Archibeque v. Moya

• Decision Date: 15 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 21359,21359
• Citation: 116 N.M. 616,1993 NMSC 79,866 P.2d 344
• Parties: Chris ARCHIBEQUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna MOYA, as an individual and in her official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 344

866 P.2d 344

116 N.M. 616

Chris ARCHIBEQUE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna MOYA, as an individual and in her official capacity Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21359.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Dec. 15, 1993.

[116 N.M. 617] Joseph P. Kennedy, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jeffrey L. Baker & Associates, Rosemary Dillon, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellee.

Paul M. Schneider, Santa Fe, for amicus curiae Risk Management Div.

OPINION

BACA, Justice.

Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-2-8 (Cum.Supp.1993) and SCRA 1986, 12-607 (Repl.Pamp.1992), we accepted the following certified question of state law from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals:

Does [NMSA 1978, Section 41-4-6 (Repl.Pamp.1989) ] of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, [NMSA 1978, Sections 41-4-1 to -29 (Repl.Pamp.1989 & Cum.Supp.1993) ], provide immunity from tort liability to an employee of the state penitentiary whose alleged negligence in releasing a prisoner into the general prison population, which included known enemies of the prisoner, resulted in the prisoner being beaten and injured by one of his enemies?

We hold that immunity is not waived under Section 41-4-6.

I.

Plaintiff-Appellant, Chris Archibeque ("Archibeque"), a prisoner at the Central New Mexico Correction Facility, was transferred to the New Mexico State Penitentiary in Santa Fe (the "penitentiary") on October 18, 1988. Before being released into the general prison population, Archibeque met with Defendant-Appellee Donna Moya-Martinez ("Moya-Martinez"), a prison intake officer. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss whether Archibeque had any known enemies within the general prison population. During the meeting, Archibeque told Moya-Martinez that Alex Gallegos ("Gallegos") was one of his enemies. Moya-Martinez, without checking an available printout of current inmates, told Archibeque that Gallegos was no longer imprisoned at the penitentiary. Moya-Martinez permitted Archibeque to be released into the general prison population. That night, Archibeque was assaulted by Gallegos and several other inmates in the prison weight room.

Archibeque brought a lawsuit in federal district court against Moya-Martinez and other employees of the New Mexico Department of Corrections. Archibeque sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), for alleged civil rights violations. Archibeque also sought damages under state law, claiming that his injuries resulted from the negligent operation of the prison facilities and that Section 41-4-6 acted to waive immunity for Moya-Martinez and other corrections employees who had acted negligently.

Prior to trial, the federal district court dismissed Archibeque's claim of negligent operation of the penitentiary. The district court interpreted Section 41-4-6 narrowly and held that the statute did not waive immunity for negligent security and custody of inmates at the penitentiary. Thereafter, Archibeque's civil rights claims were resolved in favor of Moya-Martinez and the other corrections employees.¹ The federal district court denied Archibeque's motion for reconsideration. Archibeque appealed, raising the question certified to this Court by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

II.

The potential tort liability of governmental entities and public employees is limited by the Tort Claims Act. See Pemberton v. Cordova, 105 N.M. 476, 477, 734 P.2d 254, 255 (Ct.App.1987). Section 41-4-4(A) provides that governmental entities and public employees acting within their scope of duty "are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as waived by Sections 41-4-5 through 41-4-12." Thus, the Act shields governmental entities and public employees from tort liability unless immunity is specifically waived by the Act. Wittkowski v. State, 103 N.M. 526, 529, 710 P.2d 93, 96 (Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d 1047 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 477, 745 P.2d 380, 385 (1987). At issue in this case is the interpretation of the waiver of immunity found in Section 41-4-6, the Act's "premises liability" statute, which states in relevant part:

The immunity granted pursuant to [Section 41-4-4(A) ] does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, public park, machinery, equipment or furnishings.

Archibeque argues that Moya-Martinez was participating in the operation of the penitentiary when she classified Archibeque as an inmate that could safely be released into the general prison population. Archibeque contends that Moya-Martinez's alleged negligence in misclassifying Archibeque and releasing him into the general population constituted negligent operation of the penitentiary and was effective to waive immunity under Section 41-4-6.

We do not agree with Archibeque that immunity is waived under Section 41-4-6. In two factually similar cases, the Court of Appeals has rejected arguments that are nearly identical to Archibeque's argument. In Wittkowski, the decedent's personal representative and survivors sued the New Mexico State Police, the New Mexico Department of Corrections, and various prison officials after two inmates, misclassified as minimum security prisoners, escaped from a low security work project, crossed into Colorado, and killed the decedent during the robbery of a liquor store. 103 N.M. at 527-28, 710 P.2d at 94-95. On appeal, following the trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs contended that the Department's immunity was waived under Section 41-4-6. Id. at 530, 710 P.2d at 97. The plaintiffs argued that Section 41-4-6 applied to waive immunity because the operation of the penitentiary included the security, custody, and classification of inmates, and the negligent classification of the inmates facilitated their escape and ultimately lead to decedent's death. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument and interpreted Section 41-4-6 narrowly, holding that the statute did not apply to waive immunity because "the injuries alleged did not occur due to a physical defect in a building." Id.

The Court of Appeals subsequently applied the holding of Wittkowski in Gallegos v. State, 107 N.M. 349, 758 P.2d 299 (Ct.App.1987), cert. quashed, 107 N.M. 314, 757 P.2d 370 (1988). In Gallegos, the plaintiff, a former inmate of the penitentiary, brought suit for damages resulting from injuries he sustained when other inmates assaulted him with a mop wringer. 107 N.M. at 350-51, 758 P.2d at 300-01. After the trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed, claiming that immunity was waived under Section 41-4-6 because failure to keep the mop wringer outside the inmates' living area constituted negligent maintenance of the penitentiary. Id. at 351, 758 P.2d at 301. The Court of Appeals disagreed, and, applying the rationale of Wittkowski, held that immunity was not waived under the plain language of Section 41-4-6. Id.

We apply the rule from Wittkowski and Gallegos and hold that Moya-Martinez's immunity is not waived by Section 41-4-6. The "operation" and "maintenance" of the penitentiary premises, as these terms are used in Section 41-4-6, does not include the security, custody, and classification of inmates. See Gallegos, 107 N.M. at 351, 758 P.2d at 301; Wittkowski, 103 N.M. at 530, 710 P.2d at 97. The purpose of Section 41-4-6 is to ensure the general public's safety by requiring public employees to exercise reasonable care in maintaining and operating the physical premises owned and operated by the government. Castillo v. County of Santa Fe, 107 N.M. 204, 206-07, 755 P.2d 48, 50-51 (1988). Moya-Martinez was not operating and maintaining the prison's physical premises when she negligently classified Archibeque as an inmate that could be released into the general prison population. Rather, she was performing an administrative function associated with the operation of the corrections system. Section 41-4-6 does not waive immunity when public employees negligently perform such administrative functions. To read Section 41-4-6 as waiving immunity for negligent performance of administrative functions would be contrary to the plain language and intended purpose of the statute. See State v. Riddall, 112 N.M. 78, 80, 811 P.2d 576, 578 (Ct.App.) (stating that when interpreting a statute, an appellate court is required to consider the plain meaning of the words used and the intended purpose of the statute), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 21, 810 P.2d 1241 (1991).

Citing Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 808 P.2d 614 (1991) and Castillo, Archibeque argues that this Court has rejected the narrow reading of Section 41-4-6 found in Wittkowski and Gallegos in favor of a broader interpretation. Archibeque maintains that immunity must be waived under an expansive reading of Section 41-4-6. In Bober, we rejected previous narrow interpretations of Section 41-4-6 and quoted with approval the following language from Castillo: " 'Section 41-4-6 ... contemplate[s] waiver of immunity where due to the alleged negligence of public employees an injury arises from an unsafe, dangerous, or defective condition on property owned and operated by the government....' " Bober, 111 N.M. at 653, 808 P.2d at 623 (quoting Castillo, 107 N.M. at 205, 755 P.2d at 49). A careful reading of Bober and Castillo reveals that both cases rejected reading Section 41-4-6 to limit waiver of immunity to those instances where injury occurred due to a physical defect in a building. Bober, 111 N.M. at 652-53, 808 P.2d at 622-23; Castillo, 107 N.M. at 206, 755 P.2d at 50. Bober and Castillo favored an interpretation of Section 41-4-6 that permitted waiver of immunity when injury was caused by a dangerous or defective condition on the property surrounding a public building, as well as for injuries...