Ardrey v. City of Dallas
Decision Date | 22 April 1896 |
Citation | 35 S.W. 726 |
Parties | ARDREY et al. v. CITY OF DALLAS et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from district court, Dallas county; R. E. Burke, Judge.
Action in equity by A. C. Ardrey and others against the city of Dallas and another to enjoin the sale of property for nonpayment of a special tax. From the decree, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.
Leake, Henry & Reeves, for appellants. A. P. Wozencraft, for appellee.
This suit was brought by appellants, A. C. Ardrey and 34 others, against the city of Dallas and J. C. Bogel, its tax collector, to enjoin the sale of their property, fronting on Akard street, in said city, upon the ground that the ordinance of May 7th, hereinafter copied, levying a tax upon their property for local improvements, is void because of the failure of the city to comply with the provisions of its charter prescribing the manner in which such local improvements should be made, and the taxes therefor assessed, levied, and collected. A temporary writ of injunction was granted. The city interposed general and special exceptions, which being overruled, it answered by a general denial and special denials, and alleged that by reason of plaintiffs' petitioning the council to improve the street, promising in their petition to pay their pro rata part of the expense, the petition having been granted, and improvement made in accordance therewith, with their full knowledge, which enhanced the value of their property against which the tax is assessed,—they are estopped from objecting to the plans and specifications by which the improvements were made, or to any matter preliminary to letting the contract, or any irregularity occurring either prior to the letting of their contract, or subsequent thereto, and by admitting that the special tax was assessed according to the charter of 1889, and averred that, as the contract was outstanding, the tax, under the provisions of the amended charter, was properly assessed in accordance therewith. The city asked the court, should it find that any portion of the tax was not justly due, to determine what portion is justly due, and to enter an order granting the prayer in plaintiffs' petition only upon condition that they should, within a time to be fixed by the court, pay into court the sum so found due, and that if the court should hold that the tax should have been levied according to the terms and provisions of the old charter (1885), then that the court decree the plaintiffs to pay into court the amounts of money that would be due if levied according to the provisions of the old charter, and refuse to grant their prayer to perpetuate the injunction unless they should pay the money into court, or to the defendants, within a time to be fixed in the decree. Attached to the answer is a tabulated statement showing the amount of the tax that would be against the property of plaintiffs, respectively, if levied according to the provisions of the old charter. The cause was tried without a jury, and the court decreed that the injunction should be granted, provided the plaintiffs do equity, by paying to the city of Dallas the just and lawful amount of taxes assessed against their property for the improvement of Akard street, which "just and lawful amount" the court found, and entered in its decree the respective sums found against each party, opposite his name, stating that such sums would have been the amount of taxes assessed against the properties of said respective plaintiffs if the same had been levied and assessed according to the provisions of the city charter of the city of Dallas at the time of entering into the contract for the improvement of Akard street. It then decreed that if the respective plaintiffs should pay to the city of Dallas, or should pay into court for the benefit of said city, the respective sums, within 20 days from and after the rendition of judgment, the injunction theretofore granted should be perpetuated, but that if plaintiffs, or any of them, should refuse or fail to pay to the city of Dallas, or into court for its benefit, within 20 days, the sums in the judgment assessed against them, the injunction, as to such plaintiffs so failing or refusing to pay the amounts, should be dissolved. From this judgment the plaintiffs have appealed, and the following are the charter provisions, ordinances, and facts applicable to the case as it is presented to us:
Section 15 of the charter of the city of Dallas (1885) provides: etc. Section 175 of same charter: Section 176 of the same charter provides that Section 178 of same charter provides that "contracts for street improvements shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder, and of such contractor the city council shall require such bond as they may deem proper." The charter granted the city by the act of March 13, 1889, provides, by section 154, that ...
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