Ardon v. City of L. A.
| Decision Date | 17 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. S223876.,S223876. |
| Citation | 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 743,62 Cal.4th 1176,366 P.3d 996 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | Estuardo ARDON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant. |
Noreen S. Vincent and Beverly A. Cook, Assistant City Attorneys; Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono, Holly O. Whatley, Amy C. Sparrow and Tiana J. Murillo, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edward J. McIntyre and Leah S. Strickland, San Diego, for San Diego County Bar Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Christine Van Aken, Chief of Appellate Litigation, Paul Zarefsky and Warren Metlitzky, Deputy City Attorneys, for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Kira L. Klatchko ; Best Best & Krieger and Irene S. Zurko, Sacramento, for International Municipal Lawyers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, Francis M. Gregorek, Rachele R. Rickert, Marisa C. Livesay, San Diego; Chimicles & Tikellis, Timothy N. Mathews ; Cuneo Gilbert & Laduca, Sandra W. Cuneo ; Tostrud Law Group and Jon A. Tostrud, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In civil discovery proceedings during the course of litigation between plaintiff Estuardo Ardon and defendant City of Los Angeles (City), the trial court determined that certain documents City possessed were privileged under the attorney-client privilege or the privilege for attorney work product, and City withheld them from plaintiff. Years later, plaintiff filed a request under the California Public Records Act (Gov.Code § 6250 et seq. ; Public Records Act) seeking to obtain documents relating to the subject matter of the litigation.
In response, City's administrative office inadvertently provided plaintiff with some of the privileged documents. We granted review to decide whether the release of privileged documents under these circumstances waives the privilege, thus allowing plaintiff to retain and use the documents and to disseminate them to others. The question requires us to interpret Government Code section 6254.5 (section 6254.5 ), part of the Public Records Act, which generally provides that "disclosure" of a public record waives any privilege.
Interpreting section 6254.5 in light of the Public Records Act as a whole, we conclude that its waiver provision applies to an intentional, not an inadvertent, disclosure. A governmental entity's inadvertent release of privileged documents under the Public Records Act does not waive the privilege. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached a contrary conclusion.
This is the second time this case has come before this court. (See Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 283, 255 P.3d 958.) As we explained in our earlier opinion, plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against defendant City challenging the validity of a certain tax and seeking a refund of taxes already collected.
In March and September 2007, as part of the underlying litigation, plaintiff served City with two requests for production of documents relating to the tax in dispute. It also served a subpoena for production of business records on the League of California Cities, of which City is a member. City produced some of the requested documents but, in February 2008, it also provided plaintiff with "Defendant City of Los Angeles' Privilege Log" (privilege log), listing 27 documents it was withholding on the basis that they were privileged. In March 2008, the superior court granted motions to quash filed by City and the League of California Cities, finding certain documents to be privileged under either the attorney-client privilege or the privilege for attorney work product.
On January 14, 2013, Rachele R. Rickert, one of plaintiff's attorneys, acting pursuant to the Public Records Act, requested the "City Administrative Officer" to provide copies of documents relating to the tax at issue. On January 25, 2013, an assistant city administrative officer responded that "[w]e have approximately 53 documents that pertain to your request," which they would provide at a cost of $6.95. Plaintiff paid the fee, and the city administrative office provided the documents.
In April 2013, Attorney Rickert informed opposing counsel in this case by letter that, pursuant to the Public Records Act request, she had received two documents that appeared to match the description of two of the documents listed in the privilege log, specifically: (1) a memorandum dated June 1, 2006, from City's administrative officer to the city attorney (it appears plaintiff received an undated version of the document); and (2) a memorandum dated June 27, 2006, from the legal department of the League of California Cities. The letter also stated that Rickert had "obtained a copy of a document responsive to what appears to be documents 3 and 21 [as listed in the privilege log], and which discloses their contents." In fact, this third item appears related to a single document listed twice in the privilege log. Items 3 and 21 in the privilege log describe a letter "prepared by legal counsel" dated September 18, 2006, from David Michaelson, the chief assistant of the city attorney, to William Fujioka, city administrative officer. Attorney Rickert states that she did not receive the actual letter from Michaelson to Fujioka, but only a document that discloses its contents.
In a letter responding to Rickert's letter, City stated that the three documents she specified were privileged and had been produced inadvertently. It requested that Rickert return them and agree not to rely on them. Rickert refused to return the documents, contending that their production had waived any claim of privilege.
City then filed a motion in the superior court for an "order compelling the return of privileged material and to disqualify plaintiff's counsel of record." The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the production of the documents under the Public Records Act had waived any privilege. City appealed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1, subd. (a)(6) ; see Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213, 288 P.2d 267.) The Court of Appeal affirmed. It agreed with the trial court that the production of the documents waived any privilege. It held that "because the documents were disclosed to Ms. Rickert, City is precluded from denying disclosure to anyone who asks."
We granted City's petition for review.
After City filed its opening brief on the merits, plaintiff informed us, for the first time, that the underlying lawsuit was, and long had been, in the process of settlement. He moved to stay this appeal pending finalization of the settlement. We denied the motion. Settling the underlying lawsuit would not make this separate dispute moot. Plaintiff would still possess the privileged documents and could use them for any purpose. City would still be precluded from denying disclosure of them to anyone who asks. Moreover, the legal issue remains one of statewide importance. Accordingly, we will decide this dispute on the merits.
The exemptions are numerous and generally involve documents that for one reason or another should remain confidential. Relevant here is Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k), which exempts from disclosure "[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code related to privilege." City contends the documents at issue here come within either of two statutory privileges: (1) the attorney-client privilege (Evid.Code § 954 ) and (2) the attorney work product privilege (Code Civ. Proc. § 2018.030 ).
Plaintiff counters that City has waived the privileges by disclosing the documents in response to the Public Records Act request. He relies on section 6254.5, which provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law, whenever a state or local agency discloses a public record which is otherwise exempt from this chapter [the Public Records Act], to any member of the public, this disclosure shall constitute a waiver of the exemptions specified in Sections 6254, 6254.7, or other similar provisions of law." This section provides a number of exceptions to this waiver rule, none of which apply here and none of which refer to an inadvertent disclosure. Plaintiff argues that any disclosure, including an inadvertent one, waives the privilege. As we explain, we find the statutory language as a whole ambiguous in this regard, and we resolve the ambiguity by concluding that inadvertent disclosure does not waive the exemptions.
We construe statutory language in the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the statute's underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components. (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157,...
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...framework, seeking to discern the statute's underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components." (Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1176, 1183.) Keeping these statutory interpretation principles in mind, we turn to the parties' arguments. First's principal contention ......
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Ardon v. City of L. A.
...62 Cal.4th 1176366 P.3d 996199 Cal.Rptr.3d 743Estuardo ARDON, Plaintiff and Respondent,v.CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant.No. S223876.Supreme Court of CaliforniaMarch 17, 2016.199 Cal.Rptr.3d 744Noreen S. Vincent and Beverly A. Cook, Assistant City Attorneys; Colantuono, Highsmi......
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Table of Cases null
...v. Municipal Court, 113 Cal. App. 3d 523, 169 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1st Dist. 1980)—Ch. 4-C, §6.5.4(2)(a)[4] Ardon v. City of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 4th 1176, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 366 P.3d 996 (2016)—Ch. 4-C, §1.6.3(3) Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972)—Ch......