April J. Evans v. Rae L. Moore
| Decision Date | 15 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | 2103,93-LW-4516 |
| Parties | APRIL J. EVANS, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RAE L. MOORE, Defendant-Appellee CASE |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Randall L. Lambert, 215 South Fourth Street P.O. Box 702, Ironton, Ohio 45638
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Mark A. Preston, Fosson, Mann & Preston, 280 Yoctangee Parkway, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
DECISION
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas in favor of Rae L. Moore, defendant below and appellee herein, and against April J. and Gregory L. Evans, plaintiffs below and appellants herein.
Appellants assign the following errors:
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES [sic] A NEW TRIAL."
On July 28, 1990, Appellant April J. Evans suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident. On July 24, 1991, she and her husband, Appellant Gregory L. Evans, filed the instant complaint against appellee. The court set the matter for trial beginning on October 13, 1992.
In an October 13, 1992 stipulation and agreement, appellee admitted negligence and withdrew several affirmative defenses in exchange for appellants' agreement to accept the lesser of either the jury's verdict or appellee's insurance policy limits. The parties tried the matters of causation and damages to a bury.
On October 15, 1992, the jury returned a verdict against appellants. In special interrogatories, the jury explained that appellee's negligence did not proximately cause appellants' injuries. The court entered judgment in favor of appellee.
On October 29, 1992, appellants filed a motion for new trial, alleging the court's judgment was not sustained by the weight of the evidence and was contrary to law. The court overruled the motion on October 30, 1992.
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
In their first assignment of error, appellants assert the trial court erred by refusing the direct a verdict in their favor on the issue of proximate cause.
Civ.R 56(A)(4) provides:
When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.
When determining a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must submit an essential issue to the jury if there is sufficient credible evidence to permit reasonable minds to reach different conclusions on that issue. If, however, all the evidence, when construed most strongly against the movant, permits only a finding against the other party, then the trial court must instruct a finding or direct a verdict against that party. Helmick v. Republican-Franklin Ins. Co. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 71, 529 N.E.2d 464; and O'Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 280 N.E. 2d 896.
A trial court considering a motion for directed verdict must determine not whether one version of the facts presented is more persuasive than another; rather, the trial court must determine whether the trier of fact could reach only one result under the theories of law presented in the complaint. Eldridge v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 94, 493 N.E.2d 293. A motion for directed verdict tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Id. The trial court may not weigh the evidence or try the credibility of witnesses, but must give to the party opposing the motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id. A directed verdict motion is made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted. Joyce v. General Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 551 N.E.2d 172. The "reasonable minds" test of Civ. R. 50(A)(4) requires the court only to determine whether there is any evidence of substantial probative value in support of the non-moving party's claim. Id. Thus, a motion for a directed verdict should be denied when the party against whom the motion is made has offered evidence tending to support all material issues necessary to constitute a prima facie case.
Appellants argue that because every expert medical witness who testified at trial opined that the accident caused Appellant April J. Evans's injuries, the court should have directed a verdict in her favor. Appellants emphasize that no medical experts testified to the contrary.
Appellee notes that although there is no expert medical witness who testified that the accident did not proximately cause the injuries, reasonable minds could reach different-conclusions on the issue of proximate cause. We agree. Appellee's cross-examination raised many questions concerning appellant's alleged injuries. The question of whether or not the accident proximately caused the injury is inextricably intertwined with a determination of Appellant April J. Evans's credibility and the related credibility of the expert medical witnesses.
In Darcy v. Bender (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 190, 191, 428 N.E.2d 156, 157, the court wrote:
See, also, Wise v. Timmons (Jan. 22, 1991), Pickaway App. No. 89CA14, unreported; Yunker v. Douville (Apr. 22, 1988), Richland App. No. CA-2548, unreported; Reece v. Kenisley (Dec. 28, 1984), Marion App. No. 9-83-32, unreported. The absence of evidence to contradict a plaintiff's evidence should not require the trial court to render a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's evidence ordinarily should be submitted to the trier of fact who has the duty to determine tee credibility of the plaintiff's testimony. In Yunker, the court noted that there is no obligation upon a jury to believe a witness even though that witness's testimony is not contradicted by other testimony. See, also, Cunningham v. Capo (June 7, 1984), Hancock App. No. 5-83-10, unreported.
In the case sub judice, if we construe the evidence most strongly in appellee's favor, we find that reasonable minds might choose to disbelieve Appellant April J. Evans and thus might choose to disbelieve the testimony of the doctors who based their opinions in part on her subjective claims of injury. We note Appellant April J Evans's symptoms were primarily subjective. Appellant delayed medical treatment for three days after the accident, even though she was offered transportation from the scene of the accident to the hospital. She related different information to one doctor than to two others concerning the onset of her lower back complaints. One doctor initially testified that Appellant April J. Evans suffers from "peptic ulcer" disease as a result of the accident, but later acknowledged that she had stomach symptoms a few weeks prior to the accident. During one part of his testimony, that same doctor apologized to appellants' counsel for earlier incorrect testimony concerning the results of an MRI scan. Again, the question of whether or not the accident proximately caused the injury is inextricably intertwined with a determination of Evans's credibility and the credibility of the expert...
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