Archer v. State

Decision Date15 June 1876
Citation45 Md. 33
PartiesTHOMAS G. ARCHER v. STATE OF MARYLAND. THOMAS G. ARCHER v. STATE OF MARYLAND.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

William Young and Herman Stump, Jr., for the appellant.

J T. C. Hopkins and Attorney General Gwinn, for the appellee.

MILLER J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant was indicted for selling on the 10th of May, 1875 one-half pint of whiskey to Samuel M. Whiteford, with a view to profit, in the prosecution of a regular trade and business, without having obtained a license so to do. At the trial four exceptions were taken to the rulings of the Court upon the admission of testimony.

Before noticing these rulings in detail, it is proper to observe that it appears from the testimony in the case that the traverser, who had no license to sell spirituous liquors in less quantities than a pint, kept cigarettes for sale and invited the purchasers of them to drink whiskey with him. There can be no question, that if the price asked for the cigarettes was intended to cover the price of the whiskey, which was afterwards nominally given to the purchasers, the transaction was a sale of the whiskey, as well as of the cigarettes. Such an attempt to evade the law is a very shallow one, and testimony tending to show that this was the real character of the transaction was admissible to establish the offence for which the traverser was indicted. We shall now consider the several exceptions in their order.

First Exception.--On the part of the State the witness Whiteford testified, that he went to the traverser's place of business on the 10th of May, 1875, and paid him forty cents and got four cigarettes. He was then asked what these cigarettes were worth to which he replied he did not know. The State then asked him what was his opinion or judgment as to the value of them, and to the asking of this question the traverser objected. We see no error in the ruling allowing it to be put. It was important to the issue and admissible to show the actual value of these articles as compared with what he paid for them, and as he was evidently a reluctant witness it was proper after his previous answer, to press him with the question as to what was his judgment of their value. It was not necessary to inquire first whether he was an expert as to the value of such an article.

Second Exception.--The witness then stated that these cigarettes were a parcel of tobacco wrapped in paper, and might be worth a quarter to a half cent each, but he was not a judge of tobacco. The State then put to him the question, whether there was anything in the previous acts or declarations of the traverser, which induced him to believe, that if he called for cigarettes or paid him at the rate of ten cents a piece for them, that he would get in return anything besides the cigarettes for the same money, and if so to state what had occurred to induce him so to think. The traverser objected to the asking of this question. We think the Court was right in allowing it to be put. An affirmative answer accompanied with a statement of such previous acts and declarations of the accused, would clearly have been admissible and competent evidence. But if we are wrong in this, it appears by the subsequent exception the witness answered the question in the negative, and hence no harm was done to the traverser by the ruling excepted to.

Third Exception.--The witness having answered the previous question in the negative, was then (as he should have been at first) required to state all that occurred when he went to this placc on the day in question, and he replied, that he and four others went there, that he called for four cigarettes and paid forty cents for them; we were afterwards invited into another room and took a drink and came out; there was a shelf or counter to the left of the door; we walked in and took whiskey; there were glasses and a bottle there; saw but one either time; was some talk in there; went in first time with Barton, last time with Johns; cigarettes were handed round; got one and took a drink. In reply to questions by...

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7 cases
  • State v. Stanley
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1917
    ...18 Ann. Cas. 844; Pitner v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 268, 39 S.W. 662; Walker v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. Rep. 345, 94 S.W. 230; Archer v. State, 45 Md. 33, 2 Am. Crim. Rep. 404; Com. v. Sinclair, 138 Mass. 493, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 330; State v. Miller, 20 N.D. 509, 128 N.W. 1034; State v. Fallon......
  • State v. Mrs. Antonio Donaluzzi
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1920
    ...in question and support the State's claim that it was a sale and not an unauthorized appropriation of the liquor by Davis. Archer v. State, 45 Md. 33, presented similar question. There the transaction was the sale of cigarettes worth a little more than a cent a piece for ten cents and then ......
  • Casteel v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1921
    ...alleged in the indictment and as testified to by Termis Butts. 131 Ark. 450; case note 18 A. and E. Ann. Cas. pp. 850 and 851; 97 S.W. 92; 45 Md. 33; 108 N.W. 6; 8 R. C. L. 198, p. 204. OPINION WOOD, J. This appeal is from a judgment of conviction on an indictment charging that the appellan......
  • Blumenstiel v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • May 2, 1921
    ...se. 1 Hawk 733. 2. The testimony offered and objected to was admissible as competent. 131 Ark. 450; 18 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 850-1; 97 S.W. 92; 45 Md. 33; 108 N.W. 6; 135 Ark. 163. The testimony competent. 131 Ark. 445; 130 Id. 48. See, also, C. & M. Digest, § 3124. A nuisance per se is clearly......
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