Bouldis v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-3277,82-3277
• Citation: 711 F.2d 1319
• Parties: 1983-1 Trade Cases P 65,465 Pete BOULDIS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. U.S. SUZUKI MOTOR CORP., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1319

711 F.2d 1319

1983-1 Trade Cases P 65,465

Pete BOULDIS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.U.S. SUZUKI MOTOR CORP., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-3277.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 20, 1983.

Decided June 27, 1983.

Larry A. Zink(argued), Zink, Zink & Zink Co., L.P.A., Canton, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert B. Gosline, Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, Robert G. Clayton, Jr., David W. Wicklund(argued), Toledo, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, ENGEL, Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Bold-Morr, Inc. a former Suzuki motorcycle dealership, appeals a summary judgment dismissing its claim that defendants, U.S. Suzuki Motor Corporation and Daryl Lucian, a district sales manager for Suzuki, had committed a number of violations under the federal antitrust laws.The other plaintiffs, Pete Bouldis and Norman Morris, are officers and sole stockholders of Bold-Morr.In its complaint Bold-Morr sought treble damages, alleging that certain of Suzuki's business policies and practices violated § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (d) & (e)(price discrimination), § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1(tying arrangements), and § 3 of the Clayton Act,15 U.S.C. § 14(tying arrangements).

The parties engaged in extensive discovery, including interrogatories, requests for documents and depositions.Suzuki then filed a motion for summary judgment.On March 11, 1982, District JudgeNicholas J. Walinski entered a comprehensive 40 page opinion and granted Suzuki's summary judgment motion.While noting that summary procedures should be used "sparingly" in such cases, Judge Walinski concluded that summary judgment was appropriate in the present action because the evidence did not establish any factual basis upon which the asserted antitrust violations could be premised.

On appeal Bold-Morr contends that it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment.We affirm.

I

Bold-Morr was incorporated in 1972.During the years 1972-75, it operated as a Mazda automobile dealership.Due to substantial losses sustained by Bold-Morr, this venture was terminated.After the demise of the Mazda automobile dealership, appellants contacted the U.S. Suzuki representative serving the Canton, Ohio, area to inquire about obtaining a Suzuki motorcycle dealership.Subsequently, Bold-Morr acquired a motorcycle dealership, when the only other Suzuki dealer in the Canton area left the business.

Pursuant to a written Dealer Agreement, dated January 28, 1975, Bold-Morr acquired an exclusive motorcycle dealership location, and Suzuki agreed not to locate another dealer within Bold-Morr's area.In commencing its dealership, Bold-Morr was permitted to obtain the former dealer's inventory on "pay as sold" terms.¹Also, Suzuki authorized Bold-Morr to purchase new models on a pay as sold and prepaid freight basis.²Additionally, to increase its inventory, Bold-Morr purchased several models under an initial floor plan line of credit through the Borg Warner Corporation.³Subsequently, in March 1975, Bold-Morr arranged its floor plan line of credit through the Harter Bank and Trust Company of Canton, Ohio.The Harter Bank extended a $125,000 line of credit to Bold-Morr.

During the years 1975-76, Bold-Morr experienced some difficulties in making prompt payment for models procured under the pay as sold program and for parts it had ordered.Because of financial problems, in November 1975, Bold-Morr applied for an additional line of credit through the Suzuki Finance Program.⁴Due to its precarious financial posture, Bold-Morr was not approved for this additional funding.Consequently, as Bold-Morr's financial woes increased, so did its inability to participate in several promotional programs offered by Suzuki.

In May 1976, the Harter Bank terminated Bold-Morr's floor plan line of credit, when the dealership was unable to pay the principal and interest on its capital loans.Efforts by appellants to obtain alternative financing or to sell the dealership proved unsuccessful.Inability to purchase new models, maintain inventory and conduct an effective advertising campaign marked the quick and ultimate demise of the dealership.In December 1976, the Harter Bank repossessed Bold-Morr's entire inventory and, in turn, appellants terminated the Suzuki dealership.

In an effort to recover losses, appellants filed suit against Suzuki alleging violations of federal antitrust laws.In attacking the propriety of summary judgment, Bold-Morr asserts that Suzuki's promotional programs and business policies constituted forms of price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.Additionally, it is contended that certain arrangements between the parties culminated in a series of tying agreements in violation of both the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act.

II

It is a well established rule that motions for summary judgment are disfavored in antitrust litigation and that the standard for granting summary judgment is strict.SeeFirst National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 284-90, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1590-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 901, 89 S.Ct. 63, 21 L.Ed.2d 188(1968);Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458(1962);Smith v. Northern Michigan Hospitals, Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 947(6th Cir.1983);Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1197(6th Cir.1982);Taylor Drug Stores, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 560 F.2d 211, 213(6th Cir.1977).However, this general rule does not preclude the use of summary judgment in appropriate antitrust litigation.SeeFirst National Bank of Arizona, supra, 391 U.S. at 288-90, 88 S.Ct. at 1592-93;Smith, supra, 703 F.2d at 947-48;Davis-Watkins Co.supra, 686 F.2d at 1197;Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 1163, 1166-67(7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982, 99 S.Ct. 1791, 60 L.Ed.2d 242(1979).See alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 56 advisory committee note (1982)(summary judgment is "applicable to all actions").Indeed, the very purpose of a motion for summary judgment, to eliminate a trial where it would be unnecessary and merely result in delay and expense, warrants summary disposition of such cases when appropriate.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.That party must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences.SeeAdickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142(1970);United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176(1962);Davis-Watkins Co., supra, 686 F.2d at 1197.However, when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the opposing party may not rest on its pleadings, but must present sufficient evidence supporting its claims to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact.SeeAdickes, supra, 398 U.S. at 159 & n. 19, 90 S.Ct. at 1609 & n. 19;First National Bank of Arizona, supra, 391 U.S. at 288, 88 S.Ct. at 1592;Smith, supra, 703 F.2d at 947-48.See alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).If the record evidence is not disputed as to any material fact, the case should be decided as a matter of law rather than submitted to a jury.Davis-Watkins Co., supra, 686 F.2d at 1197;Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 64-65(6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed.2d 415(1979).Accordingly, "the absence of any relevant probative evidence in support of a litigant's antitrust claims will expose such claims to summary judgment disposition."Davis-Watkins Co., supra, 686 F.2d at 1197.SeeFirst National Bank of Arizona, supra, 391 U.S. at 290, 88 S.Ct. at 1593;Smith v. Northern Medical Hospitals, Inc., supra, 703 F.2d at 947-48.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that Bold-Morr has failed to submit any relevant evidence which would provide a sufficient factual basis to withstand summary judgment as to any of the asserted grounds for relief.The antitrust claims in the instant action raise only questions of law.Therefore, we conclude that disposition by summary judgment was proper under the circumstances of this case.

III

Bold-Morr contends that the district court erred in dismissing its claim of price discrimination under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.⁵Essentially, this section makes it unlawful for a seller to discriminate in price between purchasers of the same or similar goods actually sold, whether to the ultimate purchaser or for resale, if the effect of such price discrimination may be to lessen competition substantially in a line of commerce or with the competitors of the seller or its customers.SeeFederal Trade Comm. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 547-51, 80 S.Ct. 1267, 1273-75, 4 L.Ed.2d 1385(1969)(the term "price discrimination" is defined as merely a difference in price).Bold-Morr asserts two arguments to support its claim.First, it is charged that Suzuki initiated and maintained credit programs to enable dealers to purchase Suzuki products, and that Bold-Morr was not permitted to participate in these programs.Bold-Morr asserts that, as a result, its actual cost for motorcycles was greater than that of other Suzuki dealers who were approved for these credit programs.Two programs are cited by Bold-Morr in support of this contention: the "pay as sold" and the Suzuki finance programs.

Both the pay as sold program and the Suzuki finance program were initiated to afford credit to qualified dealers.Suzuki maintains that participation in its credit program is contingent upon a dealer's overall credit worthiness, and, therefore, credit decisions are based upon legitimate business factors.Suzuki presented evidence that its...