Luke for Luke v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 13 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-5394,87-5394
• Parties: , 25 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 35, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 14515A Jeanette LUKE for Scott E. LUKE, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 974

868 F.2d 974

57 USLW 2579, 25 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 35,

Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 14515A

Jeanette LUKE for Scott E. LUKE, Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Appellee.

No. 87-5394.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 1988.

Decided Feb. 21, 1989.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1989.

Karen A. Hattervig, Sioux Falls, S.D., for appellant.

Lucille G. Meis, Denver, Colo., for appellee.

Before HEANEY, ^* Circuit Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and HILL, ^** Senior U.S. District Judge.

ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant Jeanette Luke (Luke), on behalf of her minor son, Scott E. Luke, appeals the order of the district court ¹ granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and affirming the Secretary's denial of Luke's application for surviving child's insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d)(1). 666 F.Supp. 1340. The issue before this court is whether the Secretary's decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Finding that it is, we affirm.

I.

On July 2, 1985, Luke filed an application for surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of her minor son, Scott E. Luke (Scott), on the earnings record of Gary J. Groth, the deceased wage earner and alleged biological father of Scott. On September 2, 1985, the claim was denied, and that decision was upheld upon reconsideration. Luke then requested and obtained a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on May 20, 1986. On July 22, 1986, the ALJ rendered his decision finding that Scott was not eligible for benefits because Luke had failed to establish that Groth, the deceased wage earner, was Scott's biological father. The ALJ based his decision on evidence introduced at the hearing, which is summarized as follows:

Jeanette Luke lived with Gary Groth from July 1980 until she separated from him in May 1984. They were never married. Luke testified that she did not have sexual relations with anyone other than Groth during the period that she lived with him. She further testified that she did not use any birth control during that period because Groth had told her he had had a vasectomy. However, in December of 1980, Luke discovered that she was pregnant, and on August 29, 1981, she gave birth to her son, Scott, who is the claimant in this action.

Luke testified that after she became pregnant, she and Groth consulted with Dr. Irvin Kaufman to determine how, since Groth had had a vasectomy, she could have become pregnant. On January 31, 1981, Dr. Kaufman advised them that not all vasectomies are 100% effective. But when Dr. Kaufman tested Groth's semen specimen on February 9, 1981, he found no sperm in the specimen.

Notwithstanding the test results on Groth's semen specimen, Groth referred to Scott as his son and publicly held himself out to be Scott's father during the period that he (Groth) lived with Luke. Just one and one-half months after Scott's birth, on October 16, 1981, Groth, who was already receiving social security disability benefits, filed an application for child insurance benefits on behalf of Scott. That application was accompanied by a handwritten, signed statement in which Groth declared that Scott was his natural child. ² Scott was later determined to be eligible to receive child's insurance benefits, but such benefits apparently were terminated or never initiated upon the Secretary's finding that Groth's disability had ceased. Groth reapplied for child's insurance benefits on December 6, 1982 on behalf of Scott, ³ but this claim was later denied on the basis that (1) Groth was not entitled to disability benefits, and (2) Scott failed to meet the relationship requirement of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d) because new evidence, i.e., the medical report of Dr. Irvin Kaufman, indicated that Groth was not capable of fathering Scott due to a prior surgery.

The record reveals that Scott's birth certificate, filed in the State of South Dakota, does not name a father. Luke reported that she did not list Groth as the father because she and Groth were not married and because Groth was out of town at the time of Scott's birth. Groth's name does appear on Scott's hospital record of birth. Luke testified, however, that she placed Groth's name on that certificate after she returned home from the hospital.

After Luke separated from Groth in 1984, she received Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC). She also received VA pension benefits for Scott under Groth's name because the Veterans Administration had recognized Scott as Groth's child. Luke testified, however, that Groth later attempted to terminate Scott's VA benefits. The record also reflects that Groth indicated that he had no children under 18 years of age when Groth applied for disability insurance benefits on November 1, 1984.

Because Luke was receiving AFDC, the local department of social services initiated a paternity suit against Groth on Luke's behalf. Luke reported that a hearing in that case was set for June 10th or 11th, 1985, that Groth hired Gary Blue, an attorney, to contest the action, but that Groth did not appear for the hearing. Luke later learned that Groth had died on June 13, 1985. Shortly thereafter, on July 2, 1985, Luke filed the instant application for child's insurance benefits.

The ALJ specifically found that:

1. Scott Luke was not entitled to benefits as a legitimate or adopted child of Groth, because Groth never married Jeanette Luke nor adopted Scott under state law.

2. Scott Luke failed to establish that Groth was his biological father; that "there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that [Groth] could not have fathered [Scott] during the relevant time period."

3. Scott Luke was not entitled to benefits under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2)(A), because under South Dakota Law, S.D. Codified Laws Sec. 29-1-15, he could not inherit as the illegitimate child of Groth. "[T]he status of child [under the state statute] is primarily based on a biological relationship which requires that the individual acknowledging the child have had the capacity or opportunity to father the child."

4. Scott Luke was not entitled to benefits under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), because Groth's written acknowledgment that Scott was his son was insufficient in light of evidence that Scott had no biological relationship to Groth.

Thereafter, on September 29, 1986, the Appeals Council denied Luke's request for review and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Secretary. Luke subsequently filed this action for review of the Secretary's decision in district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g). On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court affirmed the Secretary's decision to deny benefits. Specifically, the district court found that the ALJ correctly determined that in order for an illegitimate child to be eligible for benefits under either 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2)(A) or Sec. 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I) he must first establish a biological relationship to the wage earner. The district court also found that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Groth was not Scott's biological father, and thus Scott was not eligible for benefits under either 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2)(A) or Sec. 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I). This appeal followed.

II.

Luke argues that the district court erred by misinterpreting South Dakota intestacy law (S.D. Codified Laws Sec. 29-1-15) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), and by finding that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she argues that Scott, though illegitimate, should be deemed legitimate and entitled to receive benefits under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2)(A) or Sec. 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I).

It is well established that where the Secretary has denied benefits, we must affirm the Secretary's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Sherrill for Sherrill v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 166, 168 (8th Cir.1987); Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987). "This deferential standard of review applies only to findings of fact, however, and 'no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law * * *.' " Smith v. Heckler 707 F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir.1982)) (referring to the Secretary's interpretation of state law). A federal district court's interpretation of state law, however, is given special weight and deferential review on appeal, and will not be reversed unless the appellate court is convinced that the district court has incorrectly ascertained or applied local law. Hazen v. Pasley, 768 F.2d 226, 228 (8th Cir.1985) (citations omitted).

The general criteria for entitlement to child's insurance benefits are found under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d)(1). Section 402(d)(1) provides that every "child" of an individual who dies fully or currently insured under the Act is entitled to child's insurance benefits if the child has applied for such benefits, is unmarried, under the age of 18, and was dependent upon the insured individual at the time of the insured's death. Id.

A child is deemed dependent if he was (1) living with or supported by the wage earner at the time of his death, or (2) is the legitimate child of the wage earner. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d)(3). If a child is illegitimate, he may nonetheless be deemed legitimate for purposes of the Act (and hence deemed dependent and thus entitled to benefits) if he can [establish]:

1) That the [child] would be entitled to inherit personal property from the deceased wage earner under the law that would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the wage earner's state of domicile at death [under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h)(2)(A) ] [or]

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3) That the deceased wage earner had a) acknowledged the [child] claimant in writing...