Appeal of Kimberly

• Decision Date: 22 December 1896
• Citation: 36 A. 847,68 Conn. 428
• Parties: Appeal of KIMBERLY et ux.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

36 A. 847

68 Conn. 428

Appeal of KIMBERLY et ux.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 22, 1896.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Prentice, Judge.

The probate court for the district of New Haven approved an instrument as the last will of Frederick H. Hoadley. Augustus H. Kimberly and wife, contestants, appealed to the superior court, where there was also verdict and judgment sustaining the will, and contestants again appeal. Affirmed.

William C. Case and William H. Ely, for appellants.

Samuel Fessenden and Henry Stoddard, for appellees.

FENN, J. This is an appeal to the superior court from an order and decree of the court of probate for the district of New Haven, approving an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of Frederick H. Hoadley, of said New Haven. The case was tried to a jury, and the will was sustained.

The only claim made upon the trial by the appellants related to the testamentary capacity of the testator, and was that he was of unsound mind on November 2, 1893, the time said instrument was executed. The five reasons assigned in the appeal to this court present three questions. The first relates to rulings upon evidence; the second, to portions of the charge to the jury; and the third presents, or was intended to present, objections to the charge taken as a whole. We will consider these matters in the above order.

Upon the trial the contestants claimed and offered evidence to prove that the deceased, who at the time of his death, February 25, 1895, was a bachelor about 49 years of age, a graduate of Yale, and by profession a physician, was a man endowed by nature with more than ordinary mental powers, which he had improved by education and travel; that at some time about 1878 or 1879 he began to make use of morphine or other kindred drug; that, as the result of such use, he, in the course of time, so undermined his physical and mental powers that, long before said will was made, he became of unsound mind, and so continued to his death; that his mental impairment was indicated in part and characterized by insane delusions which he entertained concerning his sister, Mrs. Kimberly, the contestant, who was the only surviving member of his immediate family, and for whom he had previously had a strong affection, and respecting her conduct towards and treatment of him and others; that these delusions controlled his relations to his sister during his later years, and led him without cause to harbor towards her feelings of hostility and dislike, so that he was wholly alienated from her, and to make the will he did, ignoring her. The proponents, on the other hand, claimed and offered evidence to prove that the testator, although upon occasions a user of morphine, was never a morphine habitue, and that he never did, as the result of its use, permanently impair, to any noticeable degree at least, either his physical health or mental powers; that he remained through life possessed of a strong, vigorous, and well-balanced mind; that he harbored no delusions touching his sister; and that the long estrangement between them (which was conceded) was not the consequence of insane imaginings or insane delusions, but of causes which were real, substantial, and sufficient.

The contestants, as a part of their case, and as tending to establish their said claim, offered evidence to show that the testator during the latter years of his life was careless and even slovenly in his dress and personal appearance, whereas he had formerly been scrupulously neat and particular; that his countenance was unnaturally pallid, his eyes glassy, his speech hesitating and incoherent, the muscles of face and hands nervous and twitching; and that he had a tendency to drowsiness, and even to fall asleep, in conversation. All these things the proponents denied, and offered evidence to disprove. Among their witnesses for this purpose were Samuel T. Dutton, Mrs. Lena Neilson, Theodore S. Palmer, Mrs. Emily Sands, Mrs. J. K. Thacher, and Mrs. C. H. Merriam. These witnesses, in answer to questions by appellees' counsel, testified to their acquaintance with the testator the duration of such acquaintance, the occasions upon which they had met him, the opportunities which they had had of observing him, his appearance, conduct, and conversation upon such occasions, and to the facts within their knowledge which formed the foundation of the opinions afterwards expressed by them, and then, in further response to inquiries from counsel for the appellees, and without objection, testified that, in their opinion, the testator was of sound mind. Questions were thereupon asked of these witnesses by counsel for the appellees, and against the objection of the appellants that the questions were immaterial and irrelevant, as follows: Of Samuel T. Dutton: "State whether or not during this period you observed any indication of mental weakness." Of Mrs. Lena Neilson: "Will you state whether you ever observed in his appearance or manner or conduct anything which indicated mental unsoundness?" Of Theodore S. Palmer: "Was there anything in his looks, talk, conversation, address, or anything about him that indicated any aberration of intellect in any way?" Of Mrs. Emily Sands: "Did you ever at any time see anything to indicate that he was not of perfectly sound mind?" Of Mrs. J. K. Thacher: "Was there anything in his apparel, his deportment, or conduct, or conversation, that indicated any unsoundness of mind?" Of Mrs. C. H. Merriam: "During the entire period that you knew him, I should like to have you tell the jury whether there was ever any occasion when he showed to you any incoherence in his conversation, anything that attracted your attention, indicating that he was either mentally unbalanced, or incompetent in any respect mentally." To all of these questions the several witnesses answered in the negative. Counsel for the appellants duly excepted in each case.

The action of the superior court in admitting these questions was, we think, justified by what is held in Appeal of Shanley, 62 Conn. 325, 330, 25 Atl. 245, 246. It is there said, concerning "mental unsoundness beginning at a certain time, and indicated by certain changes in the appearance and conduct of the testatrix," that, "as bearing upon this complex question, acquaintance with Mrs. Shanley before and after 1874, opportunities to see her after that date, and to observe what changes there were in her conduct and appearance, to state them if there were any, and if there were none to so state, were facts of the highest significance." But it it claimed by the appellants that the questions here asked confessedly called for the opinions of witnesses upon facts which were not given, and could not be given; that such witnesses were all nonexpert; and that what their standard of sanity was, or whether they had any standard, or any correct idea whatever of what constitutes insanity, does not and cannot be made to appear. But it must be borne in mind that all these witnesses had, and without objection, testified to their acquaintance with the testator, embracing the details and particulars, as hereinbefore stated, and had then given their opinions, founded upon such recited facts, that the testator was of sound mind. That thus far the testimony was admissible, no question has been made or exists. The standard or idea of each witness as to sanity or insanity had sufficiently appeared to furnish a basis for that expression of opinion. And now, concerning these further questions, the same foundation supports them, and the very reason upon which the exception to the general rule, by virtue of which exception such opinion evidence from nonexpert witnesses is received at all, applies with peculiar force, namely, "that the nature of the subject-matter is such that it cannot be reproduced or detailed to the jury precisely as it appeared to the witness at the time." Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn. 9; Appeal of Shanley, supra. The asking of these questions, calling for simply a bald affirmative or negative reply, with full opportunity existing for cross-examination to elicit how much in the answer was matter of fact, and how much opinion as to what would indicate mental unsoundness, could not, we think, have tended improperly to the prejudice of the contestants, and did assist in presenting to the jury the most correct possible reproduction of the subject-matter "as it appeared to the witness at the time."

Coming now to the charge: The appellants requested the court to say that "if the jury are satisfied that the testator had become estranged from his sister, and hostile to her by reason of false beliefs in regard to her conduct and feeling towards him, which feeling of hostility remained with him and influenced him in excluding her from his will, in favor of strangers, then the will is invalid." The proponents requested the court to charge that "speaking generally, and as applied to this case, an insane delusion is a false belief, for which there is no reasonable foundation, and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if of sound mind, and concerning which the mind of the decedent was not open to permanent correction, through evidence or argument." The court refused to charge as requested by the contestants, and did charge as requested by the proponents, adding: "A false belief, you should bear in mind, is not necessarily an insane delusion. False beliefs are common to men. It is only when these false beliefs are such as a reasonable man would not under the circumstances entertain, that they become insane delusions." The request made by the appellants...