Weidlich v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Bridgeport

• Decision Date: 21 April 1953
• Citation: 139 Conn. 652,96 A.2d 547
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WEIDLICH v. FIRST NAT. BANK & TRUST CO. OF BRIDGEPORT et al. In re WEIDLICH'S ESTATE. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 547

96 A.2d 547

139 Conn. 652

WEIDLICH v. FIRST NAT. BANK & TRUST CO. OF BRIDGEPORT et al.

In re WEIDLICH'S ESTATE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 21, 1953.

Clifton F. Weidlich, New York City, P. Corbin Kohn, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Henry J. Lyons, Bridgeport, Frederick L. Comley, Bridgeport, on the brief, for appellees, defendant executors and trustees.

John F. McGowan, Bridgeport, for appellee, defendant Hetty S. Weidlich.

Before BROWN, C. J., and INGLIS, O'SULLIVAN, DALY, and SHEA, JJ. (Judges Edward J. Daly and William J. Shea of the Superior Court sat for Judges Jennings and Baldwin.)- BROWN, Chief Justice.

This action originated as an appeal by the plaintiff, a remainderman under the will of Louis Weidlich, from a decree of the Probate Court for the district of Fairfield awarding a further monthly allowance for the support of the widow. The Superior Court confirmed the order and dismissed the appeal, and the plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The essential facts contained in the finding, which is subject to no material correction, may be thus summarized: On July 21, 1950, the testator died leaving his widow surviving, but no descendants. The named defendant and another duly qualified as executors. The gross estate was $780,956.25. Between June, 1950, and October 26, 1951, the widow received a cash legacy, the homestead and lands, household furniture and other personal property, and income from a residuary trust, all pursuant to the will, and she also received distributions from the Weidlich Brothers Manufacturing Company to her as a stockholder, a director's fee, jointly owned property, insurance proceeds, and a widow's allowance, making a total of $285,071.41. On August 15, 1950, the Probate Court ordered an allowance of $1250 a month payable to the widow until further order of court, and thereunder $15,000 was paid to her by the executors for the period of one year from July 25, 1950. There was no appeal from the order. The plaintiff is financially interested in the estate as a remainderman under the will.

On August 14, 1951, the Probate Court on petition of the executors ordered payment of further sums of $1250 per month for the support of the widow for the period from July 26, 1951, until October 26, 1951, or until further order of court. When this order was entered the estate was still in the process of settlement, and the executors in asking the further allowance stated that the estate could not and would not be settled for at least three months, which proved to be the fact. The third paragraph of the will provides: 'I direct my Executors on behalf of my wife, Hetty S. Weidlich, to apply to the Probate Court for an allowance for her support and maintenance while my estate is in the process of settlement, and if, for any reason, the Court shall not make such allowance, I direct my Executors to pay to my wife for her support and maintenance, the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($1,250) per month while my estate is in the process of settlement, however long that period may be, and to charge said sums against the principal of my estate.' Neither the petition of the executors for the original allowance for the widow's support nor that for the additional allowance was denied. Both were granted. The executors paid the additional allowance in the amount of $3750 to the widow.

One only of the trial court's conclusions requires mention: 'The [plaintiff] is not aggrieved by the order of the Probate Court from which he has appealed.' In substance, the plaintiff's claims of law were: (1) In the absence of a showing of necessity, the Probate Court had no authority to order the further allowance. (2) The award of the further allowance was contrary to § 7033 of the General Statutes. (3) It constituted an abuse of the legal discretion of the Probate Court. (4) The plaintiff is aggrieved by the award in that it is payable out of the principal of the estate in which he has a present vested interest. (5) Since the third paragraph of the will, if construed as valid, ousts the Probate Court of jurisdiction over the widow's allowance, it would deprive the plaintiff of his property rights contrary to the due process and equal protection of the laws clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and to § 9 of Article first of the constitution of Connecticut. (6) The third paragraph of the will is wholly void because it is contrary to the public policy of Connecticut.

Section 7071 of the General Statutes provides that '[a]ny person aggrieved by any order * * * of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may appeal therefrom to the superior court'. The appeal of the plaintiff was taken pursuant to this statute, and one of his allegations is that he 'is aggrieved' by the Probate Court's decree. It is essential to a valid appeal under the statute that the appellant is aggrieved by the order appealed from. Palmer v. Reeves, 120 Conn. 405, 409, 182 A. 138; Orcutt's Appeal, 61 Conn. 378, 382, 24 A. 276. If the appellant is not a party aggrieved, the appeal is void. Fuller v. Marvin, 107 Conn. 354, 357, 140 A. 731. This presents two questions for determination. First, what does the statute mean by 'aggrieved'? Second, is the plaintiff aggrieved within that meaning? The term 'aggrieved,' as used in the statute, applies only to those who can show a direct pecuniary interest in the matter in controversy. Beard's Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 533, 30 A. 775. To entitle a party to appeal from a probate decree, 'he must have some pecuniary interest which the decree or order appealed from will in some way injuriously affect.' Woodbury's Appeal, 70 Conn. 455, 456, 39 A. 791, 792; Norton's Appeal, 46 Conn. 527, 528; Dickerson's Appeal, 55 Conn. 223, 229, 10 A. 194, 15 A. 99; In re Avery's Appeal, 117 Conn. 201, 202, 167 A. 544, 88 A.L.R. 1154; In re Spencer's Appeal, 122 Conn. 327, 331, 188 A. 881. As these authorities make clear, a person to be 'aggrieved' within the meaning of the statute must have not only a pecuniary interest but a pecuniary interest which has been injuriously affected by the decree appealed from. Failing this, his appeal is void.

The remaining question is whether the plaintiff was 'aggrieved' within this definition. The fact that he was a remainderman under the...