Argo Oil Corporation v. Lathrop, s. 9496-9497
Decision Date | 20 October 1955 |
Docket Number | Nos. 9496-9497,s. 9496-9497 |
Citation | 72 N.W.2d 431,76 S.D. 70 |
Parties | ARGO OIL CORPORATION, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, The State of South Dakota, Defendant and Appellant, v. Edwin A. LATHROP, also known as Edwin Aivin Lathrop, Floyd O. Gabriel, also known as F. O. Gabriel; Tressa B. Gabriel, also known as Tressa Bell Gabriel; J. L. O'Connell; Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., a corporation; Phillips Petroleum Company, a corporation; The Federal Land Bank of Omaha, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Eastman & Eastman, Rapid City for appellant Argo Oil Corp.
Ralph A. Dunham, Atty. Gen., Benj. D. Mintener, W. O. Knight, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant State of South Dakota.
T. E. Wirkus, Philip, for respondents, Floyd O. and Tressa B. Gabriel.
Whiting, Wilson & Lynn, Rapid City, for respondents, J. L. O'Connell, Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., and Phillips Petroleum Co.
Otto A. Gruhn, Omaha, for respondent Federal Land Bank of Omaha.
This is an action brought by Argo Oil Corporation, plaintiff and appellant, to determine the ownership of the mineral rights in property situated in Pennington County. The State of South Dakota, defendant, answered claiming to be the owner of all the oil, gas and mineral rights in the land subject only to the rights of the plaintiff under a mineral lease executed by the Rural Credit Board, a department of the state government, to R. E. Driscoll, Jr., trustee, dated April 25, 1950. This lease was assigned to plaintiff on May 1, 1952.
It is the contention of the plaintiff and the State that the State acquired the land by deed from E. T. McDonald, the owner, in August 1935; that the mineral rights in the land were thereafter reserved to the State, as such owner, by Ch. 308, S.L.1919; that the reconveyance of the land by the State to McDonald in November 1935 was subject to such reservation whether incorporated in the deed or not. It is the contention of the defendants, other than the State, that the conveyance by the State to McDonald conveyed all the mineral rights in the land to the grantee, and that those rights were conveyed by McDonald to them. The circuit court decided that the Argo Oil Corporation, plaintiff, and the State of South Dakota, defendant, have no right, title or interest in the property involved in this action, and quieted the title as against them. The Argo Oil Corporation and the State of South Dakota appealed.
The first issue involved in this appeal is whether or not the reservation of oil, gas and mineral rights contained in Ch. 308, S.L.1919 is applicable to the land acquired by the State through the Rural Credit System.
Ch. 308, S.L.1919, SDC 55.0203, provides:
The generally accepted rule of statutory construction is that the court shall, by all aids available, ascertain and give effect to the intention or purpose of the Legislature as expressed in the Statute. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 321. The intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained by the court primarily from the language used in the statute, with the aid of the canons of construction. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 322; Boehrs v. Dewey County, 74 S.D. 75, 48 N.W.2d 831; Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458, 285 N.W. 443.
Respondents reason that because the substantial holdings of 'common school, public buildings and endowment lands' of the State are specifically enumerated in the statute, it must be construed as excluding the Rural Credit lands which are not expressly mentioned. They rely upon the maxim 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius'.
The general rule that the express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another . 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 333 b; Rehurek v. Rapid City, 65 S.D. 542, 275 N.W. 859.
In the case of Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 S.Ct. 480, 484, 72 L.Ed. 845, 851, the opinion by Justice Sutherland states:
Here the statute contains a general restraint upon the power of the executive branch of the government to alienate the mineral rights in any real property belonging to the State. Standing alone, this general provision of the statute reserves to the State the mineral rights in all land belonging to it at the time of the enactment, or thereafter acquired. The addition of the phrase 'including all common school, public buildings and endowment lands' was not intended as a limitation on the scope of the reservation. As...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Estate of Howe
...the legislature intended to say surviving children, it could easily have done so. See SDCL 21-5-5; see also Argo Oil Corp. v. Lathrop, 76 S.D. 70, 74, 72 N.W.2d 431, 434 (1955) (stating that "[t]he intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained primarily from the language used in the sta......
-
Robinson, Application of
... ... Argo Oil Corp. v. Lathrop, 76 S.D. 70, 72 N.W.2d 431; 76 S.D. 555, 82 N.W.2d ... ...
-
Request for Opinion of Supreme Court Relative to Constitutionality of SDCL 21-32-17, In re
...Co. v. Mydland, 85 S.D. 172, 179 N.W.2d 3 (1970). This intent is best ascertained from the statutory language, Argo Oil Corp. v. Lathrop, 76 S.D. 70, 72 N.W.2d 431 (1955), where words used are to be understood in their ordinary sense. SDCL 2-14-1. Under SDCL 21-32-16 the legislature waived ......
-
Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. S.D. Dept. of Rev. & Reg.
...to the meaning of a statute; and it does not constitute a formula for construction to be arbitrarily applied.' Argo Oil Corp. v. Lathrop, 76 S.D. 70, 74, 72 N.W.2d 431, 434 (1955) (quoting 82 CJS, Statutes, § 333 b; Rehurek v. Rapid City, 65 S.D. 542, 275 N.W. 859 [¶ 15.] SDCL 10-59-1 autho......