Appeal of Woodbury

• Decision Date: 24 March 1898
• Citation: 39 A. 791,70 Conn. 455
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Appeal of WOODBURY.

39 A. 791

70 Conn. 455

Appeal of WOODBURY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 24, 1898.

Appeal from superior court Hartford county; Samuel O. Prentice, Judge.

Appeal by Milo K. Woodbury, trustee in insolvency, from an order and decree of the court of probate for the district of Enfield, denying the application for an extension of time within which creditors might present their claims against the insolvent estate. Facts found, and judgment rendered in favor of the testator, and appeal by Margaret Raiche, a creditor of the insolvent estate, for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. Error and cause remanded.

Milo K. Woodbury, the present appellee, as trustee in insolvency of the estate of one Raiche, presented a petition to the court of probate, in which said estate was then in process of settlement, alleging, in substance, that the time limited by said court for the presentation of claims to the commissioners upon said estate had expired; that, through inadvertence and mistake, a number of creditors, representing over one-third of the total liabilities of said estate, had failed to present their claims within the time limited; that said claims were justly due from said estate; and asking that the time for presentation of claims be extended. The court refused to extend the time, and, from this order and decree of refusal, the trustee took an appeal to the superior court. The motion for said appeal alleged no other interest in Woodbury than as trustee in insolvency of said estate. Margaret Raiche, a creditor of said estate appeared in the superior court, and filed a motion to erase the case from the docket, "upon the grounds that it does not appear upon said appeal that the appellant has any interest in the decree appealed from, and also that the appellant, as trustee of said estate, has no right to appeal from said decree." The court denied the motion, and, upon further hearing, rendered judgment reversing the probate decree appealed from, reopening the hearing before the commissioners, and extending the time for presentation of claims for the period of one month from the date of judgment. From this judgment, Margaret Raiche appealed to this court, and assigns for error the action of the superior court 1) in denying the motion to erase; (2) in overruling two certain specified claims made by her on the trial; (3) in fixing, by its judgment, the limits of the extension of time, instead of leaving this to be done by the probate court.

Charles E. Perkins and John Hamlin, for appellant.

George B. Fowler, for appellee.

TORRANCE, J. The first question to be considered is whether the motion to erase should have been granted, and that depends upon the further question whether the trustee, as such, had the right to appeal from the probate decree in question here. It is well settled that, to entitle a party to appeal in a case like this, he must have some pecuniary interest which the decree or order appealed from will in some way injuriously affect. Norton's Appeal, 46 Conn. 527; Dickerson's Appeal, 55 Conn. 223, 10 Atl. 194, and 15 Atl. 99. Furthermore, the record mast show that he has such an interest; and if it does not, or shows that he has none, the case will, on a motion to that effect, be erased from the docket. Norton's Appeal, supra; Campbell's Appeal, 64 Conn. 277, 29 Atl. 494. The superior court in this case held, correctly enough, that the appellant must have a pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the appeal. It also held that such interest may be "either in the appellant personally, or in another, with the duty in him, by virtue of his fiduciary relations or representative capacity, to protect it." This last, as a general statement of a general rule, is perhaps sufficiently accurate. The trustee in insolvency is unquestionably, for certain purposes and to a limited extent, the representative of both the debtor and the creditors. He takes the property upon a trust—First, to apply so much thereof as may be necessary to the payment of proven debts and attendant expenses; and, secondly, to return whatever surplus may remain to the original owner. He also, like executors, administrators, and receivers, and others who act in a representative capacity, is charged with the...