Arends v. De Bruyn, 42191.
| Decision Date | 16 January 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 42191.,42191. |
| Parties | ARENDS v. DE BRUYN. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Hancock County; M. F. Edwards, Judge.
Action at law to recover damages for personal injuries and damages to the plaintiff's automobile. There was a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Sullivan, McMahon & Linnan, of Algona, and Senneff, Bliss & Senneff, of Mason City, for appellant.
Breese & Cornwell, of Mason City, for appellee.
Kossuth county trunk road B in Kossuth county lies east and west. It intersects with county road N which lies north and south. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon on a clear day, a collision occurred between the Ford Tudor coach being operated by appellant and the automobile of Syrus DeBruyn, resulting in the death of DeBruyn and damages to the person and automobile of appellant for which recovery is sought. The evidence is without substantial dispute.
Appellant was proceeding eastward on county trunk road B and appellee's decedent was proceeding northward on an intersecting highway. The speed of appellant's car was from 35 to 37 miles per hour and the speed of the north-bound automobile was 74 miles per hour. The collision occurred about the center of the intersection east and west, possibly a short distance to the west. As he approached the intersection from the west, appellant removed his foot from the accelerator, looked to his right, but seeing no one approaching, proceeded into the intersection without materially reducing his speed. Appellant first entered the intersection. The north-bound car at this time was a few rods south of the intersection. Appellant's car was struck on the right side immediately in the rear of the front fender. The court directed a verdict upon the specific ground that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence.
The petition alleged that the east and west highway is a county trunk road and that the north and south highway, on which deceased was traveling, is a local county road. No testimony was introduced on this subject. Appellee in her answer said that she admits and alleges that on October 10, 1931, plaintiff was driving his Ford car eastward on Kossuth county trunk road B and that at the time Syrus DeBruyn was driving his automobile in a northerly direction on county road N. The secondary road system of each county embraces all public highways, except primary and state roads and highways, within cities and towns. Section 4644-c2, Code 1931. Section 4644-c4 further provides:
By the provisions of section 5079-d1, county trunk roads outside of cities and towns are designated as arterial highways. The classification of the respective highways is important because of the respective duties imposed by statute upon traffic at the intersection of highways outside of cities and towns.
It is provided by statute that: Section 5079-d2.
By section 5079-d3 it is provided:
“At the intersection of such local county roads with arterial highways the traffic of said side roads shall come to a stop upon entering said arterial highways or may proceed cautiously without coming to a stop as the county board of supervisors may determine.”
Section 5079-d4 requires that:
[1][2][3][4] As appears from a consideration of the foregoing statutes, if the intersection is of two arterial highways, the question as to who shall have the right of way is to be determined by the county board of supervisors of each county by the erection of signs. If, however, the intersection is of an arterial and local county road, the traffic upon the local county road shall come to a stop upon entering the arterial highway or may proceed cautiously without coming to a stop as the county board of supervisors may determine. The record in this case is silent as to what determination the board of supervisors has made and also as to whether signs were posted at or near the intersection in question, as required by the statute. Photographs introduced in evidence disclosed the presence of some kind of a sign but, because illegible, the court is unable to determine their precise nature.
As already indicated, the traffic on arterial highways has the right of way over the traffic on local county roads at intersections therewith. It is conceded in this case that, instead of stopping at the intersection, DeBruyn...
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