Aransas County v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1917
• Docket Number: (No. 2821.)
• Citation: 191 S.W. 553
• Parties: ARANSAS COUNTY et al. v. COLEMAN-FULTON PASTURE CO. et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

191 S.W. 553

ARANSAS COUNTY et al. v. COLEMAN-FULTON PASTURE CO. et al.

(No. 2821.)

Supreme Court of Texas.

January 31, 1917.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Fourth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by the Coleman-Fulton Pasture Company and others against Aransas County and others to restrain the County Judge and Commissioners' Court from issuing bonds. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed (180 S. W. 312) an order of the district court refusing a temporary injunction, and defendants bring error. Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and order of the district court affirmed.

See, also, 191 S. W. 556 E. A. Stevens, of Rockport, and Dougherty & Dougherty and B. D. Tarlton, Jr., all of Beeville, for plaintiffs in error. Proctor, Vandenberge, Crain & Mitchell, of Victoria, and Templeton, Brooks, Napier & Ogden, of San Antonio, for defendants in error.

PHILLIPS, C. J.

By the amendment of 1903, authority is given by section 52 of article 3 of the Constitution to any county, any political subdivision of a county, any number of adjoining counties, etc., acting under legislative provision, upon a vote of a two-thirds majority of the duly qualified resident property tax payers of the district or territory to be affected thereby, in addition to all other debts, to issue bonds in any amount not in excess of one-fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property of such district or territory, for, among other purposes, the following:

"The construction, maintenance and operation of macadamized, graveled or paved roads and turnpikes, or in aid thereof."

The question in this case is that of the right of Aransas county, under this provision of the Constitution and pursuant to an act of the Legislature, to devote an issue of its bonds, $300,000.00 in amount and duly voted by the tax payers of the county, to the building of a roadway consisting in part of a bridge structure across Aransas Bay between Lamar Peninsula and Live Oak Peninsula in that county, so as to connect the public road system of the county lying north of Copano Bay with that on Live Oak Peninsula.

Aransas County is a coast county indented by bays. The mainland on the south is constituted by Live Oak Peninsula, where the county seat, Rockport, is situated. It extends in a northerly direction between Aransas Bay on the east and Copano Bay on the west to the channel between the two bays at its northern end, separating it from Lamar Peninsula, the mainland on the north. This channel varies in depth from three to thirteen feet. The causeway, or roadway, for the building of which it was proposed to use the bond issue, will be, according to the plans, about 13,000 feet long. Its middle part will span the channel between the two mainland portions of the county and will consist of a reinforced concrete bridge, 3,033 feet in length, with a draw span in the center, and having thereon a roadway twenty feet in width to be paved with wooden blocks. For its remaining length, or about 10,000 feet, the causeway will consist of roads connecting with each end of the bridge, fifty feet in width and paved with shell.

An injunction was sought by the defendants in error to restrain the issuance and sale of the bonds for this contemplated purpose authorized by the legislative act. It was denied by the District Judge. On appeal, this order was reversed by the honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth District and the case remanded with the direction that the injunction issue. 180 S. W. 312.

The holding of the Court of Civil Appeals was, in substance, that while a causeway is to be regarded as a part of a road within the meaning of the Constitution, the proposed causeway is, to the extent of 3,033 feet, a bridge, the construction of which is not specifically designated in section 52 of article 3 as one of the purposes embraced in the section, and, hence, the proposed bonds were voted for an illegal purpose. Concretely, therefore, the question for decision is the sense in which the term "roads" is used in section 52 of article 3 of the Constitution.

A bridge is ordinarily but the part of a road or highway that traverses a stream. There is, accordingly, ample authority for the proposition that when the term "roads" is used in statutes, unless from the context it appears to have been used in its specific sense, its generic meaning should be given it, which includes "bridges." City of Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169, 89 Am. Dec. 418; Follmer v. Nuckolls County, 6 Neb. 204; Isaacs v. Wiley & Elkins, 12 Vt. 674; Montgomery County v. Clarksville, etc., Co., 120 Tenn. 76, 109 S. W. 1153; Andrews v. Weckerman, 144 Mich. 199, 107 N. W. 870; 25 A. & E. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 985, notes.

This rule is well illustrated by the case of Berlin Iron-Bridge Co. v. City of San Antonio, 50 S. W. 408, also decided by the honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth District. There, the charter of the city of San Antonio authorized the issuance of its bonds for "street improvements," without any express mention of bridges. The bridge company, under a contract with the city, erected a bridge across the San Antonio River where it was crossed by one of the city streets. With respect to the right of the bridge company to have the proceeds of the city's bonds issued for "street improvements" and in its hands at the making of the contract treated as a fund for the satisfaction of the contract, it was held that the bridge was a "street improvement," for the payment of which according to the contract the bond fund might appropriately be used.

In different provisions of the Constitution, namely, section 56 of article 3, section 9 of article 8, section 2 of article 11, and section 24 of article 16, roads and bridges are dealt with as distinct subjects. In section 9 of article 8, the construction of each is recognized as a distinct purpose of taxation. Inasmuch as the term "roads" is very plainly used in these sections in a specific sense, it is urged by the defendants in error that the same restricted meaning should be given it in the construction of section 52 of article 3. Such was the view of the Court of Civil Appeals. There is force in the position as a general rule of construction. But the sense in which a term is used in other provisions of a constitution is not a conclusive test of its meaning in a particular provision. The spirit, purpose and scope of the particular provision are all to be consulted in the effort to determine with certainty the meaning of its terms.

The amendment of 1903 to section 52 of article 3, which includes the subdivision quoted at the beginning of this opinion, was adopted at a later time than any of the provisions above referred to. Upon the general subject of road improvement, it marked a radical departure from the previous policy of the State. It...