Ferreira v. Strack

• Decision Date: 14 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-442-A,92-442-A
• Citation: 636 A.2d 682
• Parties: Amelia FERREIRA et al. v. William STRACK, Jr., et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 682

636 A.2d 682

Amelia FERREIRA et al. v. William STRACK, Jr., et al.

No. 92-442-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 14, 1994.

Cort Chappell, Chappell & Chappell, Newport, for plaintiff.

Joseph W. Baglini, Higgins & Slattery, Providence, Gregory Fater, Newport, Kevin M. Cain, Matthew F. Medeiros, Flanders & Medeiros, Paul A. Anderson, Anderson, Anderson & Zangari, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal by the plaintiffs, Amelia Ferreira (Amelia), Frank Ferreira (Frank), and Frank Bors on his own behalf and as executor of the estate of Florinda Amado-Bors (Florinda), from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court for the County of Newport in favor of the defendant, St. Joseph's Church of Newport, Rhode Island (church). ¹ For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the entry of summary judgment. The following facts are undisputed.

On December 24, 1986, Amelia, Frank, and Florinda drove to the church to attend Midnight Mass. As was the practice of many parishioners, they parked their car in a small parking lot, which was owned by a third party, across the street from the church. The parking lot is separated from the church by Broadway, which is a public highway in the city of Newport.

After Mass ended, Amelia, Frank, and Florinda left the church and proceeded to cross Broadway to reach their car in the parking lot. While in the crosswalk, Amelia and Florinda were struck by a vehicle driven by William Strack, Jr. (Strack), who was later determined to be legally intoxicated. Florinda died within hours of the accident, and Amelia suffered severe and permanent injuries.

On prior occasions the church had contacted the Newport police department (police) and requested that a traffic officer be dispatched to control traffic on Broadway after various Masses. The police had dispatched traffic officers pursuant to the church's request on a so-called as-available basis. At no time did the church have a contract with the police to provide traffic officers. No representative of the church had contacted the police to request traffic control for Midnight Mass on December 24, 1986.

After the accident plaintiffs brought an action against the church for negligence. The plaintiffs proffered two theories for imposing liability upon the church. First, plaintiffs contend that the church owed them a duty to control traffic on Broadway, a public highway, because the church knew that a substantial number of parishioners would cross Broadway to reach the parking lot late at night after Mass ended. Second, plaintiffs argue in the alternative that even if no duty existed, the church voluntarily assumed a duty to patrol traffic by its past conduct of occasionally contacting the police and requesting the assignment of traffic officers to Broadway. Under this line of reasoning, plaintiffs argue, parishioners relied upon the church's gratuitous assumption of a duty and the presence of such officers on Broadway. Therefore, the church had a duty to warn parishioners when a traffic officer was not present.

The church moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In ruling on the motion, the trial justice considered the two theories put forth by plaintiffs and analyzed the church's liability under both premises-liability and general-negligence principles. The trial justice held that since plaintiffs' injuries occurred on Broadway, not on the church's property, the church had no duty under a premises-liability theory. Analyzing the church's liability under general-negligence principles and using the factors set forth in Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I.1987), the trial justice held that the church did not have a duty, and furthermore, the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries was the willful and wanton act of Strack. Accordingly the trial justice granted the church's motion for summary judgment. Although our rationale is somewhat different from that of the trial justice, we do, however, affirm his conclusion.

In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this court applies the same standard as the trial justice below. Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219, 1220 (R.I.1985). This standard requires the trial justice to view the pleadings, interrogatories, and affidavits in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact. Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I.1981). If there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the trial justice must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment under applicable law. Alfano v. Landers, 585 A.2d 651, 652 (R.I.1991). In deciding this question of law, the trial justice often finds it necessary to exercise his or her independent judgment and make findings as to preliminary facts. Rodrigues v. Miriam Hospital, 623 A.2d 456, 461 (R.I.1993). In this particular case the trial justice was required to determine whether, under applicable law, the church owed plaintiffs a duty. "If no such duty exist[ed], then the trier of fact has nothing to consider and a motion for summary judgment must be granted." Barratt, 492 A.2d at 1222.

A defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. Rodrigues, 623 A.2d at 460; Ryan v. State Department of Transportation, 420 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I.1980). Whether a duty exists in a particular situation is a question of law to be decided by the court. D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 649, 338 A.2d 524, 527 (1975).

In the past this court has recognized the difficulty of crafting a workable test to determine whether a duty exists in a particular case. See, e.g., D'Ambra, 114 R.I. at 648-49, 338 A.2d at 527 (observing that "the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has been formulated," quoting Prosser, Torts § 53 (4th ed. 1971)); Radigan v. W.J. Halloran Co., 97 R.I. 122, 128, 196 A.2d 160, 163 (1963). This court has avoided "definitively commit[ting] itself to [a specific] * * * analytical approach" and has instead adopted an ad hoc approach of considering all relevant factors. D'Ambra, 114 R.I. at 649, 650-52, 338 A.2d at 527, 528; see also Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225; ² Radigan, 97 R.I. at 128, 196 A.2d at 163; M. Jeffrey Monroe, Comment, Annual Survey of Rhode Island Law: Landowners Not Required to Warn Those on Their Premises of Shallow Water if Diving Not a Foreseeable Action, 22 Suff.Univ.L.Rev. 531, 533 (1988) (analyzing Banks and noting that the test to determine duty "remains nebulous"). We recognize that the factors utilized in a particular case should reflect considerations of public policy, as well as notions of fairness. See D'Ambra, 114 R.I. at 648-49, 338 A.2d at 527; W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53 at 358 (5th ed. 1984).

We begin our analysis with a review of various areas of negligence law tangentially related to the issue before us and from which we cull the factors to be applied in the case at hand.

Under the doctrine of premises liability a landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care toward persons reasonably expected to be on his or her premises. O'Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334, 338 (R.I.1989). The rationale for the imposition of this duty rests firmly on the landowner's possession of the premises and his or her attendant right and obligation to control the premises. See Jacobs v. Anderson Building Co., 459 N.W.2d 384, 386 (N.D.1990) (it is " 'well settled that a duty of care will not ordinarily be imposed upon an occupier of land beyond the area over which he has possession and control' "); W. Page Keeton, § 57 at 386 ("person in possession of property ordinarily is in the best position to discover and control its dangers, and often is responsible for creating them in the first place"). We note that plaintiffs' injuries occurred on Broadway, a public highway, not on the church's property. Therefore, we agree with the trial justice that the church is not liable to plaintiffs under a premises-liability theory.

A second body of related law, which is a matter of first impression in Rhode Island involves the issue of whether a landowner has the duty to protect another from intentional criminal acts of third parties which take place on adjacent property or the public way. The generally accepted rule is that no such duty exists. See Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce, 169 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1147, 214 Cal.Rptr. 405, 408 (1985) (no duty to protect plaintiff from injury by third party on land not owned, possessed, or controlled by landowner); Buck v. Acme Markets, Inc., 53 Md.App. 151, 157, 456 A.2d 47, 51 (1982) (no duty on private landowner to protect one on public way); Jones v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 681, 684, 408 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1987) (no duty to patron attacked off premises in adjacent parking lot); Wofford v. Kennedy's 2nd St. Co., 649 S.W.2d 912, 914-15 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (holding no duty to protect patron on public street adjacent to tavern); Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Associates, 116 Wash.2d 217, 235-36, 802 P.2d 1360, 1370 (1991) (no duty to protect plaintiff from intentional criminal conduct of third parties on abutting land); see also E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Private Person's Duty and Liability for Failure to Protect Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619, 626 (1966). The underlying rationale for this rule is threefold. First, a landowner has no right or ability to control adjacent property or the public way as such property is not owned or possessed by the landowner. See, e.g., Steinmetz, 169 Cal.App.3d at 1147, 214 Cal.Rptr. at 408. Second, the landowner has no control over the third party committing the criminal act and causing injury to another. See, e.g., Waters v. New York City Housing Authority, 69 N.Y.2d 225, 230, 513 N.Y.S.2d...