Appeal of Hamilton

• Decision Date: 24 April 1962
• Parties: Appeal of Wilbur H. HAMILTON and Virginia H. Knauer, Requesting the Convening of a Special Grand Jury.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

180 A.2d 782

407 Pa. 366

Appeal of Wilbur H. HAMILTON and Virginia H. Knauer, Requesting the Convening of a Special Grand Jury.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 24, 1962.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 1962.

Stanley M. Greenberg, William A. Meehan, Edward R Becker, John J. Poserina, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellants.

David Berger, City Sol., Murray C. Goldman, Asst. City Sol., James L. Stern, Deputy City Sol., Levy Anderson, First Deputy City Sol., Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, and O'BRIEN, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

The appellants, as residents and taxpayers of the City of Philadelphia, petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County to convene a special grand jury to investigate alleged corruption in the city government. The court refused the request and dismissed the petitions. From that order, this appeal is prosecuted.

Following the entry of the appeal, a motion to quash was filed. Because of the naure of the proceedings and its serious public connotations, the Court decided to deny the motion to quash and hear the matter out. Counsel for all parties were granted the right to appear and argue thoroughly all of the issues involved. Now, after a more studied consideration of the matter, we are convinced that the appeal does not lie and that the motion to quash must prevail.

This is not an adversary proceeding. The appellants appeared before the court below to inform it of facts which, in their opinion, indicated the necessity for the investigation requested. The only function of the appellants was one of presenting facts and suggesting to the court that an investigation be ordered--nothing more. They claim and have no more than a public interest in the proceeding. The investigation they suggest would result in no direct benefit to them as individuals. Hence, no appealable interest is present. They are not 'parties aggrieved' in the legal sense. While members of the public may appear and express their convications or objections in judicial hearings directed at matters of public concern, the right to so appear and be heard does not, in itself, confer the right to appeal an adverse order. In the absence of statutory authority, no one has the right to appeal in proceedings of such a character, unless he is authorized to act in matters relating to 'the public welfare,' or has some personal right, necessary to be specially protected. This personal right, or beneficial interest, must be distinct from that of the general public and differ therefrom in kind and substance. See, Easton Transit Company's Petition, 270 Pa. 136, 112 A. 917 (1921); Elliot Estate, 388 Pa. 321, 131 A.2d 357 (1957); Ritter Finance Co., Inc., of Levittown v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A.2d 246 (1960); Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Commission, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A.2d 97 (1961); Kensington Club Liquor License Case, 164 Pa.Super. 401, 65 A.2d 428 (1949); Arsenal Board of Trade v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 166 Pa.Super. 548, 72 A.2d 612 (1950).

Appeal quashed.

JONES Justice (concurring).

On occasion a judge encounters a situation wherein he must yield his belief and opinion on the merits of a controversy in deference to a long settled and well established rule of procedure, a rule to which adherence is requisite if the administration of justice is to be orderly and certain. The case at bar presents such a situation.

A careful scrutiny of the instant record convinces me that the court below should have directed an investigation by a grand jury of the matters set forth in the petition presented to it. Had I been a member of the court below to which this petition was presented, without hesitation I would have granted the prayer of the petition and directed a grand jury investigation. Thus, in many respects, I am in full accord with the views expressed and the conclusions reached in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice BELL.

However, I believe that, under our decisions and well established practice, the present appellants lack the requisite legal standing to take this appeal. The right of appeal is not universal but confined to parties who are 'aggrieved' in the legal sense by an order, decree or judgment of a lower court. Such has been the rationale of our decisions over the years. In my opinion, the present appellants are not 'parties aggrieved' in the legal sense and, hence, had no right of appeal. It is, therefore, with reluctance that I conclude that this appeal must be quashed.

COHEN, Justice (concurring).

I concur with Justice EAGEN in his determination that appellants have no standing to prosecute an appeal from a denial of their request, as memorialists, for a special grand jury investigation. They are not 'parties aggrieved' by the order of the court below, a quality essential to their right of appeal. Keystone Raceway Corporation v. State Harness Racing Commission, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A.2d 97 (1961); Ritter Finance Co. of Levittown v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 465 A.2d 246 (1960). The memorialists appeared before Judge Alexander to 'inform' the court of alleged improprieties and to urge, therefore, the appointment of a grand jury. This was no adversary proceeding. The memorialists appear in the same capacity as citizens who come before a court requesting either clemency or the imposition of a severe sentence on a defendant who has been convicted or who has pled guilty. These petitioners, seeking to direct the discretion of the court, have no standing to prosecute an appeal when their requests to the court have been denied.

In taking this appeal, appellants have misconceived both the nature of a special charge to a grand jury and the function of a memorial wherein a court is requested to embark upon such a special grand jury investigation.

A grand jury is an arm of the criminal court. It is not an independent governmental body. Shenker v. Harr, Treasurer et al., 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938). See also Special Grand Jury Case, 397 Pa. 254, 154 A.2d 592 (1959). As declared in Commonwealth v. Hubbs (No. 1), 137 Pa.Super. 229, 241, 8 A.2d 611, 616 (1939):

'Under our conception of proper criminal procedure, no grand jury is ever considered an independent body; whether engaged in the exercise of its ordinary functions and powers in considering formal indictments laid before it by a district attorney, or in the performance of the special and occasional duty of investigating matters given it in charge by the court, it is still merely an arm of the court and under its control.'

In essence, the purpose of a memorial is to invoke the machinery of the court itself to engage, through the medium of the grand jury, in an investigation of the matters alleged. In that undertaking the court does not act as a judicial arbiter to adjudicate issues between contending parties. The proceeding is not an adversary one in the traditional sense of parties litigant seeking judgment of the court. Whether the court should undertake such an investigation is purely within the ambit of judicial discretion.

A memorial is not a pleading. Its presentation neither institutes a legal proceeding, nor does it bring any 'parties' before the court. Merely because the court determines specially to charge a grand jury to undertake an investigation gives no right to the memorialists to control the investigation or even participate in it.

It follows that individuals filing a memorial with a court have no standing as litigants. Rather, they are in the position of informers who undertake to bring to the attention of the court matters upon which the court is requested to act, not as a judicial arbiter but as a coordinate branch of government. It is clear beyond doubt that the court's determination specially to charge or not to charge the grand jury is not subject to appeal since there is no litigable controversy. In fact, there is no judicial controversy of any kind. The parties against whom the investigation may be directed cannot appeal therefrom; nor can the memorialists appeal from the determination of the court not to embark upon the investigation.

That this conclusion is inescapable is revealed by an examination of the grand jury cases considered by this court since the establishment of the Commonwealth. In no case has it come before us by way of appeal. Our jurisdiction has always been invoked by an application for writ of prohibition, to prevent an alleged improper exercise of power or an abuse of jurisdiction by the court below. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 106 A.L.R. 1373 (1936) is illustrative. The invariable purpose of these proceedings in our court has been to prohibit the court below from proceeding specially to charge the grand jury to embark upon an investigation. And it is significant that almost invariably, the one requisite for special grand jury investigation has been a request by a duly constituted law enforcing official. Despite this, we have repeatedly issued the writ of prohibition to enjoin the special grand jury investigation. Never in the history of the Commonwealth have we permitted a special grand jury investigation upon a memorial of a non-official group of citizens. See Appendix A, a collection of cases compiled by the city solicitor, counsel for appellees.

The writ of prohibition is original process. It is not an appeal to this court.

The counterpart of prohibition is mandamus. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. et al. v. Laird et al., 360 Pa. 94, 100 61 A.2d 426 (1948). What appellants are really seeking by this appeal is for this court to direct the court of quarter sessions to undertake the investigation through its arm, the grand jury. Therefore, this appeal is in the nature of a mandamus directed to Judge Alexander. But a private party only has...