Archie v. Greene Bros. Lumber Co.
Decision Date | 08 January 1943 |
Docket Number | 679. |
Citation | 23 S.E.2d 834,222 N.C. 477 |
Parties | ARCHIE et al. v. GREENE BROS. LUMBER CO. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
This was a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act to obtain compensation for the injury and death of Willie C. Archie, an employee of the defendant Lumber Company. It was not controverted that both the employee and the employer were subject to the provisions of the Act, and that the claimants were the only dependents of the employee.
The hearing commissioner denied compensation. On review by the full commission a contrary conclusion was reached and compensation awarded. On appeal to the Superior Court the trial judge held that, on the facts found by the Industrial Commission, the injury to Willie C. Archie, which resulted in his death, did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, and denied plaintiffs' claim for compensation.
The plaintiffs, claimants, appealed to the Supreme Court.
Felder & Rosen, of Orangeburg, S.C., and McLean & Stacy, of Lumberton, for plaintiffs, appellants.
Clark & Clark, of Elizabethtown, for defendant appellee.
The findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission in a matter properly before that body, when based on competent evidence, are conclusive, and not open to review by the courts. Tindall v. Furniture Co., 216 N.C. 306, 4 S.E.2d 894. Since it is apparent from an examination of the record in this case that the findings of the Commission detailing the circumstances of the fatal injury sustained by Willie C. Archie, are supported by competent testimony, it follows that the only question presented by the appeal is whether upon the facts so found his dependents are entitled under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Code 1939, § 8081(h) et seq., to an award of compensation for his injury and death.
The Industrial Commission concluded that the decedent came to his death from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the defendant but the trial judge, being of opinion that this conclusion was erroneous in law, overruled the Commission and denied compensation. The appeal brings the question to us for decision.
The findings of the Industrial Commission pertinent to the appeal are as follows:
It is thus made to appear that the defendant Lumber Company, in connection with its logging operations, maintained on its premises a camp for its employees and a railroad between it and the woods where the employees, including the decedent, performed the principal part of their work. At the time of the injury to claimants' intestate, he was still subject to orders, and within the period of his daily labor, which included transportation from the woods to the camp which the defendant was under obligation to furnish. The transportation was incident to his employment. He was hurt while attempting to get on defendant's log train for the purpose of being transported from the woods to the camp. While this train was operated by the defendant between these points on its own premises, and thus afforded a means of transportation, the use of the log train for that purpose had been forbidden by a rule promulgated by the defendant for the safety of its employees, and a safe means of transportation in an enclosed car had been provided. On the occasion of the injury the car was available. It is contended that the violation of the rule established for the employee's safety, and his choice of hazardous and forbidden means of transportation should debar the claimants from compensation for an injury to him resulting therefrom.
The negligence of the employee, however, does not debar him from compensation for an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The only ground set out in the statute upon which compensation may be denied on account of the fault of the employee is when the injury is occasioned by his intoxication or wilful intention to injure himself or another. The Act was designed to eliminate the fault of the employee as a basis for determining compensation for injury incidental to employment in industry. As was said by Brogden, J., speaking for the Court, in Chambers v. Oil Co., 199 N.C. 28, 153 S.E. 594, 596, "It is generally conceded by all courts that the various Compensation Acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying recovery." This principle was reaffirmed in Michaux v. Bottling Co., 205 N.C. 786, 172 S.E. 406, where claimant was injured while attempting to climb upon a moving truck. Rowe v. Rowe-Coward Co., 208 N.C. 484, 181 S.E. 254; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678, Ann.Cas.1917D, 637.
Here it was conceded, and properly so, that if the employee had been hurt while attempting to get on the enclosed car, rather than the log train, in order to be transported from the woods to the camp, his injury would have been compensable under the statute. Getting on a conveyance furnished by the defendant for transportation on its premises from the woods to the camp was incidental to his employment and was part of the employee's duty. We do not think compensation should be denied his dependents because he made an error of judgment and attempted to use a more hazardous means of transportation, likewise under the control of the defendant, nor because in so doing he violated a rule which was not always observed by the employees. Phifer's Dependents v. Dairy, 200 N.C. 65, 156 S.E. 147; Bellamy v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 200 N.C. 676, 158 S.E. 246; Edwards v. Loving Co., 203 N.C. 189, 165 S.E. 356; Gordon v. Chair Co., 205 N.C. 739, 177 S.E. 485; Smith v. Gastonia, 216 N.C. 517, 5 S.E.2d 540; Mion v. Marble & Tile Co., Inc., 217 N.C. 743, 9 S.E.2d 501.
The only provision made by the statute with regard to an injury caused by the wilful failure of an employee to use a safety appliance, or by the wilful breach of a rule or regulation adopted by the employer and approved by the Industrial Commission, is to require that his compensation be reduced ten per cent. The statute does not deny compensation when those facts appear, but only subjects the injured employee to the penalty of a reduction in the compensation to be awarded. In the instant case the Commission reduced compensation ten per cent, without finding, however, that the employer's rule had been approved. Whether this action by the Commission was proper is not presented, as the claimants did not appeal.
The cases cited by the defendant from other jurisdictions, where different conclusions were reached on similar facts, do not seem to be in accord with what we regard as the proper interpretation of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, and may not be held controlling here.
We are of opinion, and so hold, that the court below was in error in ruling that the claimants were not entitled to compensation on the facts found and conclusions reached by the Industrial...
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