Archie v. Home–towne Suites Llc

Decision Date08 November 2010
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:09CV506–WHA.
Citation749 F.Supp.2d 1308
PartiesLinda ARCHIE, Plaintiff,v.HOME–TOWNE SUITES, LLC, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jimmy Douglas Jacobs, Jimmy Jacobs, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.John James Coleman, III, Marcel Louis Debruge, Kathryn Morris Willis, Ronald D. Scott Williams, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 37), filed by the Defendant on September 15, 2010, a Motion to Strike (Doc. # 45), filed by the Defendant on October 13, 2010, and a Request for Oral Argument (Doc. # 46) filed by the Defendant on October 13, 2010.1

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case on May 29, 2009, bringing claims of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (ADEA); gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; and state law claims for fraudulent inducement and negligent training and supervision.2 The Plaintiff alleges, and the court finds, that it has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims, and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Upon consideration of the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, and for the reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the federal claims, and the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The summary judgment rule is to be applied in employment discrimination cases as in any other case. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1026 (11th Cir.2000) ( en banc ).

III. FACTS

The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, construed in a light most favorable to the non-movant:

The Plaintiff, Linda Archie (Archie), was a 49–year–old female at the time of the events in question. Archie had been employed as a manager of a Motel 6 in Jacksonville, Florida. She had been employed with Motel 6 for twelve years. Archie wanted to return to the east Alabama area where her family was located, and engaged in discussions with representatives of Home–Towne Suites, L.L.C. (Home–Towne) about an employment opportunity at a Columbus, Georgia property. Archie contends that Robert Rowan (“Rowan”), District Manager, promised her a General Manager position at the Home–Towne Columbus, Georgia motel, which was under construction.

Archie was interviewed by the manager of Home–Towne's Kingsland, Georgia motel. She was then interviewed by Rowan and visited the Columbus, Georgia site with him in person. During the on-site meeting in Columbus, Rowan told Archie that the Columbus property was the property he was interviewing her for, and asked Archie whether she planned to live in the on-site apartment, or commute. Archie had additional interviews by telephone.

Archie was hired by Home–Towne on June 25, 2007. Rowan called her to tell her that she had been hired. He did not say at that time that she would have the General Manager position at the Columbus location when it opened, but told her to report to the Auburn property to fill out her paperwork and that he wanted her to work with the General Manager there for a while. In July 2007, Rowan requested that Archie go to the Bowling Green, Kentucky motel property to address “clean and green” operations issues. Archie was offered an operations manager position at Bowling Green, but turned it down. Archie also worked at a Prattville, Alabama property.

During her employment with Home–Towne, Archie attended a training session in Lexington, Kentucky at which Mike Tetterton (“Tetterton”), the President and Chief Executive Officer of Home–Towne, was present.

In October 2007, Tetterton made the decision to hire Steve Bovaird, a man who at the time of his hire was 44 years old, to be the General Manager, and to hire a woman named Nilsa Perez to be Sales Manager, at the motel at the Columbus, Georgia location. Archie Dep. at page 203: 11–12.

Home–Towne states that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for selecting Bovaird instead of Archie because Bovaird had prior extended stay motel experience and sales experience and abilities, whereas Archie did not.

On October 22, 2007, Archie was assigned to the Columbus location to help prepare for the hotel's opening. On November 29, 2007, Tetterton informed Archie that her existing position was being eliminated, and that she could either be paid for 30 days while she found a new position, stay in the position performing “clean and green” functions with two weeks' notice before that position was eliminated, or take an available operations manager position in Dallas, Texas. Archie chose the first option and was paid by Home–Towne through December 2007.

IV. DISCUSSION

Archie brings federal age and gender discrimination claims, and a state law claim for fraudulent inducement. Before the court addresses the grounds raised by Home–Towne for summary judgment on the merits of Archie's claims, the court first turns to the Motion to Strike to determine what, if any, evidence submitted should be stricken, as requested by Home–Towne.

A. Motion to Strike

Home–Towne has objected to Archie's evidence on grounds that it is not relevant, the evidence is hearsay,3 the evidence does not satisfy the best evidence rule, and the evidence is conclusory.

As to relevance, Home–Towne objects that evidence of Archie's Motel 6 experience, designation as “General Manager” on a Home–Towne employment form, her argument that no one at Home–Towne inquired of her sales experience, her argument regarding hotel experience, and evidence of offered comparators' prior experience are all irrelevant. The court concludes that the evidence identified meets the standard of having “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Motion to Strike is due to be DENIED to the extent it is based on relevance grounds.

Home–Towne also objects to its EEOC position statement and Archie's statement of the three options she was given by Tetterton at the time of her termination, on the grounds that they violate the best evidence rule, because the best evidence of Tetterton's options is a statement by Tetterton, presented as Attachment 9 to Tetterton's Affidavit. Archie does not dispute that Tetterton's statement “speaks for itself,” see Doc. # 48 at p. 7, so the court will consider that document, rather than other evidence regarding its content, and the Motion to Strike is due to be DENIED as moot in that respect.

Many of Home–Towne's objections are to statements by Archie in brief which Home–Towne contends are not supported by record evidence or which are “conclusory.” The court will only rely on evidence cited, and the reasonable inferences which can be drawn in the nonmovant's favor from that evidence, so arguments which Home–Towne contends are not based on that evidence will not be considered, and the Motion to Strike is due to be DENIED to the extent that it is based on such grounds.

Home–Towne also objects to the authentication of documents which are from the personnel files of persons hired as General Managers by Home–Towne. Archie responds that the records were produced by Home–Towne in discovery, and are on Home–Towne forms. Home–Towne replies that Archie calls the documents' authenticity into question by providing only selected portions of the...

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