Appeal of Kindis
| Decision Date | 19 January 1972 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re Appeal of Jacquelyn KINDIS et al. |
Steven P. Floman, New Haven, for Sylvia Kindis.
Frank J. Kinney, Jr., New Haven, for Jacquelyn and Jordan Kindis, minor children.
Thomas K. Ellsworth, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Arcari, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Before HOUSE, C.J., and THIM, RYAN, SHAPIRO and LOISELLE, JJ.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Juvenile Court which denied the appellant's petitions for the revocation of orders of the Juvenile Court for the commitment of two children of the appellant on a finding that they were uncared for and neglected. It involves the operation of the law in that delicate and difficult area which concerns the natural rights of parents with respect to their children and the prerogative powers of the state in the exercise of some sort of safeguards and some measure of fostering care for neglected and uncared-for children. The authority of the state and the exercise of its jurisdiction is well established in the common law with a full understanding that '(t)aking children from their parents is, when possible, to be avoided; on the other hand parental obligations are to be enforced.' Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 82, 121 A. 678, 682.
In 1963, by orders of the Juvenile Court, the children were taken from their natural parents as uncared for and neglected children and committed to the commissioner of welfare for placement in a foster home where they are now living. Their mother, the petitioner, in 1969 filed with the Juvenile Court petitions seeking the revocation of the orders. The petitions were denied by the Juvenile Court and the appeal to the Superior Court followed. As provided by § 17-70 of the General Statutes, the Superior Court heard the appeal on the record of the proceedings in the Juvenile Court. Under § 17-70 the Superior Court is charged with the duty to 'review the record so certified of the proceedings in the juvenile court and determine whether the court has found facts without evidence or has reached conclusions which cannot be reasonably derived from the facts found or the law applicable thereto or both, or has acted illegally or arbitrarily.'
From the record before it and after hearing the interested parties, the Superior Court found that the Juvenile Court was legally correct in applying the 'best interests of the children' standard, that there was evidence before the Juvenile Court on which it could, applying that standard, deny the petitions without abusing its discretion and that it did not act arbitrarily. Since these conclusions were dispositive of the issues raised by the petitioner, the Superior Court dismissed the appeal.
In the appeal to this court, the petitioner claims that both the Juvenile Court and the Superior Court erred in applying the standard of what was in the best interests of the children. She relies on the language of § 17-62(f) of the General Statutes which provides that any court which has committed a neglected or uncared-for child 'may, upon the application of a parent . . . upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, revoke such commitment.' It is her claim that, as used in this statute, the word 'may' should be construed in the sense of 'shall' and that the only test to be applied by the court is whether 'cause for commitment no longer exists.'
We cannot agree with the validity of this contention. The obvious absurdity of such an interpretation lies in the fact that a neglected and uncared for child ceases to be neglected and uncared for once he is placed in a foster home where, presumably, he will be given the care and attention he deserves. The petitioner's reasoning is circuitous since her analysis dictates a finding that the cause for commitment no longer exists once the commitment order is complied with and the child is cared for by foster parents. If we were to accept this tautology as the single test prescribed by the legislature, the courts of this state would be forced to treat the child as a yoyo to be tossed back and forth without regard to the circumstances or the child's best interests. We cannot, in good conscience, ascribe such a meaningless intention to an act of the legislature. The Superior Court did not hold that the 'best interest' standard was the sole test to be applied to the exclusion of a finding that cause for commitment no longer exists. What it did hold was that the Juvenile Court was legally correct in applying that standard in making...
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In re Ava W.
...of § 46b-121 (b) (1), our courts had broad authority over juvenile matters pursuant to the common law. See In re Appeal of Kindis , 162 Conn. 239, 240, 294 A.2d 316 (1972), citing Cinque v. Boyd , 99 Conn. 70, 82, 121 A. 678 (1923) ; In re Appeal of Kindis , supra, at 240, 294 A.2d 316 ("[t......
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