Appell Petroleum Corp. v. G. W. Townsend Lease Service

• Decision Date: 06 February 1964
• Docket Number: No. 32,32
• Citation: 375 S.W.2d 547
• Parties: APPELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Appellant, v. G. W. TOWNSEND LEASE SERVICE, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 547

375 S.W.2d 547

APPELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Appellant, v. G. W. TOWNSEND LEASE SERVICE, Appellee.

No. 32.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

Feb. 6. 1964.

Lawrence H. Warburton, Jr. (of Perkins, Floyd, Davis & Oden), Alice, for appellant.

Austen H. Furse (of Bell, Camp, Gwin & Furse), Bay City, for appellee.

GREEN, Chief Justice.

Appellee Petroleum Corporation, hereinafter styled Appell, appeals from an order of the trial court overruling its plea of privilege to be sued in Jim Wells County, where its principal office is located. Appellee G. W. Townsend Lease Service, a partnership, hereinafter called Townsend, to support the venue in Matagorda County, relies upon that portion of Subd. 23, Article 1995, Vernon's Ann. Tex. St., reading as follows:

'Suits against a private corporation * * * may be brought * * * in the county in which the cause of action or part thereof arose.'

The venue facts necessary to be plead and proved in order for Townsend to be entitled to maintain his suit against Appell in Matagorda County are (1) that Appell is a private corporation; (2) that Townsend has a cause of action against Appell; (3) that said cause of action, or a part thereof, arose in Matagorda County, Texas.

There being no findings of fact or conclusions of law in the record, it is presumed that the trial court found all fact issues raised by the evidence in favor of the judgment. It is our duty to examine the testimony in the light most favorable to appellee and to indulge every reasonable inference in support of the judgment. Banks v. Collins, 152 Tex. 265, 257 S.W.2d 97; Lambert Corporation v. Martin, Tex.Civ.App., 369 S.W.2d 703, writ dism.

That appellant is a private corporation is an admitted fact and hence not in issue.

Townsend's suit, based on a sworn account, is to recover from Appell and other defendants, including one L. W. Dennis, Jr., Trustee, for work done, materials furnished and for rental and maintenance of a board road on a mineral lease in Matagorda County constructed by Townsend in May, 1961, for defendant Bauman and put to use by defendants Dennis and Appell during the drilling operations on the lease from June to and including September, 1961. Appell and Dennis, who by assignments owned the working interests in the lease, entered into a written contract on June 9, 1961, by the terms of which Appell became obligated to drill a well on the lease, 'and to furnish and to pay for the complete drilling rig, all of the necessary tools, appliances, materials, equipment and other items and labor (including the water well heretofore drilled and pits heretofore dug on the leased premises, but excluding the cost and expense of the construction of the board road heretofore laid to the well site) for drilling, completing and equipping said well and that same shall be the exclusive responsibility of Appell until said well is so drilled, completed and equipped without further cost, expense or obligation of or against the said L. W. Dennis, Jr., Trustee, his heirs, successors or assigns.'

The contract further provided that, commencing at the casing point of the completion of the well, the two parties were to share all future expenses of their operations on the leased premises in proportion to their respective interests.

Townsend concedes that Appell is not liable for the expenses incurred in the construction of the board road. The only claim that appellee now asserts against Appell is for rental use of this board road from August 27, 1961, to September 27, 1961. It appears from the testimony that the well was...