Appeal of Mulac

Decision Date25 May 1965
Citation418 Pa. 207,210 A.2d 275
PartiesAppeal of John MULAC, Appellant, and Ruth Hanna From the Decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of McKeesport.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

David S. Palkovitz, Jack Palkovitz, Palkovitz &amp Palkovitz, Robert Palkovitz, McKeesport, for appellant.

A J. Rosenbleet, City Sol., McKeesport, for City of McKeesport and Zoning Board.

Dayne Shaw, McKeesport, for Baehr Brothers.

Before BELL C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, and ROBERTS, JJ.

O'BRIEN Justice.

The case at bar involves the re-zoning of a parcel of land in the City of McKeesport from "E' Residential' to 'General Business'. The land in question was, for a long period, owned by the School District of the City of McKeesport, which maintained a school building thereon. The property consists of one city block, bounded by Soles, Oak, Bridge and Evans Streets, in the seventh ward of the City, and measures 210 ft. X 215 ft., being 45,150 sq. ft., or 1.04 acres.

The McKeesport Zoning Ordinance, enacted in 1953, designated the property in question, and the surrounding property, as "E' Residential'. Subsequent to the enactment of the 1953 Ordinance, the school use of the property was discontinued and the School District conveyed the property to Baehr Brothers. Thereafter, the City Council enacted an ordinance amending the 1953 ordinance by changing the zoning classificatin of the property to 'General Business'. In due course, Baehr Brothers applied for, and was granted, a building permit for he erection of a grocery super market on the re-zoned premises.

Residents and property owners in the vicinity appealed to the Board of Adjustment, which sustained the grant of the building permit. An appeal followed to the County Court of Allegheny County, which remanded the matter to the Board for further hearing. New hearings were held by the Board, it again sustained the grant of the permit and an appeal was taken to the County Court. The Court, without taking additional testimony, sustained the Board and dismissed the appeal; we allowed an appeal in accordance with the provisions of Rule 68 1/2 of this court.

Appellant contends that the amendatory ordinance is invalid because not accomplished in accordance with a comprehensive plan and does not promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Appellant further argues that the amendatory ordinance constitutes spot zoning and is, therefore, illegal. Appellees urge that the re-zoning was within the scope of the City's comprehensive plan; that there was no spot zoning, inasmuch as the general area is mixed in nature, consisting of residential and commercial properties; and that the Board neither abused its discretion nor committed an error of law.

We conclude that the re-zoning of the land in question constituted illegal spot zoning. Putney v. Abington Twp., 176 Pa. Super. 463, 108 A.2d 134 (1954), defined spot zoning as "A singling out of one lot or a small area for different treatment from that accorded to similar surrounding land indistinguishable from it in character, for the economic benefit of the owner of that lot or to his economic detriment is invalid 'spot' zoning". This definition was specifically approved by us in several recent cases. Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964); Upper Darby Township Appeal, 413 Pa. 583, 198 A.2d 538 (1964); Glorioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964).

While there is not, and cannot be, a formula which can be applied with mathematical certainty to determine whether a particular situation constitutes spot zoning, guide lines are available for application to individual fact situations. In French v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 408 Pa. 479, 184 A.2d 791 (1962), we held that the commercial zoning of six parcels of land, then devoted to commercial uses, in the midst of a residentially zoned area, was spot zoning. In Cleaver, supra, we approved the re-zoning of some 11 acres of land, and in Upper Darby Township Appeal, supra, we approved that re-zoning of a parcel less than 1 acre in size. In Glorioso, supra, we reversed the 'special' zoning of a 4 1/2 acre tract. Clearly, the size of the property involved is only one of the determining factors. What is most determinative is whether the parcel in question is being singled out for treatment unjustifiably differing from that of similar surrounding land, thereby creating an 'island' having no relevant differences from its neighbors.

In neither Cleaver nor Upper Darby were such islands created, while in Glorioso and French they were. In Glorioso, we held that 'the only distinction between the zoning in the instant case and in French is that the spot zoning in French tended to increase the value of the area given exceptional treatment whereas here the special treatment tended to diminish value'. The case at bar fits into the situation in French, the value of the re-zoned property being greatly enhanced by the amendatory ordinance.

Appellees' argument that the re-zoning was proper because the parcel is situated in an area of mixed commercial and residential uses is not persuasive. The area in which the subject premises is located is zoned residential. It is true that, within the confines of this large residential zone, certain commercial uses exist. All such commercial establishments exist, however, as non-conforming uses and, should such uses cease, the properties could be utilized only for residential purposes. French v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., supra. The amendatory ordinance creates a commercially zoned island in a residentially zoned sea and, unless a proper basis appears for such special treatment, cannot be sustained.

The facts fail to disclose any sound basis for such special treatment. The record discloses that the property could be used, albeit not as profitably, for residential purposes. The record does not support the conclusion reached by the court below that new residential development in the neighborhood is not economically feasible, the owner himself having testified that the land could be so developed.

Since the court below took no additional testimony, our function is to determine whether the Board of Adjustment clearly abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, supra; Jasy Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 413 Pa. 563, 198 A.2d 854 (1964). We conclude that an error of law was committed in that the Board failed to find the amendatory ordinance to be illegal spot zoning. So holding, we neither discuss nor decide the questions raised concerning comprehensive plan and the promotion of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

Order reversed.

ROBERTS Justice (concurring).

I concur in the result reached by the majority but do so only after considering, as the majority fails to do, 'the questions raised concerning comprehensive plan and the promotion of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.' In my view, a finding of illegal 'spot zoning' must necessarily involve consideration of those matters.

Confusion arises in this area of zoning law because of the dichotomy of meaning attributed to the term 'spot zoning'. In some instances, 'spot zoning' is used in a descriptive sence connoting the geographical isolation...

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2 cases
  • Appeal of Mulac
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • May 25, 1965
  • Carnahan v. Slippery Rock Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • November 8, 2023
    ...to a single property and the costs and benefits to be balanced are those of particular property owners. In Appeal of Mulac, . . . 210 A.2d 275, 277 1965), we [defined] "spot zoning" . . . "as a singling out of one lot or a small area for different treatment from that accorded to similar sur......
1 books & journal articles
  • Property pieces in compensation statutes: law's eulogy for Oregon's measure 37.
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Vol. 38 No. 4, September 2008
    • September 22, 2008
    ...land, thereby 'creating an "island" having no relevant differences from its neighbors' (citations omitted) (quoting Appeal of Mulac, 210 A.2d 275,277 (1965))). (207) Bishop Nursing Home, 638 A.2d at 386; see also Pierce v. King County, 382 P.2d 628, 638 (Wash. 1963); State ex rel. Miller v.......

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