Application of Bernhart
Decision Date | 20 November 1969 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 8187. |
Parties | Application of Walter D. BERNHART and William A. Fetter. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Christensen, Sanborn & Matthews, Seattle, Wash., attorneys of record, for appellants. Gordon R. Sanborn, Orland M. Christensen, Seattle, Wash., of counsel.
Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D. C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Jere W. Sears, Washington, D. C., of counsel.
Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, McGUIRE, Judge, sitting by designation, and ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges.
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals1 affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 8, 13 and 18-21 in patent application serial No. 151,909, filed November 13, 1961, entitled "Planar Illustration Method and Apparatus" and disclosing a method of and apparatus for automatically making a two-dimensional portrayal of a three-dimensional object from any desired angle and distance and on any desired plane of projection.
The starting point for the method and the input for the apparatus is a set of data defining the three-dimensional positions of various points on or in the object relative to some convenient fixed point, plus information as to which of the various points should be connected by lines. The disclosure provides equations definitive of the geometric relationships between the three-dimensional coordinates of each point of interest and the corresponding two-dimensional coordinates which determine the location of that point on a planar portrayal or drawing to be made. The equations are sufficiently general to allow the resulting drawing to represent a view of the object as projected on any selected plane and as viewed from any point in space. The disclosure then teaches that the original data on point positions and connecting lines can be written in a form acceptable as input to a general purpose digital computer; that the equations disclosed in the application can be used to control the operation of the computer on the input data, i. e. the equations can be programmed into the computer; that an operator can select particular values for certain terms in the programmed equations, thereby determining the kind of portrayal to be produced; that the computer output will be a sequence of signals representative of the locations of points on the desired portrayal; and that those signals can be used to control the operation of a plotting machine which will produce the desired view of the object on paper.
Applicants concede that they did not invent the computer or the plotting machine. Nor do they claim any special method of feeding input data on point positions into the computer. Most importantly, they do not claim as their invention merely a set of equations even though, as we shall later see, those equations were not known in the prior art.
In order to know what the invention is we must, of course, look to the claims which point it out. We find that claims 8 and 18-21 define apparatus and claim 13 defines a method. Apparatus claims 8 and 18 are substantially the same in scope and subject matter; apparatus claims 19-21 are substantially similar. To simplify and clarify the issues here, we consider claim 18 as representative of the first group and claim 19 as representative of the second group. Method claim 13 has a lengthy and somewhat confusing preamble providing antecedents for various terms in the body of the claim. We omit most of the preamble for clarity. The representative claims are therefore as follows:
The examiner's first ground of rejection, applied to all the claims here in issue, was insufficient disclosure under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and Patent Office Rule 71(b). The examiner contended that since applicants had merely set forth equations and asserted that the equations could be readily programmed by programmers of ordinary skill, they had not set forth how the automatic equipment of their invention was to be made, but merely invited programmers to solve applicants' problems. The board reversed this rejection, noting that the statute required only enough information in the disclosure to enable persons of ordinary skill to practice the invention. The board recognized that applicants' equations could be readily programmed into the computer by those skilled in programming, and held that the disclosure was therefore sufficient. See In re Naquin, 398 F.2d 863, 55 CCPA 1428 (1968). Since the board reversed this ground of rejection, it is not in issue here, but we mention it because of its relationship to obviousness, which we shall later discuss.
The apparatus claims were further rejected by the examiner as failing to define a machine within the statutory class (35 U.S.C. § 101) "since for patentability they were predicated on mental steps," citing a patent to Tripp2 which, said the examiner, showed that it was old to combine a programmed digital computer with a plotting device. The examiner indicated that the novelty in applicants' claims therefore lay in the equations with which the computer was programmed, and that this is not a structural difference over the prior art. The examiner concluded that since the programming was not structural, the claims were "predicated for patentability on mental steps." As to the method claim, the examiner similarly argued that since the novelty of applicants' claimed invention lay in the particular equations to be solved, the invention is non-statutory, citing Ex parte Meinhardt, 1907 C.D. 238; In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 38 CCPA 945 (1951); In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 38 CCPA 967 (1951); and In re Middleton, 167 F.2d 1012, 35 CCPA 1166 (1948). The board affirmed these rejections, but it reasoned with respect to the apparatus claims that the issues were analogous to the "printed matter" cases such as Ex parte Gwinn, 112 USPQ 439 (PO Bd. App.1955). Regarding these cases, the board said:
As to method claim 13, the board rejected applicants' contention that the claim defines a new use of an old machine within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), and ruled that only a new result was defined by the claim, the use being the old use of solving equations and plotting the results.
The board nowhere mentioned "mental steps" in its affirmance of the examiner's rejections based on non-statutory subject matter, but it expressly adopted "the reasons set forth in the Examiner's Answer * * * and not inconsistent herewith." While such a statement tends to...
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