Arceneaux v. Arrington
| Citation | 284 S.C. 500,327 S.E.2d 357 |
| Decision Date | 14 November 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 0397,0397 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Parties | Ray ARCENEAUX, G.G. Case, Jr., and D. Clyde Spearman, Appellants, v. Jerry W. ARRINGTON, Respondent. . Heard |
Michael O. Hawkins, Anderson, for appellants.
W. Jerry Fedder, of Fedder, Derrick, Ritter & Williams, Seneca, for respondent.
This is a proceeding in equity to enforce a restrictive covenant on real property. The circuit court denied the plaintiffs' prayer for mandatory injunctive relief. We affirm.
In 1965 Arrington acquired title to a 491.3 acre tract in Oconee County. He subsequently transferred title to the Port Bass Development Company, Inc., a company he incorporated for the purpose of subdividing and developing the property. Before deeding the land to the corporation, Arrington recorded an instrument entitled "Restrictions for Port Bass Subdivision," imposing restrictive covenants on part of the property. Among other things, these covenants prohibited metal buildings and "any use whatsoever for commercial purposes" in the restricted area.
From 1965 onward the sales office of the Development Company was located on Tract 11 of the Port Bass subdivision. Tract 11 is outside the area made subject to the original restrictive covenants. In 1967 Arrington incorporated a water company, Water Systems, Inc., to serve the subdivision. The water company's facilities and a well drilling business were also located on Tract 11.
Between 1965 and 1982, the Development Company made twenty to twenty-five conveyances of property within the Port Bass subdivision. As the Development Company sold lots outside the restricted area but within the subdivision, Arrington included a clause in the deeds making the lots "subject to" the original restrictions. Arrington's wife, the secretary of the Development Company, prepared all the deeds. She is not an attorney; she simply copied the form of previous deeds.
On March 26, 1979, the Development Company conveyed Tract 11 to Arrington personally. Arrington recorded the deed in the office of the clerk of court the following day. The deed contains a clause making Tract 11 "subject to" the original restrictive covenants. Arrington claims the restrictions were copied into the deed by mistake.
In the spring of 1979, Arrington constructed a large prefabricated metal building on Tract 11 to house the water company and the well drilling business. The building cost approximately $65,000 to construct. It is clearly visible to anyone entering the subdivision.
In September 1981, Arceneaux, Case, and Spearman (the Plaintiffs), each of whom owns property in the subdivision, commenced this action, alleging violations of the restrictive covenants. They asked the court to enjoin Arrington from using Tract 11 for any purpose other than residential and to have him remove the metal building or veneer it with brick or wood. Arrington answered, denying the restrictive covenants apply to Tract 11 and raising the affirmative defense of laches. The circuit court found the Plaintiffs guilty of laches and entered judgment for Arrington.
If there has been unreasonable delay in asserting a claim, or if, knowing his rights, a party does not seasonably seek to avail himself of the means at hand for their enforcement, but suffers his adversary to incur expense or enter into obligations or otherwise change his position, then equity will ordinarily refuse to enforce those rights, especially if an injunction is asked. Archambault v. Sprouse, 215 S.C. 336, 55 S.E.2d 70, 12 A.L.R.3d 388 (1949). Whether the plaintiff is barred by laches is to be determined in light of the facts of each case, taking into consideration whether the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the other party. Privette v. Garrison, 235 S.C. 119, 110 S.E.2d 17 (1959). Delay alone in the assertion of a right does not constitute laches. Grossman v. Grossman, 242 S.C. 298, 130 S.E.2d 850 (1963).
In this case, the Plaintiffs readily admit their prior knowledge of the commercial use of Tract 11. Arceneaux, who purchased his lot in 1977, testified he knew the trailer originally...
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In re Dunes Hotel Associates
...427 S.E.2d 920 (App.1993) (same); Glover v. Lewis, 299 S.C. 44, 382 S.E.2d 242, 245 n. 3 (App.1989) (same); Arceneaux v. Arrington, 284 S.C. 500, 327 S.E.2d 357, 359 (App.1985) However, South Carolina Code § 30-7-90 provides that possession of real property will not provide "constructive" o......
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Butler v. Lindsey, 1019
...of the majority opinion. Butler in early 1975 was put on notice to inquire as to the state of the record. See Arceneaux v. Arrington, 284 S.C. 500, 327 S.E.2d 357 (Ct.App.1985). (A party is deemed to have notice of a deed from the date it is recorded.). Butler's attorney found Lindsey's dee......
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All Saints Parish v. Protestant Episcopal Church
...delay, [and] (3) prejudice." Hallums v. Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 199, 371 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1988); see Arceneaux v. Arrington, 284 S.C. 500, 503, 327 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Whether . . . [a claim] is barred by laches is to be determined in light of the facts of each case, taking int......
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All Saints Parish v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 3757.
...unreasonable delay, [and] (3) prejudice." Hallums v. Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 199, 371 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1988); see Arceneaux v. Arrington, 284 S.C. 500, 503, 327 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ct.App.1985) ("Whether ... [a claim] is barred by laches is to be determined in light of the facts of each case, t......