Arant v. First Southern Co.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1967
• Docket Number: No. 18632,18632
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Jane E. ARANT, Respondent, v. FIRST SOUTHERN COMPANY and the American Casualty Company, Appellants.

Page 919

153 S.E.2d 919

249 S.C. 305

Jane E. ARANT, Respondent, v. FIRST SOUTHERN COMPANY and the American Casualty Company, Appellants.

No. 18632.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 10, 1967.

McEachin, Townsend & Zeigler, Florence, for appellants.

Lee & Ball, Columbia, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice:

This is an appeal in a Workmen's Compensation proceeding, by the employer and carrier, from an order of the circuit court affirming a compensation award by the Industrial Commission.

The alleged accident sustained by the respondent-employee occurred in the State of Tennessee and the key question on appeal is whether the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim, under the provisions of Sec. 72--169 of the 1962 Code of Laws. This court has repeatedly construed this section and held that there are four prerequisites to the South Carolina Industrial Commission having jurisdiction of a claim arising out of an out of state accident, such being: (1) The contract of employment must be made in this State; (2) the employer's place of business must be in this State; (3) the residence of the employee must be in this State; and (4) the contract of employment must be for services to be performed not exclusively outside of this State. Price v. Horton Motor Lines, 201 S.C. 484, 23 S.E.2d 744; Tedars v. Savannah River Veneer Co., 202 S.C. 363, 25 S.E.2d 235, 147 A.L.R. 914; Younginer v. J. A. Jones Construction Co., 215 S.C. 135, 54 S.E.2d 545; Watson v. Wannamaker & Wells, 212 S.C. 506, 48 S.E.2d 447.

In the instant case the cardinal question is whether the first prerequisite existed, that is, was the contract of employment made in this State?

It is well settled that in determining whether the South Carolina Industrial Commission had jurisdiction we are not bound by the factual findings of the Commission but are required to review the evidence and determine the jurisdictional facts in accordance with our view of the preponderance of the evidence. See Younginer v. J. A. Jones Construction Co., supra, and cases therein cited.

The corporate structure and activities of the appellant-employer, First Southern Company, and its subsidiary or subsidiaries, are somewhat involved. Its business operations are intertwined with its subsidiary known as Domestic Management, Inc. and various other subsidiary corporations known as Domestic Loans, Inc., such latter corporations having as a part of their corporate names the towns or cities of their respective locations. The home offices of First Southern Company and its subsidiary Domestic Management, Inc. are located in Greensboro, North Carolina, but Domestic Loan offices operate in several states. Among other things, it is contended by the appellant-employer that the respondent was not its employee but an employee of its subsidiary, Domestic Management, Inc. For the purpose of this appeal, however, we shall assume, without deciding, that the employee was at the time of her alleged accident an employee of the appellant First Southern Company.

The facts disclosed by the record are as follows. The employee-claimant (who was from Florence, South Carolina) in the summer of 1961 was working in Columbia, South Carolina, and after some preliminary negotiations went, in August, to Charlotte, North Carolina, where she accepted employment as an office cashier with Domestic Loans of Charlotte, Inc. She resided in Charlotte and continued in such employment until about July 21, 1963, when she was given a new assignment and promotion by either Domestic Management, Inc. or First Southern Company. She was promoted to the position of auditor and training supervisor with an increase in salary of $90 a month. Upon her promotion, she went from Charlotte to Salisbury, North Carolina, for a one week training period...