Archer v. Youngblood
| Decision Date | 29 April 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 12723.,12723. |
| Parties | ARCHER v. YOUNGBLOOD et ux. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Dick Dixon, Judge.
Suit by R. C. Youngblood and wife against J. M. Archer, to cancel trustee's deed. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
E. P. King, of Dallas, for appellant.
Ross M. Scott, of Dallas, for appellees.
R. C. Youngblood and wife instituted this suit against J. M. Archer, to cancel a trustee's deed to "Lot 54 of Cedar Glade Addition to the City of Dallas".
The record discloses that, on October 9, 1931, the plaintiffs executed and delivered to one I. R. Burris a promissory note in the sum of $1,801.05, due and payable in installments running over a period of six years, and a deed of trust to said lot, with the usual trustee's power of sale, to secure the payment of said note. The note and deed of trust were given in consideration of a stock of merchandise sold by Burris to the Youngbloods; and, on default in payment of said note, the trustee, on November 3, 1937, in accordance with the deed of trust, after having given public notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, sold said lot and executed deed to J. M. Archer.
Plaintiffs' primary and dominant contention is: That, at the time of the execution of the note and deed of trust, the lot in question was a part of their resident homestead, claimed, used, and occupied by them as a place of business, and as a range for their chickens to roam and feed, thus the deed of trust lien was ineffective and the trustee's deed void.
The cause was tried to the court without a jury and, on conclusion of the testimony, the court found that, at the date of the execution of the note and deed of trust, the property was a part of plaintiffs' homestead; the deed of trust, and deed executed pursuant to the trustee's sale, were void, and no title to any part of the lot or property passed to the purchaser on account thereof; accordingly, the court entered judgment, canceling the trustee's deed to defendant, divesting all title to the lot out of defendant and vesting title in plaintiffs.
Appraising appellant's numerous assignments of error and propositions, we conclude that the ultimate objective is, to show conclusively that, at the time the note and deed of trust were executed and long prior thereto, plaintiffs had effectively abandoned the property involved as a part of their homestead; therefore, not exempt under the constitutional homestead exemptions, and the court erred in canceling the deed of trust lien, subsequently foreclosed, thereby divesting appellant of the title to said property.
In approaching the action of a trial court, we recognize that a reviewing court must accept as true its judgment, it being a trier of facts, if and when there is cogent evidence, liberally construed, that will support its findings and conclusions. The evidence in this case is undisputed, thus the objective presents a question of law.
It is settled law in this state that the homestead in property continues its exempt character as long as it is owned, occupied, and used as such; and that it ceases to be only...
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Collier v. Perry
...Mary and Arthur Perry, but had long prior thereto been abandoned, having been appropriated to an inconsistent use. Archer v. Youngblood [Tex.Civ.App.], 129 S.W.2d 382, writ of error It is clear that the finding was that plaintiff here was not a prior creditor of defendants Mary and Arthur P......