Carnahan v. Slippery Rock Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.
| Docket Number | 1082 C.D. 2022 |
| Decision Date | 08 November 2023 |
| Parties | Marcia Carnahan, Donald M. Carnahan, Paul Boas, and Christopher Coleman, Appellants v. Slippery Rock Township Zoning Hearing Board, Slippery Rock Township, and Heilman Pavement Specialties, Inc. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Appellants Marcia Carnahan, Donald M. Carnahan, Paul Boas, and Christopher Coleman (collectively Appellants) appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County's (Common Pleas) September 7, 2022 order. Through that order, Common Pleas affirmed Appellee Slippery Rock Township Zoning Hearing Board's (Zoning Board) November 22, 2021 decision (Decision), in which the Board had denied Appellants' substantive validity challenge to Slippery Rock Township (Township) Ordinance No. 2020-1.[1] We affirm.
Common Pleas Op., 11/23/22, at 2. In its application, HEI-WAY listed its proposed use for the Property as "[c]ommercial development for [c]old-mix asphalt plant with product storage and associated facilities including scale(s) and scale house[,]" and requested that the Board of Supervisors rezone the Property from RC-1 Rural Conservation to L-I Light Industrial. R.R. at 1a.[5] On May 11, 2020, the Township's Planning Commission voted unanimously to recommend that the Board of Supervisors rezone as Light Industrial both the Property and two nearby parcels of land. Id. at 4a. The Board of Supervisors then held a public hearing on June 8, 2020, regarding the proposed zoning changes and, on June 22, 2022, enacted Ordinance No. 2020-1, which changed the zoning classification of those three lots from Rural Conservation to Light Industrial. Id. at 35a-36a; S.R.R. at 264a-303a.
Thereafter, on September 8, 2021, Appellants filed their substantive validity challenge to Ordinance No. 2020-1, but only as to its effect upon the Property. See R.R. at 65a-67a. The Zoning Board held a hearing regarding Appellants' challenge on October 27, 2021, and, after considering the parties' respective arguments and evidentiary submissions, denied the challenge on November 22, 2021. Appellants then appealed this denial to Common Pleas, which took no additional evidence and, on September 7, 2022, affirmed the Board's Decision, in full. This appeal to our Court followed shortly thereafter.
Preliminarily, we must address Heilman's argument that Paul Boas does not have standing to maintain the instant appeal. Heilman's Br. at 16-20. Heilman moved to challenge Boas' standing during the course of the Zoning Board's October 27, 2021 hearing, and though the Zoning Board stated in its Decision that "[b]ased on the testimony given in this matter by Boas, [it did] not believe he [met] the standard for being a [p]arty," the Zoning Board nevertheless declined to grant Heilman's motion. Decision at 6-7. Heilman then reiterated its challenge to Boas' standing during the course of appellate proceedings before Common Pleas, but Common Pleas denied that challenge without explanation. See Common Pleas Order, 9/7/22, at 2. As a prevailing party that was not ultimately aggrieved by either the Zoning Board's Decision or Common Pleas' subsequent order, Heilman was not required to file a protective cross-appeal in order to preserve this issue for consideration at a later juncture. See McGuire on behalf of Neidig v. City of Pittsburgh, 250 A.3d 516, 526 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021); Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Com., 83 A.3d 107, 112-13 (Pa. 2013); but see Firearm Owners Against Crime v. Papenfuse, 261 A.3d 467, 476 nn. 8 & 13 (Pa. 2021) ().
In order to have standing, a party must be "aggrieved," in that the party must have an interest in the matter that is substantial, direct, and immediate. William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 282-83 (Pa. 1975).
A substantial interest is one in which there is "some discernible adverse effect to some interest other than the abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply with the law." William Penn, . . . 346 A.2d at 282. A "direct" interest requires a showing that the matter complained of causes harm to the party's interest. Upper Bucks [Cnty.] Vocational-Technical [Sch. Educ. Ass'n] v. Upper Bucks [Cnty.] Vocational-Technical School Joint Comm[.], . . . 474 A.2d 1120 ([Pa.] 1984). An "immediate" interest is something more than a "remote consequence" and centers on the causal nexus and proximity between the action complained of and the injury to the party challenging it. William Penn, . . . 346 A.2d at 283; Skippack [Cmty.] Ambulance [Ass'n], Inc. v. [Twp.] of Skippack, . . . 534 A.2d 563 . The requirement that the interest be "immediate" is also met where it falls within the "zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Upper Bucks [Cnty.], . . . 474 A.2d at 1122. Finally, the rationale underlying the requirement that the party be "aggrieved" or "adversely affected" by the action at issue is to ensure that a legal challenge is made by the appropriate party.
Pittsburgh Tr. for Cultural Res. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 604 A.2d 298, 303-04 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). "[A] party who appears before a zoning board may only appeal an adverse decision to court if that party has standing per this . . . traditional understanding of the concept." S. Bethlehem Assocs., LP v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bethlehem Twp., 294 A.3d 441, 448 (Pa. 2023); see Section 916.1(b) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), 53 P.S. § 10916.1(b)[6]("Persons aggrieved by a use or development permitted on the land of another by an ordinance or map, or any provision thereof, who desires to challenge its validity on substantive grounds shall first submit their challenge to the zoning hearing board for a decision thereon under [S]ection 909.1(a)(1) [of the MPC[7]."); 2 Pa. C.S. § 752 ().
A key component of the William Penn standing analysis, and whether an objector is "aggrieved" for purposes of the MPC, is whether the proposed use in question, or, in a substantive validity challenge, the challenged ordinance, actually causes the injury complained of by the objector. William Penn, 346 A.2d at 282; see also Worthington [v. Mount Pleasant Twp.], 212 A.3d 582, 593 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)] ("theoretical concerns do not satisfy the legal requirement that [the objector] have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest to have standing"); Laughman [v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Newberry Twp., 964 A.2d 19, 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)] ().
Lodge v. Robinson Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 283 A.3d 910, 926 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
In this instance,[8] Boas testified before the Zoning Board that he resides along Slippery Rock Creek, "about seven or eight miles" from the Property. R.R. at 167a.
Boas' residence is thus not in close proximity to the Property and its location, standing alone, cannot support a determination that he has standing in this matter. See Laughman, 964 A.2d at 22. Boas also stated that he is an avid kayaker who regularly spends time on the Creek, which abuts the Property, often passes by the Property while kayaking to-and-from his home downstream, and is concerned that pollution from the proposed cold-mix asphalt plant (whose placement on the Property would not be allowed absent the Property's rezoning) will negatively affect his ability to use and enjoy the Creek. See R.R. at 167a-71a. Such concerns, however, are merely speculative at this juncture, and cannot serve as a basis for conferring standing upon him. Worthington, 212 A.3d at 593. Consequently, we conclude that Boas was not aggrieved in this instance and dismiss him from this matter for lack of standing.
With that question resolved, we now turn to the substance of the arguments posed by Marcia Carnahan, Donald M. Carnahan, and Christopher Coleman (Remaining Appellants).[9] As they did when before the Zoning Board and Common Pleas, Remaining Appellants assert that Ordinance No. 2020-1 is substantively invalid with regard to the Property because the Ordinance (a) had spot zoned the Property; (b) violated article I, section...
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