Application of G. K., 11873

• Decision Date: 31 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 11873,11873
• Parties: Application of G. K. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 380

248 N.W.2d 380

Application of G. K. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

No. 11873.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Dec. 31, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1977.

Thomas C. Barnett, Jr., Gary R. Thomas, Fort Thompson, for appellant.

John F. Cogley, of Morgan, Fuller, Theeler & Cogley, Mitchell, for respondent.

WINANS, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment granting custody of her child to its natural father. This is the type of case in which the courts are expected to act with Solomon-like wisdom. Any solution reached in a custody case is seldom totally satisfactory. We affirm.

G. K., the natural father of T. T. G., a child, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court seeking custody of the child from M. G., its natural mother. Defendant's return of the writ alleged that the mother of an illegitimate child is entitled to sole custody and prayed that the proceedings be dismissed. Pursuant to a motion to quash the writ the matter came on for hearing. The lower court awarded custody of the child to the father. Defendant seeks to have the judgment reversed; in the affirmative, she would have us remand for further inquiry into her present fitness.

The child is the product of unfortunate circumstances. The contestants in the matter are his unmarried, natural parents. M. G. is a resident of Mitchell, South Dakota. G. K. is now a resident of Kemmerer, Wyoming, but at the time of T. T. G.'s conception was attending college in Mitchell. The couple met in early 1972. He was 26 years old and she was 17. As a result of their relationship, M. G. became pregnant. G. K. learned of the pregnancy shortly before his graduation in August 1972. He secured employment in Boise, Idaho and before he left for that job the couple discussed the possibility of M. G. joining him there. It was financially infeasible at that time, however, so G. K. gave her money for a rental trailer in Mitchell until he could afford to bring her to Idaho.

G. K. stayed in frequent contact with M. G. and in September offered to bring her to Idaho. She requested a delay because of the Corn Palace festivities. Subsequent conversations also produced requests for delay and finally in late October M. G. refused to go to Idaho. G. K. had been sending her money throughout this period. ¹ Although M. G. refused to join him, G. K. continued to send money. T. T. G. was born on April 5, 1973. G. K. voluntarily paid the expenses incident to the birth and has contributed to the support of the child on a monthly basis since that time. G. K. visited the child on his return trips to Mitchell whenever M. G. permitted him to do so.

T. T. G. has resided with his mother since his birth. M. G. has lived at various locations in Mitchell, spent three months in Georgia with her brother, and moved into her mother's home in April or May 1974. ² In June 1974 the maternal grandmother called G. K. and requested that she receive the support payments because M. G. had been keeping all or part of the money herself. Thereafter G. K. added the grandmother's name to the support payments.

In August or September 1974 M. G. was hospitalized as a result of either cutting her wrists or taking an overdose of pills. In January 1975 she was arrested because of an altercation in her mother's home; she was charged with resisting arrest and assaulting a police officer. Pursuant to an agreement with the presiding judge, sentence was withheld because M. G. committed herself to Yankton State Hospital for thirty days of treatment for alcoholism. She failed to remain the full thirty days.

When M. G. left the hospital, she went to Cedar Rapids, Iowa to visit her boyfriend by whom she was pregnant at the time of the hearing. Except for a brief period when M. G. returned to Mitchell, T. T. G. remained in the care of his grandmother until May 1975. At that time M. G. returned and moved into a house with her son. She has never been employed; she subsists on the payments provided by G. K. and on aid provided by the Welfare Department in Davison County. In May 1975 G. K. petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody of T. T. G.

Illegal detention is the basis for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. When custody of a child is involved, however, the scope of the writ is enlarged and the court's equitable powers over the child are invoked. Application of Habeck, 1955, 75 S.D. 535, 69 N.W.2d 353. See also, Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 1963, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216; Green v. Green, 1965, 178 Neb. 207, 132 N.W.2d 380; In re Mark T., 1967, 8 Mich.App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27; In re Richard, 1975, 14 Cal.3d 783, 122 Cal.Rptr. 531, 537 P.2d 363. As is true in all custody cases, the best interest and welfare of the child is the controlling concern. Application of Habeck, supra; In re One Minor Child, 1972, Del.Supr., 295 A.2d 727.

SDCL 21--27--5 provides:

'The court or judge to whom the application for a writ of habeas corpus is made, shall forthwith award the writ, unless it shall appear from the application itself or from any document annexed thereto, that the applicant can neither be discharged nor admitted to bail, nor in any other manner relieved.'

It is defendant's contention that under this statute the writ should not issue because petitioner did not make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to custody. See State v. Foreman, 1942, 68 S.D. 412, 3 N.W.2d 477. She argues that the petition must show legitimation in order for petitioner to have standing to seek custody of an illegitimate child. She assigns as error the deprivation of custody absent legitimation by the natural father.

We start with the proposition that there is a strong public policy favoring legitimation. In re Richard, supra. See also In re Kessler's Estate, 1956, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599. The legislature has provided a method whereby the father of an illegitimate child may remove the stigma of illegitimacy. SDCL 25--6--1 provides:

'The father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such into his family, with the consent of his wife if he is married and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The other prvisions of law relating to adoption shall not apply in such cases.'

That G. K. is the father of the child is not disputed. He has publicly acknowledged his paternity and has otherwise treated the child as his own. The only requirement lacking is receiving the child into his family.

While the typical situation contemplates actual physical presence in the father's home, actual receipt is not required where the father has done all that he reasonably can to fulfill that requirement. G. K. voluntarily provided a place for M. G. during her pregnancy, made repeated requests that she join him in Idaho, voluntarily provided support for the child after its birth, and visited and child when he was able to do so. That the child was not actually received into his home is due only to the actions of the defendant. In view of the strong policy favoring legitimation we find that the acts of petitioner amount to constructive receipt of the child into his home. In re Richard, supra; Blythe v. Ayres, 1892, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915. See also, Moreno v. Richardson, 1973, 9 Cir., 484 F.2d 899; Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 1971, D.C.N.D.Cal., 329 F.Supp. 597. Therefore we find that T. T. G. is the legitimate child of G. K. by virtue of the latter's compliance with SDCL 25--6--1.

The question thus distilled is one of custody between parents of a legitimate child. ³ The law is clear. SDCL 30--27--19 provides:

'In awarding the custody of a minor or in appointing a general guardian, the court or judge is to be guided by the following considerations:

(1) By what appears to be for the best interests of the child in respect to its temporal and its mental and moral welfare; and if the child be of a sufficient age to form an intelligent preference, the court or judge may consider that preference in determining the question;

(2) As between parents adversely claiming the custody or guardianship, neither parent is entitled to it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the child be of tender years, it should be given to the mother; if it be of an age to require education and preparation for labor or business, then to the father.'

In making an award of custody the trial court has broad discretion. The controlling factor is the best interests of the child. The court's exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record presents a clear case of abuse. ⁴ Masek v. Masek, 1975, S.D., 228 N.W.2d 334; Anderson v. Anderson, 1972, 86 S.D. 757, 201 N.W.2d 394; Oursland v. Oursland, 1968, 83 S.D. 382, 159 N.W.2d 922. We find no abuse of discretion in this case.

In an action pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus to determine the custody of a child, the relative fitness of the parents as custodians is a proper subject of judicial inquiry only to the extent that this issue affects the child's welfare. Pugh v. Pugh, 1949, 133 W.Va. 501, 56 S.E.2d 901. It was the finding of the trial court that M. G. was not a fit and proper person to have the care, custody, and control of the child; that G. K. was a fit and proper person; and that the best interests and welfare of the child dictated that custody be granted to G. K. with reasonable visitation rights to M. G.

We find substantial evidence to support the finding that the mother was not a fit and proper person. The facts discussed above need not be reiterated here. While the father did not escape unscathed, we also find that the record supports the finding that G. K. is a fit custodian. He is college educated, earns $1,350/month, has had L.P.N. training including care of young children, has a good reputation in the community, is willing to provide proper care for the child, and intends to marry in the near...