Architectural Decorating Co. v. Nicklason

• Decision Date: 08 December 1911
• Citation: 66 Wash. 198,119 P. 177
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: ARCHITECTURAL DECORATING CO. v. NICKLASON et al.

119 P. 177

66 Wash. 198

ARCHITECTURAL DECORATING CO. v. NICKLASON et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 8, 1911

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; W. W. Black Judge.

Action by the Architectural Decorating Company against Gustaf Nicklason and another. From a judgment denying relief plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Roberts, Battle, Hulbert & Tennant, and George R Biddle, for appellant.

F. E Anderson and E. J. Adams, for respondents.

MORRIS J.

Appeal from a decree denying appellant a foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. The case is before us upon a short record, containing only the findings of fact, conclusions of law, decree, and two exhibits. The court finds that the respondents are indebted to appellant in the sum of $646 for materials furnished and labor performed in the construction of the building; that it had filed its lien in due time, but was not entitled to a foreclosure for failure to comply with section 1133, Rem. & Bal. Code, providing that a materialman must send to the owner of any building to which materials are furnished for construction, alteration, or repair a duplicate statement of all materials so furnished to any person or contractor; otherwise the lien shall be unenforceable. The court finds no such duplicate statement was delivered to the owner, and for this reason holds the lien is not entitled to be foreclosed.

In our judgment the findings do not support the decree for two reasons:

(1) The appellant is not a materialman. It contracted with the agent of the owner to do the decorative plaster work, supplying both labor and material. It was furnishing labor to the same extent as any mechanic who worked on the building. The fact that it furnished its own material and put it in place does not make it a materialman. Its contract was direct with the owner through the owner's agent. The statute covers a situation where three persons are involved--the one who furnished material, the one to whom the material is furnished, and the owner of the building for which they are furnished. The owner has no contractual relation with the first person, and has no means of knowing what materials may be furnished to the second person upon the faith and credit of the building, except as he receives notice through his duplicate bills. Upon receipt of these the owner is in a position to protect himself against his contractor and the materialman by...