Archer v. Reno, Civ. A. No. 94-119.

Decision Date05 January 1995
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 94-119.
Citation877 F. Supp. 372
PartiesNaomi ARCHER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Janet RENO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ana Balbuena, pro se.

Leonora Caminero, pro se.

Vickie Dellinger, pro se.

Martha Hernandez de Vasquez, pro se.

Daisy Diaz, pro se.

Sally Ann Fugett, pro se.

Dena Hannum, pro se.

Margaret McCoy, pro se.

Dorena Morales, pro se.

Lynne Rogers, pro se.

Gerrie Schwartzbach, pro se.

Susan Moore, pro se.

Naomi Archer, pro se.

Dell M. Littrell, U.S. Attorney's Office, Lexington, KY, for Albert J. Lane and Daniel Lawrence.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FORESTER, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This complaint stems from the decision of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to convert the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky ("FMC Lexington"), which has been an all-female institution for the past several years, to an all-male institution effective in January 1995. When this action was filed on April 7, 1994, the following thirteen (13) female inmates at FMC Lexington were named as Plaintiffs herein: Naomi Archer, Ana Balbuena, Leonora Caminero, Vicki Dellinger, Martha Hernandez de Vasquez, Daisy Diaz, Sally Ann Fugett, Dena Hannum, Margaret McCoy, Dorena Morales, Lynne Rogers, Gerrie Schwartzbach, and Susan Moore.

Plaintiffs filed this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), against the following Defendants: Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States; Kathleen Hawk, Director of the BOP; Margaret Hambrick, Warden at FMC Lexington; A. Darrell Valentine, D.D.S., Chief Dental Officer of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Dental Laboratory at FMC Lexington; Albert J. Lane, Director of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Dental Laboratory at FMC Lexington; and Daniel Lawrence, Assistant Director of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Dental Laboratory at FMC Lexington, alleging that the BOP's decision to convert FMC Lexington to an all-male institution and to transfer them to other correctional institutions prevented them from completing an educational course to become certified dental technicians, in violation of their equal protection rights and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 of Title 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.

Plaintiffs state that the BOP operates five dental laboratories nationwide, that four of these five dental laboratories are operated at all-male institutions, and that FMC Lexington is the only correctional institution in the nation that currently affords female inmates the opportunity to work in a dental lab and to participate in a dental education course. Plaintiffs contend that with the conversion of FMC Lexington to an all-male institution, their forthcoming transfer to other institutions will violate their constitutional rights since they will then be denied the opportunity to complete this educational course in the dental lab at FMC Lexington and become certified dental technicians.

By Order of July 18, 1994, Magistrate Judge Wehrman denied Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order to prevent the BOP from transferring them to other correctional institutions until either this lawsuit was resolved or until they had completed the dental education course and had become certified dental technicians. Also on July 18, 1994, the magistrate judge denied Plaintiffs' motion for an emergency hearing on their motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), and denied Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of counsel. DE # 31. Also, on July 18, 1994, Magistrate Judge Wehrman entered a Report and Recommendation concerning Plaintiffs' motion for a TRO wherein he recommended that Plaintiffs' motion for a TRO be denied. DE # 29. Subsequently, over Plaintiffs' objections, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Wehrman's Report and Recommendation and denied Plaintiffs' motions for a TRO. DE # 39.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Plaintiffs having responded to this motion, it is ripe for review. The Defendants have submitted affidavits in support of their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the Court has considered these matters outside the pleadings (the affidavits) in reviewing this matter; therefore, the Defendants' motion must be analyzed as a motion for summary judgment.

II. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 directs the disposition of a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) states in relevant part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court's function in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is to determine if any genuine issue exists for trial, not to resolve any factual issues, and to deny summary judgment if material facts are in dispute. United States v. Articles of Device, 527 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir.1976); Tee-Pak, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 491 F.2d 1193, 1195 (6th Cir.1974). Further, "in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Bouldis v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 711 F.2d 1319, 1324 (6th Cir.1983). In short, summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact remains to be decided, and when the undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court is required to consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Ultimately, the standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). See also, Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir.1989).

With this standard in mind, the court will proceed to consider the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Discussion

The Defendants contend that for numerous reasons, this action should be dismissed. Defendants generally argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which the relief they seek can be granted, that Plaintiffs have failed to state a Bivens claim, that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing this action, and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to mootness or lack of standing.

Factual Background
A. The decision to make FMC Lexington an all-male facility

In July 1993, the BOP Executive Staff, which consists of the Director of the BOP, the Assistant Directors of the BOP, and the Regional Directors of the BOP, made the decision to convert FMC Lexington from an all-female institution to an all-male institution. (See Executive Staff Memorandum attached to Declaration of Alberto Munguia, Defendants' Exhibit 4 to Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss—Docket Entry # 21). This decision was made due to the combination of two factors: (1) the Federal Medical Center at Carville, Louisiana, an all-male institution, was being closed, requiring the relocation of those inmates, and (2) the U.S. Department of Defense donated land at Carswell Air Force Base, Texas to the BOP, and several buildings, including a hospital, are located on this property. (Declaration of Albert Lane, Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss— Docket Entry # 21). The BOP also decided to make Carswell a female institution. As the result of these decisions, (1) many of the male inmates at FMC Carville will be transferred to FMC Lexington, and (2) the female inmates presently housed at FMC Lexington will be transferred to other institutions, including the medical center at Carswell. In making this decision, the BOP considered the inmates' security levels and the cost containment of male inmates. Factors the BOP considered in making the decision to transfer the female inmates at FMC Lexington to other institutions were demographic distribution and access to services, programs, and family contact. (See Exhibits 1 and 4 to Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss—Docket Entry # 21).

B. The Dental Laboratory at FMC Lexington

The Dental Laboratory has operated at FMC Lexington since 1976 and is one of five regional dental labs operated by the BOP. The other four dental labs are located at Federal Correction Institution ("FCI") El Reno, California; FCI Oxford, Wisconsin; United States Penitentiary ("USP") Lompoc, California; and USP Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. The dental lab at FMC Lexington provides dental prosthetic devices to twenty-two (22) federal facilities. The primary purpose of the dental laboratory is to produce dental prosthetic appliances that are needed by these federal facilities. A secondary purpose of the dental lab is to provide inmates with a job and to instruct them on the production of dental prosthetic appliances. (Declaration of Albert Lane, Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss—Docket Entry # 21).

Inmates volunteer to work in the dental lab. In order to be eligible to work in the dental lab, the inmate must meet the following requirements:

1. have a high school diploma or the equivalent;
2. have more
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