Ladue v. Pla-Fit Health, LLC

• Decision Date: 30 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2019-0354,2019-0354
• Parties: Theresa A. LADUE v. PLA-FIT HEALTH, LLC
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

173 N.H. 630

247 A.3d 367

Theresa A. LADUE

v.PLA-FIT HEALTH, LLC

No. 2019-0354

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: June 10, 2020

Opinion Issued: October 30, 2020

Follender Law Offices, P.L.L.C., of Nashua (Richard C. Follender on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.

Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C., of Manchester (Michael R. Mortimer and Michael G. Eaton on the brief, and Mr. Eaton orally), for the defendant.

Welts, White & Fontaine, P.C., of Nashua (Israel F. Piedra on the brief and orally), for New Hampshire Association for Justice, as amicus curiae.

BASSETT, J.

The plaintiff, Theresa A. Ladue, was injured in a fall at a gym in Nashua operated by the defendant, Pla-Fit Health, LLC (Planet Fitness). Ladue brought a negligence claim against Planet Fitness. Planet Fitness moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court (Temple, J.) granted the motion, finding that Ladue's claim was barred by a release of liability provision in her membership agreement. Ladue now appeals. We affirm.

The record supports the following facts. In April 2017, Ladue entered into a membership agreement with Planet Fitness. The agreement included a liability release, which stated, in part: "I understand and voluntarily accept full responsibility ... for the risk of injury or loss arising out of or related to my use ... of the facilities," and "I further agree that Planet Fitness ... will not be liable for any injury ... resulting from the negligent conduct or omission of Planet Fitness, PF Corporate, or anyone acting on their behalf, whether related to exercise or not." (Emphases added.)

In September 2017, Ladue went to a Planet Fitness gym in Nashua. After exercising on a treadmill, Ladue walked toward a trash bin to dispose of a towel that she had used to wipe down the equipment. Ladue tripped and fell on an "irregular and uneven walkway," and her right arm "struck an uncovered, unprotected bolt" extending from an interior chain link fence. Ladue suffered a gash on her right arm and a broken wrist.

In 2018, Ladue brought this action, alleging that Planet Fitness was negligent in maintaining its facility. Planet Fitness moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that Ladue's claim was barred by the liability release. The court found that the release did not violate public policy, and that the language of the release shielded Planet Fitness from liability for Ladue's injury. This appeal followed.

When reviewing a trial court's entry of summary judgment, "[w]e review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts in its summary judgment ruling." Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 151 N.H. 649, 652, 864 A.2d 368 (2005). "[W]e consider the affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Lacasse v. Spaulding Youth Ctr., 154 N.H. 246, 248, 910 A.2d 1262 (2006) (quotation omitted). "If our review of the evidence does not reveal a genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the trial court's decision." Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mutrie, 167 N.H. 108, 111, 105 A.3d 595 (2014) (quotation omitted).

"This court will not enforce an exculpatory contract that contravenes public policy." Wright v. Loon Mt. Recreation Corp., 140 N.H. 166, 169, 663 A.2d 1340 (1995). "Once an exculpatory agreement is found unobjectionable as a matter of public policy," Barnes v. N.H. Karting Assoc., 128 N.H. 102, 107, 509 A.2d 151 (1986), we will enforce the agreement if "the plaintiff understood the import of the agreement or a reasonable person in his position would have understood the import of the agreement." McGrath v. SNH Dev., 158 N.H. 540, 542, 969 A.2d 392 (2009) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff's claims must also have been "within the contemplation of the parties when they executed the contract." Id. (quotation omitted).

When a defendant asserts that a plaintiff's claim is barred by an exculpatory agreement, the defendant "must show that [the] exculpatory agreement does not contravene public policy; i.e., that no special relationship existed between the parties and that there was no other disparity in bargaining power." Id. at 543, 969 A.2d 392 (quotation omitted). "We have found an agreement to be against public policy if, among other things, it is injurious to the interests of the public, violates some public statute, or tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety." Id.

On appeal, Ladue raises two primary arguments. First, she argues that the trial court erred in enforcing the liability release because the release violates public policy. Second, she argues that even if the release does not violate public policy, it is unenforceable because a reasonable person would not understand it to shield Planet Fitness from liability for the injury that she suffered.

We first address Ladue's argument that the release violates public policy because a special relationship exists between her and Planet Fitness, such that the agreement is prohibited. Ladue asserts that, because any member of the public may join the gym, Planet Fitness is open to the public and, therefore, a special relationship exists between Planet Fitness and each of its members. Planet Fitness counters that, because the gym does not provide an essential service, and does not fall within any of the commonly-recognized classes of persons charged with special duties to their patrons, it does not have a special relationship with Ladue. We agree with Planet Fitness.

In New Hampshire, "a special relationship exists where the defendant is a common carrier, innkeeper or public utility, or is otherwise charged with a duty of public service." Id. at 544, 969 A.2d 392 (quotation and brackets omitted). A special relationship also exists if the defendant provides a service that is "of great importance to the public," or is "a matter of practical necessity." Barnes, 128 N.H. at 108, 509 A.2d 151 ; see also McGrath, 158 N.H. at 544, 969 A.2d 392. Additionally, a special relationship may exist when the plaintiff is both dependent on and legally compelled to use the defendant's services. See Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717, 662 A.2d 272 (1995) (ruling that a special relationship exists between schools and students because of the compulsory nature of school attendance, the reliance of parents and students on schools to provide a safe environment, and the critical importance of education to society).

Accordingly, whether such a special relationship exists turns largely on the importance and necessity of the services provided by the defendant, and not, as Ladue suggests, on whether a facility is open to the public. As we explained in McGrath, "the fact that [a recreational facility] is available for public use is not dispositive of a special relationship." McGrath, 158 N.H. at 544, 969 A.2d 392. In fact, we have held that, because a given recreational activity was not of great importance or necessity, no special relationship existed between a recreational facility and members of the public using the facility. See Barnes, 128 N.H. at 106, 108, 509 A.2d 151 (finding no special relationship between a go-kart racing facility that served "a segment of the public" and a racer who used the facility); McGrath, 158 N.H. at 544, 969 A.2d 392 (finding no special relationship between a ski facility that was open for public use and a snowboarder who used the facility).

Here, as in McGrath and Barnes, we cannot say that the recreational use of a private gym is of such great importance or necessity to the public that it creates a special relationship, such that the release is prohibited as against public policy. See McGrath, 158 N.H. at 544, 969 A.2d 392 ; Barnes, 128 N.H. at 106, 108, 509 A.2d 151. Exercising at a private gym is not a matter of practical necessity. See, e.g., Massengill v. S.M.A.R.T., 996 P.2d 1132, 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2000) (stating that services offered by personal training facility "did not affect the public interest nor could they be considered as necessary or essential"); Seigneur v. National Fitness, 132 Md.App. 271, 752 A.2d 631, 640 (2000) (stating that "[t]he services offered by a health club are not of great importance or of practical necessity to the public as a whole"); Shields v. Sta-Fit, Inc., 79 Wash.App. 584, 903 P.2d 525, 528 (1995) (stating that, although "[m]embership in a health club is certainly beneficial ... that is a far cry from declaring health clubs an indispensable necessity as a matter of public policy"). Nor is using a private gym compulsory. See Marquay, 139 N.H. at 717, 662 A.2d 272 ; Dupont v. Aavid Thermal Technologies, 147 N.H. 706, 710-11, 798 A.2d 587 (2002) (distinguishing Marquay, and finding no special relationship between employers and employees because employment is not compulsory, and employers, unlike schools, do not act as parental proxies). Therefore, because use of a private gym is neither a necessity nor a service of great importance to the public, and since it is undisputed that Planet Fitness is not "a common carrier, innkeeper or public utility, or ... otherwise charged with a duty of public service," McGrath, 158 N.H. at 544, 969 A.2d 392 (quotation omitted), we conclude that no special relationship exists between Ladue and Planet Fitness that would cause the liability release to be prohibited as against public policy.

Next, Ladue argues that the release violates public policy because it undermines public safety. This argument has two parts. First, Ladue asserts that, because she was not actually exercising at the time of her injury, her injury is not related to her use of the fitness center. She contends that she "was merely walking on the uneven floor when she fell," and that her injury could have occurred in any business setting. She then argues that, because her injury is not directly connected to her use of the fitness center, this case...