13 |
Citation | 203 S.E.2d 51,285 N.C. 64 |
Parties | Appeal of FORSYTH COUNTY, North Carolina from an action and final decision of the State Board of Assessment relating to the 1972 ad valorem taxes on certain tobacco inventory of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
P. Eugene Price, Jr. and Chester C. Davis, Winston-Salem, for appellant.
Hudson, Petree, Stockton, Stockton & Robinson by William F. Maready, Winston-Salem, for appellee.
The parties agree that the resolution of this controversy depends upon the interpretation of G.S. § 105--277(a) (1971). The act provides: 'Agricultural Products in Storage.--Any agricultural product held in North Carolina by any manufacturer or processor for manufacturing or processing, which agricultural product is of such nature as customarily to require storage and processing for periods of more than one year in order to age or condition such product for manufacture, is hereby classified as a special class of property under authority of Sec. 2(2), Article V of the Constitution.' The parties conceded that tobacco qualifies as an agricultural product and it is of such character as requires storage and processing for periods of more than one year; and that R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is a manufacturer and processor. The County has contended that the tobacco loses its preferred character for tax purposes when it is removed from the shed where the hogsheads were stored during the early part of the aging process. The taxpayer contends it retains its preferred status during the time it is Held in North Carolina by a manufacturer or processor for manufacturing or processing.
In Chapter 806, Session Laws of 1971, the General Assembly rewrote the North Carolina Machinery Act of 1971. § 105--277 is here quoted in material part:
The taxing authorities of Forsyth County contend that subtitle '(a) Agricultural Products in Storage' controls and that the tobacco becomes taxable at the moment it leaves the latticed shed where the hogsheads had been stored. Such is not the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Fletcher
...the enactment of that provision. Brown v. Brown , 353 N.C. 220, 224, 539 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2000) (first citing In re Forsyth County , 285 N.C. 64, 71, 203 S.E.2d 51, 55 (1974) ; and then citing Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham , 350 N.C. 805, 812, 517 S.E.2d 874, 879 (1999) ). S......
-
State v. Tutt
...Statutes. However, "[t]he law is clear that captions of a statute cannot control when the text is clear." In re Appeal of Forsyth County, 285 N.C. 64, 71, 203 S.E.2d 51, 55 (1974) (citing In re Chisholm's Will, 176 N.C. 211, 213, 96 S.E. 1031 (1918)). In Rule 103 the text makes it clear tha......
-
Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. v. Hinton
...somewhat misleading, and "[t]he law is clear that captions of a statute cannot control when the text is clear." In re Forsyth County, 285 N.C. 64, 71, 203 S.E.2d 51, 55 (1974). In the case sub judice, penalties were assessed under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 105-236(a)(5)(c), which does not require a ......
-
State v. Lyles
...exists, it cannot control when, as here, the language of the statute itself is clear and unambiguous. Cf. In re Forsyth County, 285 N.C. 64, 71, 203 S.E.2d 51, 55 (1974) (statute controls when language in caption conflicts with clear language in statute). Thus, to the extent that the commen......