Archer v. Town of Hopkinton
| Decision Date | 29 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | CA No. WC-2019-0015 |
| Parties | Katherine A. Archer, Amanda L. Bentley, Justin P. Bentley, Carol A. Brough, Daniel J. Brough, Deborah H. Colucci, Lynn V. Lapierre, Dorsey K. Wellman and Susan H. Wellman, Cheryl E. Reynolds and Bruce D. Reynolds, Martin Sheldon and Lucinda A. Sheldon, formerly known as, Lucinda A. McGee, Plaintiffs, v. Town of Hopkinton, a Rhode Island Municipal Corporation, the Hopkinton Town Council, Frank T. Landolfi, Thomas E. Buck, Sylvia K. Thompson, David F. Husband and Barbara A. Capalbo, in their official capacities only, as Members of the Town Council of the Town of Hopkinton, Rhode Island, Rhode Island Solar Renewable Energy, LLC, a defunct Rhode Island Limited Liability Company, Anthony J. DelVicario, formerly the Manager of Rhode Island Solar Renewable Energy, LLC and Maxson Hill, LLC, a Rhode Island Limited Liability Company, Defendants. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
The Solar Energy Defendants1 and Town Defendants2 (Defendants) present Motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56 in response to an action fordeclaratory judgment from Plaintiffs challenging the passage of two zoning ordinance amendments. These amendments permitted Defendants to begin constructing a solar panel array in an area previously zoned as residential. Plaintiffs objected to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. This Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1.
Plaintiffs3 are thirteen residents of Hopkinton, Rhode Island (the Town) who brought an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), §§ 9-30-1 et seq., regarding the passage of two zoning ordinance amendments to permit the construction of a solar farm. On January 29, 2018, the Hopkinton Town Council (the Council) gave duly advertised notice of a public hearing regarding an application by the Solar Energy Defendants to amend the zoning map and comprehensive map plan to change property located at 310 Main Street from RFR-80 residential zoning to a "Commercial Special" designation, limiting the use to installation of a solar array and collection of solar energy. (Pls.' Mem. Supp. Obj. to Def. Developers' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2
The initial hearing on the application was held on February 20, 2018. (Compl. Ex. M, Town Council Meeting Minutes, Feb. 20, 2018.) At that hearing, the matter was continued until March 19, 2018 because the Hopkinton Town Planning Board (Planning Board) had not yet rendered an advisory opinion. Id. at 3. On March 14, 2018, the Planning Board issued a unanimous opinion opposing the proposed amendments. (Compl. Ex. S, Planning Board Advisory Opinion.) ThePlanning Board found that the environmental concerns to the property outweighed the potential economic benefits of a solar farm. Id.
At the continued hearing on March 19, 2018, the Council set a date of May 7, 2018 to render a decision on the application.4 (Compl. Ex. U, Town Council Meeting Minutes at 3, Mar. 19, 2018.) On May 21, 2018, the Council voted 3-2 to pass the two amendments. (Compl. Ex. X, Town Council Meeting Minutes at 12, May 21, 2018.) Chapter 259 in the Hopkinton Code of Ordinances amended the Town's Future Land Use Map of the Comprehensive Plan of the Town of Hopkinton, changing the designation of the Property from RFR-80 to "Commercial" with restrictions limiting use of the Property to a solar energy system. ( Chapter 260 in the Hopkinton Code of Ordinances amended the Town of Hopkinton Zoning Map, making the same change to the Property. (
Plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief on January 9, 2019, contending that the Council acted unlawfully in passing the zoning ordinance amendments and seeking to enjoin the Solar Energy Defendants from starting construction on a solar panel array at the Property. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Town Defendants were required to pass the amendments with a supermajority vote due to the adverse opinion by the Planning Board; that the Town Defendants failed to properly provide notice for the continued hearing dates; and that these and other procedural inadequacies rendered the passage of the zoning ordinance amendments unlawful.
The Solar Energy Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on November 18, 2019, and the Town Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28, 2020. These motions for summary judgment argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a declaratory judgment action and that Defendants can prevail on the merits of the case because the Council acted lawfully in passing the two amendments. The Solar Energy Defendants further contend that injunctive relief is improper because they have already received a building permit to construct the solar array, and Plaintiffs cannot meet the requisite elements to obtain an injunction.
Plaintiffs filed their objection on March 9, 2020. On May 12, 2020, the parties entered into a consent order agreeing to waive oral argument on the summary judgment motions and permitting the Court to enter a judgment on the pleadings.
This Court will grant summary judgment "when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I. 2001); Super. R. Civ. P. 56. '"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously."' DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 129 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I. 2008)). As such, "only if the case is legally dead on arrival should the court take the drastic step of administering last rites by granting summary judgment." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 756 A.2d 179, 185 (R.I. 2000). In its analysis, the Court will view the evidence in "a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Industrial National Bank v. Peloso, 121 R.I. 305, 307, 397 A.2d 1312, 1313 (1979).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing there are no genuine issues of material fact; the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must put forth a genuine issue of material fact. McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A., 91 A.3d 853, 858 (R.I. 2014). The nonmoving party cannot rest on '"mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions"' to establish a genuine issue of fact. D'Allesandro v. Tarro, 842 A.2d 1063, 1065 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Santucci v. Citizens Bank of Rhode Island, 799 A.2d 254, 257 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam)). In deciding questions of law, "the trial justice often finds it necessary to exercise his or her independent judgment and make findings as to preliminary facts." Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 685 (R.I. 1994) (citing Rodrigues v. Miriam Hospital, 623 A.2d 456, 461 (R.I. 1993)).
The UDJA permits the Superior Court to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Section 9-30-1.5 When addressing claims under the UDJA, the Court must determine whether it is presented with a justiciable case or controversy, which requires "(1) a plaintiff with the requisite standing and (2) 'some legalhypothesis which will entitle the plaintiff to real and articulable relief.'" N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick ex rel. Moore, 964 A.2d 1141, 1145 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008)).
Standing is satisfied when a plaintiff has suffered "some injury in fact, economic or otherwise." Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317 (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22, 317 A.2d 124, 128 (1974)). Our Supreme Court adopted the approach of the United States Supreme Court in holding that an injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). In reviewing a plaintiff's standing, the Court "focuses on the party who is advancing the claim rather than on the issue the party seeks to have adjudicated." Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). ' ' Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 862 (quoting Matunuck Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Sheldon, 121 R.I. 386, 396, 399 A.2d 489, 494 (1979)).
Courts have "refused to find standing when a plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a personalized injury distinct from that of the community as a whole." Meyer v. City of Newport, 844 A.2d 148, 151 (R.I. 2004). "In Rhode Island, 'generalized claims alleging purely public harm are an insufficient basis for sustaining a private lawsuit.'" Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State, 81 A.3d 1106, 1110 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Watson v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130, 136 (R.I. 2012)). Vague or general assertions of harm are not sufficient for a plaintiff to have standing.
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence that they suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact sufficient for standing under the UDJA. Their general allegationsclaiming that the actions of the Town Council "have damaged [them], leaving their lives and ownership interests in their properties, without the protections that the laws in fact provide" are insufficient to demonstrate a legally cognizable injury. (Compl. ¶ 279.) In fact, of the thirteen named Plaintiffs, only four provided affidavits alleging any kind of specific harm....
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