Appeal of Heath

• Decision Date: 19 April 1951
• Citation: 146 Me. 229,79 A.2d 810
• Parties: Appeal of HEATH. In re REED'S WILL.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 810

79 A.2d 810

146 Me. 229

Appeal of HEATH.

In re REED'S WILL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 19, 1951.

Hutchinson, Pierce, Atwood & Scribner, Portland, John W. Quarrington, Richmond, John J. Keegan, Bath, proponents.

Franklin R. Chesley, Portland, (deceased), Edward S. Titcomb, James H. Titcomb, Sanford, Me., contestants.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY, and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

MERRILL, Justice.

On exceptions. Ore E. Reed, the testatrix, died on the eleventh day of October, A.D.1948 in a nursing home in Richmond, in the County of Sagadahoc and State of Maine. A document dated April 12, 1940, purporting to be her last will and testament, was offered for probate in the Probate Court for the County of Cumberland, State of Maine, by the executors named therein, who are here the appellees. The petition for probate of the will alleged that the testatrix last dwelt in Portland, in said County of Cumberland. The Judge of Probate for Cumberland County denied motions by the contestants, which motions sought the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on the ground that the testatrix died a resident of Richmond, in the County of Sagadahoc, and that because of the provisions of R.S. Chap. 140, Sec. 9, the Probate Court for Cumberland County was without jurisdiction in the premises. From this decision an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Probate. After hearing upon the petition, in which the contestants again raised the question of jurisdiction, the Judge of Probate held that the testatrix died a resident of Cumberland County and allowed the document presented as her last will and testament. From this decision of the Judge of Probate an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Probate. The aforesaid appeals were heard together in the Supreme Court of Probate and decree was entered holding that the testatrix died a resident of and domiciled in Portland, in the County of Cumberland and State of Maine, allowing the document presented as her last will and testament and dismissing both appeals. To the decree of the Justice of the Supreme Court of Probate, as well as to certain rulings of his admitting and excluding testimony and evidence, exceptions were alleged and allowed. It is on these exceptions that the case is now before this Court.

The bill of exceptions for convenience is divided into three numbered parts. Part numbered 1 is an exception to so much of the decree of the Justice of the Supreme Court of Probate as overruled the motion of the contestants to dismiss the petition, and his finding that the decedent was domiciled in and a resident of the city of Portland at the time of her decease. Part numbered 2 consists of a group of separate exceptions therein lettered A to H, both letters inclusive, the several exceptions being to rulings of the presiding Justice admitting or excluding testimony and evidence objected to by the contestants. Part numbered 3 is an exception to the decree of the Supreme Court of Probate allowing the will, and especially to so much thereof as held that the testatrix was of sound mind on April 12, 1940, the date of the execution thereof. For convenience we will first consider the exceptions contained in parts 1 and 3 of the bill of exceptions. These exceptions are to the decree and findings of the Supreme Court of Probate.

By and in the Reasons of Appeal, the issues before the Supreme Court of Probate were (1) the jurisdiction of the Probate Court for the County of Cumberland over the proceedings, (2) the execution of the will, (3) the competency of the testatrix to make a will and (4) whether its making and execution were procured through fraud, deceit and undue influence.

The validity of a decree of the Supreme Court of Probate can be challenged before this Court only by exceptions. Cotting v. Tilton's Estate, 118 Me. 91, 106 A. 113; Tuck v. Bean, 130 Me. 277, 155 A. 277; Appeal of Bronson, Aplt., 136 Me. 401, 11 A.2d 613; and Appeal of Edwards, Aplt., 141 Me. 219, 41 A.2d 825. Exceptions reach only errors in law. Clapp v. Balch, 3 Me. 216; Laroche v. Despeaux, 90 Me. 178, 38 A. 100. We said in Cotting v. Tilton, 118 Me. 91, 94, 106 A. 113, 114: 'The findings of the justice * * * in the Supreme Court of probate in matters of fact are conclusive, if there is any evidence to support them. And when the law invests him with the power to exercise his discretion, that exercise is not reviewable on exceptions. If he finds facts without evidence, or if he exercises descretion without authority, his doings may be challenged by exceptions.'

See also In re Mitchell, 133 Me. 81, 174 A. 38; Appeal of McKenzie, 123 Me. 152, 122 A. 186; Appeal of Packard, Aplt., 120 Me. 556, 115 A. 173; Palmer's Appeal, 110 Me. 441, 86 A. 919.

The sufficiency of bills of exceptions to the findings and decrees of the Supreme Court of Probate is determined by the same rules of law which determine the sufficiency of bills of exceptions in other civil cases, and especially by those applicable to bills of exceptions from the findings and decisions of a single Justice in cases tried without the intervention of a jury.

As said in Appeal of Bronson, Aplt., 136 Me. 401, 11 A.2d 613, 614, with respect to exceptions to a decree of the Supreme Court of Probate:--'It is now well settled that this Court under R.S., Chapter 91, Section 24 (now R.S., Chap. 94, Sec. 14), has jurisdiction over exceptions in civil and criminal proceedings only when they present in clear and specific phrasing the issues of law to be considered. The presentation of a mere general exception to a judgment rendered by a justice at nisi prius is not sufficient under the statute. Gerrish, Ex'r v. Chambers, 135 Me. 70, 189 A. 187. An exception to a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of Probate is within the rule.' (Emphasis ours.)

Exceptions to the findings of a single Justice on the ground that they are erroneous in law, to be within the foregoing statutory rule must on their face show in what respect the ruling is in violation of law. In the Bronson case, which held that the bill of exceptions was insufficient, it was alleged that 'said rulings were erroneous and prejudicial to her and she excepts thereto, and prays that her exceptions be allowed.'

The bill itself must state the grounds of exceptions in a summary manner. The bill must be able to stand alone. See Bradford v. Davis, 143 Me. ----, 56 A.2d 68. The bill of exceptions must show what the issue was and how the excepting party was aggrieved. Jones v. Jones, 101 Me. 447, 64 A. 815.

If the ground of exception to the finding of a single Justice is that it was erroneous in law because there was no evidence to support it, or because his finding was made without any evidence, such ground must clearly appear in the bill of exceptions. A general exception on the ground that the finding was erroneous in law is not sufficient. As said in Wallace v. Gilley, 136 Me. 523, 12 A.2d 416, 417: 'The exception, however, is not properly presented. It is directed generally and indiscriminately to the judgment below. It is not stated whether the error alleged is based upon the erroneous application of established rules of law, or upon findings of fact unsupported by evidence, or on other exceptionable grounds. It is now settled that the presentation of a mere general exception to a judgment rendered by a justice at nisi prius does not comply with the law.'

If it is claimed that the error in law is because the finding of fact is without any evidence to support it, the bill of exceptions should contain such allegation or its equivalent. The bill of exceptions in the present case, so far as it relates to the finding by the Justice of the Supreme Court of Probate that the testatrix died a resident of Cumberland County, and to his decision that the document presented was her last will and testament based upon his finding that she was possessed of testamentary capacity, nowhere alleges that such findings or either of them, were made without evidence to support them. Nor does the bill of exceptions contain language equivalent to such allegations. On the other hand, the bill of exceptions itself with respect to those subjects clearly shows that there was evidence with respect to each of them to be weighed and passed upon by the presiding Justice and from which he could draw conclusions which supported his findings with respect thereto.

The effect of the statements contained in the bill of exceptions respecting these issues amounts to no more than that the presiding Justice erred in making his choice between two conclusions, either of which he could have made from the facts set forth in the bill of exceptions. The exceptions to so much of the decree as relates to the jurisdiction of the court and to the sustaining of the will are insufficient. Neither of them either by direct allegation or by necessary inference alleges any error of law on the part of the presiding Justice. They must be overruled as insufficient.

Realizing, however, the importance of this case to the parties, involving as it does an estate of approximately one-half million dollars, we have carefully examined the case upon its merits so far as these issues are concerned. The reading of the entire record presented to us, consisting of 1332 pages, together with a volume of exhibits consisting of 75 pages, and the briefs of the parties containing 187 pages, and an examination of the cases cited was no small task. In approaching this task we were bound by the rule, too well established to require further mention, that if there is any evidence to support the findings and decree of the Supreme Court of Probate, exceptions will not lie. Even had the bill of exceptions been sufficient, because of the foregoing rule we would not have been obliged nor would it have been within our...