Arell v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 30 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-0553,2019-0553 |
| Parties | Richard D. ARELL, Jr. & a. v. Henry M. PALMER & a. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Concord (Karyn P. Forbes and Alexander W. Campbell on the brief, and Ms. Forbes orally), for the plaintiffs.
Cleveland, Waters and Bass, P.A., of Concord (Timothy E. Britain and Jeffrey C. Christensen on the brief, and Mr. Christensen orally), for the defendants.
The defendants, Henry M. Palmer and Janis A. Monty-Palmer, appeal an order of the Superior Court (Kissinger, J.) granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Richard D. Arell, Jr. and Natalie E. Allard-Arell. In their petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the Arells asserted that the Palmers’ temporary easement to use a well on the Arells’ property required the Palmers to develop their own water source. The trial court ordered the Palmers to investigate the cost and feasibility of developing a well on their own property, and, if possible and reasonable, to install a well within three years. Because the clear and unambiguous language of the Palmers’ deed does not support the trial court's decision, we reverse and remand.
The trial court found the following facts. In 2000, the Palmers purchased a parcel of land (Palmer property) located on Canterbury Road in Chichester. The Palmer property was previously owned by a trust, which also held title to a separate, undeveloped parcel of land located across the road. A well situated on the undeveloped parcel serviced the residence located on the Palmer property. The trust conveyed the Palmer property to the Palmers by deed, which included an easement granting them use of the well. The deed granted:
[A] temporary easement over a portion of said Tax Map 3, Lot 0119 owned by Grantor to access the existing well located on that lot for purposes of serving the existing single family residence located on the premises herein conveyed until such time as Grantees shall have another water source available. Grantees shall be responsible for all costs and liability associated with the maintenance, repair and operation of the well, water lines, pumps and similar matters related to Grantee's [sic] utilization of the well.
In 2002, the trust sold the undeveloped parcel to the Arells by deed subject to the Palmers’ easement. The Arells sued the Palmers in 2018, seeking, as relevant here, a declaration that the easement "requires [the Palmers] to use reasonable efforts to affirmatively establish a new water source," and an injunction requiring the Palmers to establish a new water source within one year. In response, the Palmers filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration affirming their right to use the well, as well as an injunction preventing the Arells from unreasonably interfering with the Palmers’ use of the well.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Arells argued that the word "temporary" required the easement to terminate, and because termination required the availability of another water source, the deed imposed an implied duty on the Palmers to develop another well. Alternatively, the Arells argued that the deed was at least ambiguous as to the duration of the easement because the possibility that the easement would last indefinitely conflicted with the meaning of the word "temporary." The Arells further asserted that, if the deed language was ambiguous, the rule of reason required the Palmers to identify and obtain another water source. Specifically, the Arells claimed that the easement unreasonably burdened the use and enjoyment of their property, citing the Palmers’ continued use of the well for seventeen years and the addition of a "Second Residence" on the Palmer property.
The Palmers countered that the clear and unambiguous language of the deed imposed no affirmative duty on them to terminate the easement. The Palmers also contended that the word "temporary" did not render the deed ambiguous because it was simply intended to qualify the phrase "until such time as [the Palmers] shall have another water source available." With respect to the rule of reason, the Palmers argued that the rule did not apply, and, even if it did, the Arells had not advanced any evidence that the easement unreasonably burdened the Arell property.
The trial court rejected the Palmers’ position and granted the Arells’ motion to the extent that it sought a ruling requiring the Palmers to take reasonable steps to create a well on their property. The trial court determined that the deed was ambiguous because both parties’ suggested interpretations could fit within the meaning of the word "temporary." The trial court then applied the rule of reason, concluding that "it is unreasonable to assume that ‘becomes available’ means the spontaneous appearance of a well or access to public water, which has not occurred in the past nineteen years and so seems unlikely to occur." The court therefore ordered the Palmers to build a well on their own property within three years. The court further stated that, if the Palmers determined that installing a new well was not possible or "far exceed[ed] the customary cost," they could seek further review by the court. This appeal followed.
In reviewing a trial court's rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party. Stowell v. Andrews, 171 N.H. 289, 293, 194 A.3d 953 (2018). If our review of the record discloses no genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Id.
On appeal, the Palmers argue that: (1) the deed language is unambiguous and imposes no duty on them to develop another water source; and (2) the rule of reason does not require them to develop another well.1 We conclude that the Palmers’ deed is unambiguous and imposes no duty on the Palmers to obtain another water source. We also conclude that the trial court improperly applied the rule of reason in ordering the Palmers to develop another well for their property.
The Palmers first argue that the language of the deed granting the easement is unambiguous. Resolving this argument requires that we interpret the meaning of the deed language. The interpretation of a deed is a question of law, which we review de novo. White v. Auger, 171 N.H. 660, 663, 201 A.3d 670 (2019). In interpreting a deed, we give it the meaning intended by the parties at the time they wrote it, taking into account the surrounding circumstances at that time. Id. If the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, we interpret the intended meaning from the deed itself, considering it as a whole, without resorting to extrinsic evidence. Id. at 663-64, 201 A.3d 670. If, on the other hand, the language of the deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance may be used to clarify its terms. Id. at 664, 201 A.3d 670.
The language of a contract, including a deed, is ambiguous if the parties to the contract could reasonably disagree as to the meaning of the language. See Birch Broad. v. Capitol Broad. Corp., 161 N.H. 192, 196, 13 A.3d 224 (2010) ; LeBaron v. Wight, 156 N.H. 583, 585-86, 938 A.2d 891 (2007). A deed may contain either a patent or a latent ambiguity. Ettinger v. Pomeroy Ltd. P'ship, 166 N.H. 447, 450, 97 A.3d 1133 (2014). A patent ambiguity exists "when the language in the deed does not provide sufficient information to adequately describe the conveyance without reference to extrinsic evidence." Id. A latent ambiguity exists when the language of the deed is clear, but "the conveyance described can be applied to two different subjects or is rendered unclear by reference to another document." Id.
The deed here grants the Palmers a "temporary easement" to access the well "until such time as [the Palmers] shall have another water source available." The conditional phrase "until such time as" signals the existence of a determinable easement. See Chapin and Wife v. School District, 35 N.H. 445, 450 (1857). A determinable easement is an easement that terminates automatically upon the occurrence of a stated event. See Black's Law Dictionary 644 (11th ed. 2019); see also North Hampton District v. Society, 97 N.H. 219, 220-21, 84 A.2d 833 (1951) (). If the stated event or condition does not occur, the easement could potentially exist forever. See Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 10:3, at 676 (2019) ().
We construe the language of the Palmers’ deed as unambiguously granting the Palmers a temporary easement to use the well until another water source becomes available. The word "temporary" is defined as "existing or continuing for a limited time." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2353 (unabridged ed. 2002). Similarly, a "temporary easement" is an easement of "limited duration." Black's Law Dictionary 646 (11th ed. 2019). Although the Palmers’ deed provides no certain date of termination, the determinable language "until such time as" clearly limits the duration of the easement. The Palmers acknowledge that, if they "decided to develop a new well," or if the town "installed municipal water supply in the area," the easement would terminate. Accordingly, because the deed does not grant a perpetual right to use the well, the Palmers’ easement is temporary. See Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal.App. 554, 229 P. 1002, 1005-06 (1924) (...
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